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ABSTRACT
For an understanding of security relationships between superpowers
and Third World states in world politics, it traces the main theories and
looks at the characteristics of US security policy and the institutions that
are significant in formulating the policy.
Subsequently the case study examines the influence of a particular
sort of international relationship known as cliency on the domestic politics
of the client state. The features of this relationship are flows of military
and economic aid, security agreements, and overt or covert interventions
by the patron on behalf of the client government. For the national
security, the superpower supports the client government vis-à-vis
domestic political groups, thus contributing to authoritarianism and
reducing the prospects for democracy in the client state. This also causes
the state to become more domestically autonomous in the sense that it can
more easily resist political pressures from domestic societal groups.
The US-Iran security relationship of cliency can be dated from
August 1953, when the Iranian Prime Minister was overthrown in a CIA-
supported coup. US performed a significant role in this coup, and in the
subsequent consolidation of power by the shah. Following the coup,
military and economic aid was given to Iran under the relationship. US
also provided extensive training for Iran's armed forces and the SAVAK.
US military and economic aid was instrumental in helping the shah
consolidate his dictatorship. The US-Iran relationship had profound
influence on Iran's domestic politics. The long-term implications of this
policy for Iranian politics and for US interests are discussed in the
conclusion of this study.
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INTRODUCTION
With the end of the Cold War era, one of the most important intellectual lessons
of the collapse of US influence in Iran is the need for deeper understanding of security
relationships between Great Powers and Third World states in world politics. The
major idea of this study was initially conceived during the Iranian revolution which
gave a big impact to the researcher, who was then a young Army field grade officer in
the Republic of Korea involved with the US-Korean military strategic mission. Due to
the US president Carter's Human Rights policy, the two US client authoritarian regimes
in Third World - Iran and South Korea, faced violent resistance from domestic
opposition groups. Consequently, in 1979, the shah of Pahlavi was expelled from Iran
by revolutionary groups and president Park who had ruled the country since he took
power in the coup of May 1961, was assassinated by his one of close cabinet member,
the director of KCIA (Korean Central Intelligence Agency). Despite the two dictators'
long terms in power and also their dedication to programmes of economic development,
they were not able to legitimise their rule. However, after 1979 US influence in Iran
collapsed, but in Korea, her influence was maintained in close security relations. The
desire to examining the differences in US security policy toward Iran and Korea
compelled researcher to initiate this study on US-Iran security relations.
This introductory chapter will discuss the purpose of the research, the concept
of National Security, an overview of US global strategic concepts during Cold War era,
and the importance, and major questions of this study and structure of the research.
The objective of this study is to examine the great powers and Third World
states' security relationship during the Cold War era through the case study of US-Iran
relations. However, this study concentrates mainly on great power's policy making
procedures and its characteristics as the thesis title indicates. The study focuses on the
following four areas. First the chief aim is examining how US security policy
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established the international cliency relationship with the strategically important Third
World states for National Security interest. Secondly, tracing the characteristics of the
philosophy of US policy making. Analysing and studying of the American heritage in
foreign relations is vital to understanding the strengths and weakness of US foreign and
security policy. Thirdly, studying the institutions that are significant in formulating US
security policy towards Third World countries. Finally, examining how the client
state's domestic politics, including conflicts between the shah dictatorship and the
opposition group, was affected by US security policy. Through examining these four
aims, this study fundamentally attempts to provide an appraisal of the US security
policy toward a Third World state. This study also provides some recommendations for
alternative strategic concepts which may applicable to US policy makers to achieve the
National Security interests.
The primary concern of a state, whether it is either a great power state or a small
power state is, and will be, how it can guarantee its own security. The term "national
security" has been coined and widely used as a rhetorical phrase for politicians and a
conceptual term for security analysts and social scientists in describing policy objective.
Traditionally, national security has been defined in terms of a nation's ability to protect
its own entity and values against external threats.' The term was also defiRed in a
collective sense encompassing both security and foreign relations of a nation, that is,
the condition provided by a militarily advantageous position of a nation over another, or
politically favourable position of one nation over another, or both.' In this context, the
definition of the term national security has been meaningful when it deals with the
ability of a nation, whether to protect itself or to foster a favourable condition for itself,
in the light of the relations of the nation with other nations.
The capabilities that together serve as the foundation for a nation's security are
always relative to the capabilities of other nations. Thus an understanding of the
elements of national security should begin with an examination of the international
context within which national security must be shaped. This setting determines the
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security problems and prospects that face any nation and also limits the choices
available. A small self-sufficient island-state faces problems different from those of a
landlocked, underdeveloped but resource-rich state bordered by both strong enemies
and friends. The internal structure of a state must also be considered because, for some
countries, principal threats may be almost totally internal as different ethnic, cultural,
religious, or political groups fight for control of that government.
Before focusing on the specific aspects of the US security policy towards Iran, it
is essential to gain an overview of US global strategic concepts and domestic affairs.
Until President Woodrow Wilson involved the United States in "world" (European)
affairs as a war partner, "isolationism" (non-involvement in European affairs) had
prevailed. From World War I, the government began to change policy as the United
States became a global power. Before then, the majority of the US public generally had
accepted wars as just or, at least, as cruelly necessary. But after World War I, in which
125,000 US troops died for what seemed a remote cause, there was a reaction. The US
population suspected that it had not been told the real reasons for US entry into World
War I, and through Congress, public opinion forced the state to pull back and confine
its intervention to Latin America and Asia.3
After the United States emerged from World War II as the strongest dbonomic
and military power in the world, key government and industrial leaders saw the
opportunity for a world empire. Urged on by the business elite, which sought to
maintain and expand its advantaged status, US leaders constructed, from the
expansionist past and the World War II organisation, a national security state to deal
with global affairs. The concept of national security, which was never defined clearly
or explained, became the overriding concern of the state, at the expense of other long-
held traditions and practices. The concept also became dominant in domestic affairs; it
governed political debate and rationalised restrictions on the individual's constitutional
freedoms. The National Security Act of 1947 (which was secret at the time) and
subsequent amendments and decrees placed the governance of critical foreign security
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policies in the hands of new institutions: a national security apparatus run by national
security managers. As a political term, "the national security" has been used so
broadly, that the implications of the undefined notion means the president simply
announces that a crisis exists and US national security requires him to commit armed
forces to, for example, Iran, Greece, or Korea. The president did not explain "why"
because clear explanations might violate another national security requirement:
secrecy.'
Melvyn Leffler suggests that the US-Iranian relationship and US-Middle
Eastern oil policy fit into a global conception of national security which defence
planners adopted in the Cold War era. Several of the factors he analyses influenced the
State Department's decision to support an Iranian alliance. Technological advances
associated with the war - especially long-range bombers and the atom bomb -
necessitated a strategy of "defence in depth". To guarantee its security, the United
States would have to maintain a string of overseas bases as well as military air transit
and landing rights. Budgetary and political constraints would at times force planners
"to rely on private airlines, which had to be persuaded to locate their operations
designated essential to military air transit rights". Iran's location along air and land
routes to Asia and the Soviet Union led the State Department to define these air routes
as one important aspect of US-Iran relations.'
More importantly, by the end of World War 11, US strategic planners had
become convinced that the United States could not allow any potential enemy to control
the Eurasian land mass. Huge reserves of natural resources, industry, and manpower
were at stake. Middle Eastern oil was the one resource available to the Soviet Union
and greatly extended the Russians "defence in depth". Soviet Union bases in Europe
and the Middle East could undermine the effectiveness of US strategic air power upon
which planners had increasingly come to rely. The domino theory adopted during the
1945-46 crisis designated Iran as the first line of defence. The fall of Iran might lead to
the loss of the entire Asian subcontinent, which was one reason the State Department
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insisted on maintaining US military and police advisers in Iran after the war had ended.'
Leffler, also, argues that the American assessment of Soviet intentions underwent a
transformation from the fall of 1945 to the spring of 1946. As the war ended,
diplomatic and military planners were willing to concede that the Soviet Union had
some legitimate security concerns and that negotiations might still achieve some useful
accommodations. But events in Eastern Europe, the eastern Mediterranean, Asia, and
Iran led to a reformation of American assumptions about Soviet intentions. Soviet
behaviour no longer seemed to be based on rational security considerations. American
policymakers came to believe that Stalin had set out to control the Eurasian land mass,
to destroy capitalism, and to extend Soviet-directed communism throughout the world.'
George Kennan's "Long Telegram" established the conceptual framework in
which American leaders came to understand Soviet policy. What was most striking
about Kennan's analysis was his assumption that paranoia or irrational fear underlay
Soviet expansion. The United States could not reach useful accommodations with such
a foe in an ordinary manner. Only through military strength, constant vigilance, and
support from its allies - through a policy of containment - could the United States
frustrate Soviet ambitions. Kennan's analysis, undertaken as the World War II alliance
deteriorated, confirmed the widely held assumption that the Soviet Union had, as its
ultimate aim "Russian domination of a communist world". That belief became
embedded in national security thinking. By 1948 NSC-7 stated what had became an
American cold war gospel: "The ultimate objective of Soviet-directed world
communism is the domination of the world"!
The containment of Soviet power which originated as a result of the Iran-
Azerbaijan crisis during 1945 to 1946 and was formulated by the Truman
administration, became the centrepiece of post-war US foreign and security policy. A
broad consensus emerged and underlay American policy until Vietnam: the central
conflict in the world was the one between the Soviet-led Communist world (which after
1950 was seen as including Communist China) and the American-led "free world"; any
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Communist gain of influence was a loss of influence for America and its allies and
friends; it was the task of the West, in general, to oppose such expansion, and in
particular that of the United States. When the cold war was replaced by détente, the
policy changed from one of containment to an era of strategic parity, with on one side
the Sino-Soviet schism and, above all, on the other a period of pseudo-isolationism in
the United States.
Until the early 1970s, the United States experienced a world pre-eminence that
only a few nations throughout history have enjoyed. During these years America
reigned as the world's foremost military and economic power. The US forged a
network of alliances that committed her to come to the defence of over fifty Third
World states if they were subject to attack. When she chose to intervene somewhere
with military force, she did so at will. For over twenty-five years, she maintained a
military force of over a half-million men stationed overseas. Through her nuclear
might she faced down her foremost adversary in their singular test of wills over Cuba in
1962. Through the sheer size and dynamism of her economy, she generated an
economic presence throughout the world that left few areas untouched. She was and
still remains the world's biggest single national market for the sale of manufactured
goods and raw materials. Her multinational corporations dominated the economies of
some nations and significantly affect those of many others. For hundreds of millions of
non-Americans, the American standard of living was the yardstick by which to measure
progress. With the exemption of the Vietnam War, America's foreign policy for over
thirty years, as measured by the objectives she set for herself, was mostly a string of
success, not a series of failures, 'The Age of Pax Americana, was brief but brilliant.
By the early 1970s, the US had passed the zenith of her power. It was not that
she was becoming weaker absolutely, but rather that others were becoming stronger in
relation to her and were thereby narrowing the gap between their power and hers. By
1972 the Soviet Union had effectively closed the gap between her strategic nuclear
forces and those of the United States. In signing the Strategic Arms Limitation Accords
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of 1972, America publicly accepted this fact and gave to the Russians something that
had become central to their foreign policy objectives - official recognition by America
of their coequality in nuclear armaments. Although not yet possessing conventional
forces as transportable and flexible as those of the United States, the Soviet Union was
rapidly developing the sea and air transport capabilities that would enable her to act, not
merely as a regional, but also as a global power.
While the SALT Accord of 1972 officially marked the end of America's nuclear
pre-eminence, the devaluation of the dollar in 1971 symbolically marked the passing of
America's overarching economic dominance. No longer the fixed bedrock of
international economic dealings, the dollar became subject to the same type of pressures
that had caused other currencies before it to be devalued. Underlying the dollars
devaluation was a host of structural changes in the non-communist international
economy, but prime among them was the revived prosperity of Western Europe and
Japan, her two erstwhile dependants, which experienced extremely rapid growth
throughout the 1960s. Reflective of America's recognition of this fact was the dual
nature of the 1974 Trade Reform Act: it provided both for the lowering or virtual
elimination of tariff and quota barriers and their reimposition should foreign
competition prove too severe for American industry.
If the United States had passed the zenith of her power by the early 1970s, she
nevertheless remained quite powerful. Among the four power centres of the world, the
United States still retained the pre-eminent position. The Soviet Union could not match
America's economic strength; Western Europe could not match her military strength;
Japan could match neither. But because the gap between her power and that of the
other three was narrowing, America could no longer command the same degree of
obedience from her allies nor the same degree of restraint from her prime adversary that
she once could. While still pre-eminent, the United States could no longer convert that
pre-eminence into the virtual dominance she once held.
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Before entering the main chapters of the thesis, it will be helpful to discuss the
fact that although in most respects Iran qualifies as a Third World state, there are
differences that distinguish it from most others. First, Iran is the neighbour of a Great
Power, sharing about 1,200 miles of boundaries with the former Soviet Union. The fact
that so much of the East-West global and regional competition for power and influence
has centred on the Middle East and South-western Asia after World War II partly
distinguishes Iran, which straddles both regions, from most other Third World states.
Second, unlike most Third World states, Iran is an oil-rich state, and it is also the only
such state that physically dominates the world's most vital oil chokepoint. The Strait of
Hormuz through which over 55 percent of the world oil trade flows. Third, unlike most
Third World states, Iran is not a former colony of Western imperial powers, although its
independence was nominal during most of the nineteenth century and part of the
twentieth. The list of differences between Iran and most other Third World states can
be extended. Nevertheless, there are many similarities that justify a number of
theoretical propositions based on the Iranian experience that may be relevant to the
study of influence relationships between the United States and other Third World states.
While there was a reluctant willingness by the Carter Administration and by
many Americans to accept some US complicity in building up the shah, there was
neither a precedent in the dominant American political consciousness nor a theoretical
framework for understanding how a cliency relationship such as the one maintained
with Iran could affect the domestic politics. Vietnam was not a useful guide. To focus
on the consequences of US involvement in Vietnam for that country's domestic politics
seemed to miss the most important points. In any case, the Vietnam experience was
regarded by most Americans as a nightmarish aberration. Nor did US policy on Latin
America, the region of the third world in which the United States has traditionally been
most deeply involved, seem to offer many insights. Although the US impact on Latin
American politics has been blatant, it has been of a very different form. US interests in
Latin America have been primarily commercial rather than strategic. US economic
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penetration of Latin America, studied so insightfully in the dependency literature, has
been of greater consequence than state-to-state security relations.
Despite the absence of literature on this subject, the phenomenon seemed worth
studying. Iranians had suffered for twenty-five years under a dictatorship supported by
the United States. This was one of reasons which caused the revolution and a more
autonomous position in the global system. US national security interests in the Persian
Gulf and throughout the world had been seriously damaged. The situation in Iran
examined by this study may also provide useful insights for other US allies of Third
World states. Also the importance of the case study of Iran as US client state is
considered as follows. First, Iran was the original place for Cold War and the
implementation US containment policy after World War II. Second, Iran is a prime
target of Soviet aggression during the Cold War era. Third, as the linchpin of US
defence arrangements in the Middle East. And finally, as a vital source of petroleum
and markets for American exports including arms.
Six major questions have influenced this study. First, what historical precedents
and philosophical roots have affected current US security and foreign policymaking?
Second, what is the nature of constitutional and institutional structures which are the
action channels and set the rule parameters within which security policy is formally
made? Third, did the US security policy actually promote dictatorship in Iran during
the period of the shah's reign? If so, how? Fourth, what were the US security and
foreign policy goals that led to such an outcome? Fifth, how has the US association
with the shah regime, as a cliency security relationship, affected the Iranian domestic
politics? Sixth, assuming that these goals were considered vital to US national security,
could alternatives to the policies have been followed which would have safeguarded US
interests without producing such disastrous consequences for Iran?
This study is divided into two parts with eight chapters in addition to this
introduction and conclusion. Part one is the theoretical frameworks with four chapters.
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The main theories developed in chapters one and two guide the subsequent case study
analysis in the second part. Chapter one discusses the main theories of international
relationship including an analysis of great power-small power and definitions of patron
and client state. Chapter two provides the concepts of the client state including the
relations between the state and society. Chapter three is concerned with answering the
first of the six questions. Chapter four examines the institutions that are significant in
formulating US security policy: the Presidency, the National Security and Foreign
Affairs agencies, the Congress, and Public Opinion and the Media in order to answer
the second question. Even though this chapter is not directly relevant to the US-Iran
case study of part two, it is still regarded as a significant portion of this study. The US
formal institutions which depend upon a constitution, legal customs, and administrative
precedent, establishes a framework which directly affects the more abstract and
informal aspects of philosophical thought, personal style, role perception, force of
circumstance, interpersonal relations, inter-institutional conflicts and even crisis
decision making. The formal institution of US foreign policymalcing by the
prerequisites of democratic control are clearly present in every aspect - legally,
philosophically, and politically. Part two is the case study of the US and Iran
relationship. This case study covers the period from the 1940s to the 1970s butpainly
focuses on the time of Coup of August 1953, and its aftermath on US - Iran relations. It
is divided into four chronologically defined chapters. Most of this case study efforts are
concerned with answering the third of the questions. Chapter five examine Iran's
domestic politics and great power influence in World War II and the early Post War
period. Chapter six discusses the Oil and US interest in Iran. Chapter seven and eight
examine US policy in Iran in the 1950s and 1960s and its domestic political
consequences. Chapter seven discusses the Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis and the Coup of
August 1953. Chapter eight as the final chapter, discusses the consolidation of a client
state. This chapter focuses especially on the importance of the US-Iran security is
relationship relative to the other structural factors that affected Iranian politics, and is
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the answer of the fifth question. The fourth major question pursued by this study is
dealt with in general terms in chapter one and more specifically in the context of Iran in
parts of chapters six to eight. The sixth question is considered in the conclusion of this
study with providing some applicable recommendations for alternative US security
policies.
,r.
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PART ONE - THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS
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CHAPTER I
MAIN THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND US
SECURITY POLICY
This chapter, will attempt to lay out the relevant main theories of international
relationships which will guide this study in order to understand US security policy
toward Iran as a Third World country. It begins by analysing central concepts of the
great power-small power relationship. Their implications for the client's domestic
politics are discussed in chapter 5 as part of the case study. Consequently this chapter
shall discuss the definitions of cliency. 1 The motives which bring the patron and client
together and the goods and services which transpire under a cliency relationship are
then discussed. Next, the concept of cliency is further illustrated by contrasting it with
several related concepts. This chapter concludes with a brief descriptive overview of
US cliency relationships in the post-War era.
1.1. Analysis Of Great Power-Small Power Relations
1.1.1. Concepts of Security Relations
The problem of security is the principal concern of this study. Security is the
central goal of all nation-states, whether pursued unilaterally or within an alliance
framework. Every nation-state employs all means at its disposal for its own security.
National security is defined as the ability of a nation to protect its internal values
from internal and external threat. 2 The security of the nation involves not only its
foreign relations and its military posture but also the state of its economy. 3 Thus,
national security policy is defined as the military, diplomatic, and economic measures
taken by a government to provide for national protection. In this sense, national
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security policy can be viewed as the most significant national policy.4
It is only very recently that social scientists have begun to examine the nature of
national security as an analytic concept. There are several advantages of national
security as an organising concept over foreign policy:
(1) It focuses on common elements and uniformity in the external policies of all
national actors.
(2) It provides a convenient frame of reference which opens up possibilities of
comparison between superficially disparate matters and which can help organise
the welter of comparative data produced by the historical foreign policy approach.
(3) It also adds a dimension to the concern of traditional foreign policy with conflict
situations.
(4) It makes room, conceptually, for the consideration of common international
interests, which could result in a simultaneous increase of security for all the
international system and thus becomes a legitimate goal of national security
policy.
(5) It focuses on the underlying unity of internal and external activities of states by
explicitly recognising that external behaviour is an integral part of the total
behaviour pattern of the national system. It therefore avoids the misleading
dichotomy between domestic and foreign policy, and joins the two by envisaging
both as designed to protect the same set of values and, ultimately, to maintain the
national and even the international system.5
Thus, as an organising concept, national security is different from the
conventional meaning of national interest and power. Traditionally, most foreign
policy studies rested heavily on the concept of national interest based on the "power"
explanations of "political realism." According to Hans J. Morgenthau, international
politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Therefore, he defines national interest
in terms of power,6
 and argues that the "objective of a foreign policy must be defined in
terms of the national interest."7
 However, while it is true that every nation seeks power
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to attain its policy objectives, relationships, processes, and quantities of power, he
concludes that "this formulation of power concept will not be useful for all aspects of
the study of international relations." 8 Thus, the power proposition of the national
interest may not explain the behaviour of a nation.
Unlike the concept of power, national security is an instrumental goal whose
satisfaction does not necessarily deny similar satisfaction to other states. Today, in the
nuclear age, the primary goal of security is that one state's survival depends upon the
survival of other friendly states. In this sense, the study of national security is an
important contribution to peace strategy and peace research.9
The categorisation of classification of states according to size has long been a
part of international politics, but the focus of academic literature has generally been
upon the role of great powers in international politics. However, a tremendous increase
in newly independent small states in the last five decades has stimulated growth in the
number of scholarly works on the phenomenon of small states.10
It is generally agreed that based on the scope of foreign policy interest, small
powers have limited interests in international politics. Their politics, consequently, are
designed for the achievement of limited objectives of the security of their own territory.
Big powers' interests are not limited to their own territory and particular regions, and
are concerned with the problems of the world at large.
There are some difficulties in a clear-cut definition and classification of a
nation-state as the "small power" or the "great power", because the "small" and "great"
are relative concepts," subject to great differences in interpretation.12
Maurice A. East categorised the small powers based on one or more of the
following conditions: (1) small land area, (2) small total population, (3) small total
GNP (or other measures of total productive capability), and (4) a low level of military
capabilities."
However, the definition of the small power based on capabilities of nation-
states in terms of tangible components is not accurate without considering intangible
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elements. Robert Rothstein rejected a definition of small power based on purely an
"objective or tangible criteria" and developed a definition with a psychological as well
as a material dimension:
"A small power is a state which recognises that it cannot obtain
security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must
rely fundamentally on the aid of other state, institutions, processes,
or developments to do so; the small power 's belief in its inability
to rely on its own means must also be recognised by the other
states involved in international politics."14
He points to three unique aspects of the small power's situation: (1) outside
help is required, (2) the state has a narrow margin of safety, with little time for
correcting mistakes, and (3) the state's leaders see its weakness as essentially
unalterable. He is concerned only with a limited category of small powers, those that
"feel they are potentially or actually threatened by the policies of the great powers",15
i.e., those states which are within an area of big power confrontation "or which fear that
confrontation will affect their interest significantly." 16 Thus, Rothstein focuses on a
particular category of small power and its security dilemma. Rothstein argyes that
"neutrality or nonalignment is a dangerous security policy for small powers which are
exposed to a great power threat." 17 However, he concludes that:
"Small power ought to prefer mixed, multilateral alliances. They
provide the most benefits in terms of security and political
influence. If unavailable, they probably should choose a small
power alliance in preference to an unequal, bilateral alliance,
particularly if the small power s do not fear an immediate threat to
their security, and if their goals in allying are primarily political.
An alliance with a single great power ought to be chosen only if
the other alternatives are proscribed, and if the small power s fear
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an imminent attack - and even then only in hopes of improving
their deferent stance."I8
Rothstein's dim view of alliance with a single great power applies not only to
bilateral ties but also to alliances between several small powers and one great power.
An alliance with several great powers is desirable but very difficult to achieve
practically. Thus, the freedom of choice of a small power may be restricted.
For the definition, alliance is also an elusive term, permitting widely divergent
definitions by scholars. 19 It is variously considered as "techniques of statecraft,
international organisations one or more of regulating mechanism in the balance of
power."2° Robert E. Osgood define it as :
"A formal agreement that pledges states to co-operate in using
their military resources against a specific state or states and usually
obligates one or more of the signatories to use force, or to consider
the (unilaterally or in consultation with allies) the use of force, in
specified circumstances."21
In this sense, an alliance is considered as an instrument of nationaLsecurity
highly dependent upon military capability and policy. This is the case because the
primary purpose of alliance formation is to deter external threat, rather than national
strength or weakness, and for national security rather than out of a sense of
community.22
There are four general functions of alliances: (1) aggregation of power; (2)
interallied control or restraint of allies, (3) promotion of international order; and (4)
international security. 23 As a vehicle for the aggregation of power, an alliance serves to
maximise military capabilities so as to offset the fear of insecurity. Interallied control is
the most prominent function of alliances, and is used to maximise surveillance over an
otherwise undependantable power. Since alliance partners share common orientations,
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it is their mutual interest to restrain any member from pursuing extremist policies.
Generally, four methods of control of alliance partners are used: (1) staying great
power's troops on the territory of small powers; (2) foreign aid; (3) military
intervention; and (4) designating political leaders of the small partner or working
closely with internal opposition groups. International order or even international
government is the broadest and the least attainable function of an alliance.
The last function, internal security, is especially important for a small power .
Sometimes, alliances may be intended to enhance the security or stability of an ally's
government or regime by legitimising material assistance or military intervention
against internal opposition.24
Most treaties of alliance contain a fundamental commitment of response in the
event of military contingency; such contingencies have been identified either as
"aggression" or "armed attack." The commitment is well defined in the National
Commitment Resolution adopted by the US Senate in the 91st Congress:
"Whereas accurate definition of the term "national commitment"
in recent years has become obscured: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, that (1) a national commitment of the Armed Forces of
this resolution means the use of the Armed Forces of the United
States on foreign territory, or a promise to assist a foreign country,
government, or people by the use of the Armed Forces or financial
resources of the Untied States, either immediately or upon the ,-,
happening of certain events, and (2) it is the sense of the Senate
that a national commitment by the United States results only from
affirmative action taken by the executive and legislative branches
of the United States Government by means of a treaty, statute, or
concurrent resolution of both Houses of Congress specifically
providing for such commitment."25
Significantly, commitment is implemented through the two principal methods of
military force and financial resources. For the purpose of US security policy, Roland
Paul has provided a precise definition of security commitment:
"any pre-existing relationship between this country and another
that would significantly tend to lead this country toward the use of
force even if, at the movement of crisis, it were not otherwise
American policy to use it."26
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This definition is restrictive in that it considers only commitment of aid from
one country to its allies. In this sense, US commitments to Iran before the US-Iran
Security Alliance of 1953 were not considered as a security commitment."
Paul classified commitments into seven types of commitment:
(1) treaties; (2) security agreements; (3) stationing of troops in a foreign country; (4)
unilateral government declaration; (5) moral commitment; (6) obligations arising from
a general identification between one country and the governing order, broad political
programmes or society of another country; and (7) other obligations over the course of
time resulting from the accumulation of many small contributions to the defence,
survival, and well-being of another country.28
1.1.2. Motivations and Interrelationships of Great Power-Small Power
According to Liska, the overall purpose of an alliance is to act as "the
institutional link between the politics of the balance of power and the politics of
preponderance or empire."29 As an international device, alliances are used as an
instrument of augmenting one's insufficient power and of controlling the ally's use of
power even while supplementing it. 30 The great power and the small power' &motives
for joining alliances can be understood in this context.
The principal motives of great powers to enter into alliances are: (1)
aggregation or addition; (2) diversion; and (3) disguise of power and its exercise.31
More bluntly, the great power's motives are: (1) a desire to control the activities of the
small state; (2) a desire to deny the small power 's territory to an adversary; (3) a wish
to support the "legitimacy" of a particular government; and (4) an attempt to impress
third parties by maintaining that particular alliance.32
On the other hand, the motives of small power s to ally with a great power can
be those of security, stability and status. 33 As an analytical purpose, Omer De
Raeymaeker classified small power s motives for joining alliances as follows: (1)
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security in relation to the geographical situation; (2) prestige in the international
community; (3) domestic stability; (4) economic aid and military assistance; and (5)
ideology.34
However, the basic dilemma of the small power in an alliance is to obtain
sufficient support without undue interference from the great power. Weakness,
according to Vital, is the dominant fact of the existence of small power alliances with
great powers because of a disparity of military strength. Thus, the dilemma of the small
power is that it is difficult for it to establish military modernisation without
compromising its political independence. 35
 He warns that the price of alignment is the
loss of real independence and effective sovereignty of the small power. 36 Thus, Vital's
argument is that the small power's conflict with the great power is eventually a conflict
over its autonomy.37
On the other hand, while aware that a small power may show weakness in
military capability, some scholars view that the small power has some area of strength.
Annett B. Fox, analysing small power s in World War II, and 1919-1969, finds:
"The distinctive power of great states flows from their military
strength. However, the ability of a state to secure what it wants
through the use of violence is only one mark of political power...
There are other means. Both small and great states can employ
economic, ideological, and diplomatic methods, as well as military sk
measures. 2938
Furthermore, she finds:
"the small state has one important advantage over the great power:
its interests are local and limited. Thus, all attention can be
focused upon a single objective, whereas the large state, with
varied and extensive interests, must balance these and give only a
relatively fleeting glance towards a particular small power. With
favourable conditions many governments of various small states
have successfully utilised negotiating techniques in order to resist
the pressures of the great powers."39
She emphasises the techniques of diplomacy as the government's strongest
power, and "the small states must be able to protect themselves by adroit diplomatic use
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of favourable opportunities for advancing their interest."40
Robert Keohane also argues that "possession of superior military or economic
force cannot guarantee small-power compliance with big power interest." 41 He
continues that "weakness does not entail only liabilities; for the small power, it also
creates certain bargaining assets." 42 Generally, small powers' bargaining positions
stem from the following conditions:
(1) a state may be economically weak, have low military strength and be politically
unstable; but its weakness can be a source of bargaining power if a great power
perceives the territory of the small state to be of strategic importance and is
prepared to commit conventional military forces to its assistance.
(2) the bargaining power of small states involved in a military conflict will be increased
if there is a clear and overt commitment by great powers to opposite sides.
(3) a coalition of small states, which is weakly organised, with disputed leadership and
whose members have differing political systems and ideologies will have a high
degree of stress within it over the formulation and implementation of common
objectives, when involved in a military conflict.
(4) a small state can sometimes act with impunity against a great power. The response
of the great power will be determined primarily by the type of threat, the dpgree of
its active involvement elsewhere and concern lest any retaliatory action might
adversely affect its relations with other states in the region.
(5) a small state can use international organisations to mobilise support for its policies
by widening the arena of debate and criticism.
(6) a small state will be able to resist collective non-military sanctions if it receives
support from border states and if the collective sanctions are not universally or
equally applied by members of international organisations.43
Keohane observes that the small power in an alliance system can influence the
great power more actively and forcefully than in a non-alliance system. 44 The
bargaining power of the small power stems from the alliance structure of
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interdependence. In the alliance system, the smaller ally can use three lines of tactics to
influence the larger ally: (1) unreliability by attempting to trigger the larger ally into
unwanted conflict or by seeking a separate accommodation with the common enemy,
(2) contributions by becoming a loyal and reliable ally, or (3) weakness by stressing its
fragile position which may undermine the alliance itself.45
The capability of a small power to influence the great power is sometimes
referred to as the "power of the weak", or "tyranny of the weak". However, generally, a
small state's bargaining power stems from the great power's motivations and gratuity.
Thus, small power s usually have disproportionate power in the bargaining process with
great powers, and the small power may "accept a certain amount of control by the great
power in its domestic and foreign policy as an inevitable and legitimate price for
support."46
 In order to minimise great power influence, however, a small power can
resist from positions of both weakness and strength.°
Based on the above arguments several hypotheses are derived:
(1) Neutrality or nonalignment is a dangerous security policy for small powers which
are exposed to a great power threat.
(2) In the alliance system, however, a small power ought to prefer mixed, multilateral
alliances.
(3) The distinctive power of great states flows from their military strength. However,
possession of superior military force cannot guarantee small power compliance
with big power interest.
(4) For the small power , weakness does not entail only liabilities. It also creates
certain bargaining assets.
(5) A small power in an alliance system can influence a great power more actively and
forcefully than in a non-alliance system.
In spite of the fact that such a broad general approach to the study of small and
big power relationships has appeared in the professional literature, the inquiry is still at
an elementary stage. There still remains a lack of any workable theory for comparative
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analysis, partly because the universe of big power-small power relationship is too
broad. Thus, a restricted case-study has been adopted. By use of a relaxed conceptual
framework in the analysis of small power -big power behaviours in an alliance system,
it is hoped that the case-study of US-Iran relationship can facilitate theorising
concerning the behaviour of the big power's relationships with the small power. As
Michael Brecher indicates, "social science models are of little value unless they are
subjected to the rigorous test of empirical utility. Without case studies little progress
can be made on the long road to theory. '148
Harry Eckstein classifies five different types of case-studies: (1) configurative-
idiographic studies, (2) disciplined configurative studies, (3) heuristic case studies, (4)
case-studies as plausibility probes, and (5) crucial case-studies. 49 He lists six options
on the utility of case studies:
(1) Holds case-studies and comparative studies to be wholly separate and unequal.
(2) Desegregates case-studies and comparative studies.
(3) Holds case-studies to conduct precisely for the purpose of discovering questions and
puzzles for theory, and discovering candidate-rules that might solve theoretical
puzzles.
(4) Focuses on the stage of theory-building at which one confronts the question whether
candidate-rules are worth the costs (time, effort, ingenuity, manpower, funds, etc.)
of testing.
(5) Goes still another step further, to the testing (validation) stage itself in attempting to
validate theories case-studies and comparative studies in principles.
(6) Holds that case-studies are not merely equal alternatives at testing stage, but,
properly carried out, a better bet than comparative studies.5°
This case-study is a disciplined configurative study5I
 which adopts the third
option. This case-study approach is useful not only for the interpretative application of
general ideas to particular cases and for helping the inquirer to arrive at notions of
problems to solve or solutions worth pursuing, but also to arrive at more useful means
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of determining whether solutions are valid.52
In constructing and in interpreting a single case-study, however, there are many
persistent problems:
(1) The boundaries of the case - what is to included or excluded;
(2) The level of case comparability to be sought - the extent to which the case
method employed will permit replication and comparison;
(3) The representativeness of the case - the universe of behaviours to which the case
findings are hypothesized to apply; and
(4) The adequacy of explanation - questions concerning the relative merits of
competing explanatory hypotheses, including choices among internally induced
and externally introduced explanations.53
With the disciplined configurative case study approach the examination of the
nature of national security in the framework of small power and great power
relationships in an alliance system is a systematic means of proceeding toward solution
of these problems. As noted above, the study of national security has several
advantages as an organising concept over foreign policy.
To support this thesis, the following fundamental questions must be kept in
mind: (1) What were the sources of bargaining power of the United States - Iran? (2) To
what extent did the allies' goals conflict? (3) How US foreign policies were related and
influenced between president and interest groups? (4) In what circumstances was the
United States able to influence domestic and foreign policies of Iran? (5) What tactics
(means) did great power (United States) and small power (Iran) use to influence the
other? (6) Did US foreign policies pursue national interests or values?
To answer above questions, this study analyzes the issue areas in historical
events in order to trace the development of each nation's strategy, leverages, and tactics
towards the other. Each chapter in part two of this case study is related to the US
security commitment policy toward Iran and Iran's responses in the framework of big
power and small power relationship. The organization of this study is basically
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chronological.
1.2. The Definitions of Patron and Client state
1.2.1. The Cliency Relationship 
Cliency is a long-term, asymmetric, mutually-beneficial relationship between
two independent and autonomous countries which differ greatly in their size, wealth,
and military and political power. The cliency relationship is security-oriented, based on
a broad spectrum of security concerns which are complementary and often identical for
the countries involved. The similarity of these concerns and the great disparity in the
capabilities of the patron and client create strong incentives for them to co-operate in
order to further their mutual interests. This co-operation consists of a reciprocal
exchange of services and material resources which are dissimilar and which help to
enhance the security interests of the two countries. While this exchange is the most
visible and concrete aspect of the cliency relationship, it is the recognition of mutual
interests and the commitments and co-operation which follow that are its defining
characteristics. The co-operative nature of the cliency relationship means that it is
„
fundamentally non-coercive, and the patron and client are autonomous in this sense. Its
non-coercive character and its security orientation are the major factors distinguishing
cliency from other asymmetric international relationships, such as economic
dependence, the satellite relationships of Eastern Europe, colonialism, and
imperialism.54
 Cliency and these other relationships will be contrasted in some detail in
next section of this chapter.
The goals which bring the patron and client together in a cliency relationship
may vary considerably, depending on domestic, regional, and global circumstances.
However, some basic motives can be outlined here.
In entering into a cliency relationship, the patron primarily seeks a stable and
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co-operative ally in an area vital to its security which can deter threats by rival powers
and help defend its regional interests. The patron's regional interests may include the
defence of its national borders or other strategically important areas, protection for
nearby allies, and economic concerns such as the protection of investments by its
nationals or sources of vital raw materials. The patron may also have various secondary
goals, including co-operation from the client on intelligence matters, support in
international forums, military assistance in extra-regional conflicts, and arrangements
for military bases and other kinds of facilities.
The client generally seeks a reliable source of security-oriented goods and
services to enhance its domestic stability and its military capabilities vis-a-vis other
countries. Those may include various kinds of military and economic aid and formal or
informal commitments by the patron to assist it in the event of threats to its security.
The motives of the patron and client in establishing a cliency relationship thus
converge on two basic goals: a stronger client military apparatus and greater stability in
the client country. A strong client is clearly essential for the patron's primary goals of
deterring hostile powers and protecting its regional interests. However, the client's
domestic stability can be equally important for the patron. A client which experiences
frequent unrest may be weakened by dissension may make it difficult for the client to
act decisively on behalf of the patron's interests. Uncertainty about the client's future
stability can present serious problems for the patron's long-term interests and force it to
re-evaluate its regional policies. The patron will generally seek to minimise these
problems by acting to ensure that the client is sufficiently stable to present a credible
military threat and justify a long-term commitment.
The client government also has an obvious interest in becoming military
stronger and more stable. While the broad goals of military strength and stability are
held by both the patron and the client, in practice they may have very different reasons
for pursuing these goals and different conceptions of what they entail. The client may
have regional ambitions which are not shared by the patron or which may, in fact,
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conflict with the patron's interests. Building up the client's military forces without
some control over their use may then have adverse consequences for the patron. Of
perhaps greater importance are differences between the patron and client over how to
achieve domestic stability. While the patron may seek a measure of political consensus
to minimise unrest and ensure peaceful changes of government, a client government
may be more interested in strengthening its domestic position by repressing popular
movements and acting against its opposition. Since the client government is the main
recipient of the services and resources transferred under the cliency relationship, cliency
can help it to achieve these particular goals. Repression of popular movements and
suppression of the opposition can lead to conditions which jeopardise the client's long-
term stability. Consequently, attempts by the patron to enhance the client's stability
may also have adverse long-term implications for the patron's interests.
1.2.2. Means of Cliencv
The resources and services provided by the patron to the client under this
relationship will be referred to here as means of cliency. Three main categories can be
distinguished: i) military and economic transfers, including loans and grants, training
,-,
for security forces, and indirect transfers via loan guarantees, quotas, favourable credit
terms, etc.; ii) overt and covert interventions, including intelligence, direct
manipulation of domestic political actors, and military or paramilitary actions against
particular domestic or foreign targets, iii) security agreements such as treaties, pacts,
and other less formal arrangements. These goods and services are provided by the
patron to enhance the strength and stability of the client, to ensure its continued co-
operation, and often to achieve more specific security goals.
Foreign aid is an instrument that has been used to achieve a broad variety of
foreign policy goals, 55 many of which do not involve a cliency relationship. It can,
however, be of considerable importance in this context as well. In sufficient
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magnitude, economic aid can bolster the client's economy by increasing domestic
demand and augmenting investment in infrastructure and other key areas. It can be
used to finance transfers to specific domestic groups by enabling the client government
to allocate social services and development projects more selectively and fund more
direct transfers such as subsidies and tax concessions. These mechanisms can be quite
useful in placating popular unrest, particularly in crisis periods, and can thus enhance
the client's stability. Economic aid can also be used to build up the client's military
capabilities by providing it with a strategically-important infrastructure and by allowing
other funds to be diverted for military spending. Indirect financial transfers can play a
similar role, although they do not necessarily accrue to the client government and are
usually smaller in volume than direct economic aid.
Transfers of military equipment and training for military personnel can more
directly enhance the military capabilities and domestic stability of the client country.
Sophisticated military equipment is, of course, available in the international arms
market. However, the patron can provide it at no cost or on favourable terms, and can
often provide items which are more advanced than those available elsewhere. While
most discussions about US arms transfers have focused on major weapons systems for
use primarily in international engagements, a sizeable portion of US military,aid has
actually gone for domestic counterinsurgency operations. 56 Of particular importance in
this context has been special training for counterinsurgency units, both at US bases and
locally through military missions. Sophisticated equipment and special training can
boost morale and make military and paramilitary operations more efficient, enhancing
the client's military posture and enabling it to maintain domestic stability in a more
effective manner.
Military and economic transfers can increase the client's military capabilities
and its ability to contain domestic unrest. However, they may not be sufficient to
achieve the patron's particular regional goals or maintain the client's stability. Overt or
covert interventions by the patron or security agreements providing for intervention
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under certain circumstances may be necessary. Actions of this sort generally imply a
stronger commitment by the patron to the client's security, and thus a stronger and more
vital cliency relationship.
In its most benign form, intervention can involve relatively innocuous actions
by the intervening power such as the provision of subsidies, advice, and technical
assistance for domestic organisations which are seen as favourable to its goals. These
may include labour unions, political parties, business firms, newspapers, and other
private organisations which play a significant political role. 57 More effective covert
action may include propaganda, sabotage, assassinations, and other paramilitary
activities directed against groups who are seen as a threat to the client government.58
These actions are generally targeted at nationals of the client country, either at home or
in exile. They can have a substantial impact on the organisation and effectiveness of
friendly or hostile groups, and can thus significantly affect the client's stability. Covert
action may also involve foreign targets, as when a hostile country provides critical
support for domestic groups. Actions such as these can strengthen the client vis-à-vis
other countries, in addition to enhancing its domestic stability.
Overt interventions include direct involvement of the patron's military forces on
behalf of the client country and the temporary or permanent stationing of its troops
within the client's borders. Direct military involvement by the patron is generally a
means of last resort. The stationing of troops in a client country is used more frequently
to deter hostile aggression. Overt interventions may be directed either at domestic
groups, which may not receive outside support, or at nearby countries which are hostile
to the client. They may consequently be used either to promote the client's domestic
stability or to enhance its military capabilities vis-à-vis other countries. In many cases
(such as the large-scale US intervention in Vietnam) these two goals may be
indistinguishable.
Bilateral treaties, multilateral pacts and security organisations, and other
security arrangements often serve as the legal basis for interventions. In addition to
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legitimising interventions, these arrangements symbolise the patron's commitment to
the client and consequently can play an important role in deterring aggression by hostile
foreign or domestic groups.
1.2.3. The Client State
The main thesis of this study is that cliency can seriously affect the domestic
politics of the client country. The impact of cliency on the client's domestic politics is
embodied here in the concept of the client state. The client state is a particular form of
state in which state-society relations have been fundamentally altered as a result of the
client government's participation in a cliency relationship. State-society relations are
affected by the transfer of the goods and services referred to above as cliency
instruments to the client government. These instruments can obviate the client
government's need for support from domestic social groups and enable it more
effectively to undermine the political power of groups that oppose it. Domestic groups
consequently have very little political influence in a client state, and the state's policies
may become divorced from the interests and needs of society.
This can have important long-term consequences. A state which is not
,.,
constrained by societal pressures can undertake virtually any policies it sees fit,
regardless of their impact on society. Over a long period of time the absence of public
input into state policy-making can lead to serious problems in the economy, in foreign
relations, and in other policy areas, often resulting in domestic unrest. This may be
particularly true in underdeveloped countries, where unrest can be augmented by the
absence of institutions to channel and contain public discontent and where economic
planning is generally of great importance. By undermining societal influences on state
policy cliency can thus paradoxically lead to long-term instability. Furthermore, if the
patron power becomes closely identified with the client state in the eyes of discontented
social groups, their anger may be directed at it as well as at the client government.
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Hence in the long term cliency can have consequences which are quite different from
those originally envisioned by the patron and client governments.
In order to adequately discuss how cliency can lead to the establishment of a
client state and to succinctly characterise state-society relations in such a state it is
necessary to discuss several other concepts which bear on these matters. This will be
done in chapter 2. Chapter 2 will also review a number of studies which give important
insights into the nature of policy-making in a client state and its possible long-term
consequences. The remainder of this chapter further illustrates the concept of cliency
by comparing it with other asymmetric international relationships and by presenting
some empirical data which help to identify US clients in the post-War period.
1.3. Comparison to Other International Relationships
In this section cliency is compared with dependency, with the satellite
relationships which existed in Eastern Europe, and with colonialism and imperialism.
These five types of international relationship are contrasted in figure 1 according to two
key issues: i) whether the more powerful country must use coercion to maintain the
relationship and ii) whether it is primarily an economic relationship, a security-oriented
relationship, or a combination of the two. A comparison of these five relationships
according to these issues helps to identify the unique aspects of cliency. It is also useful
in broadly illustrating how the domestic impact of cliency may differ from that of the
other relationships discussed here.
- Figure 1 will be seen next page -
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Figure 1 - Cliency Contrasted with Other International Relationships
Primary Orientation of Relationship
Security Economic Imperialism
Coercion
Required to
Maintain
Relationship?
yes satellite colonialism imperialism
no cliency dependency
s,
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1.3.1. Dependency
As is evident in figure 1, cliency bears a greater similarity to dependency and to
satellisation than to colonialism or imperialism. Cliency and dependency are both non-
coercive, but differ in their primary orientation. Dependency theory, at least in its
original Latin American tradition, 59 is mainly concerned with the effect of such
economic interactions as trade, capital flows, and technology transfer on the economic
development of the weaker, dependent country. This approach has been extended by
writers such as Frank, Cardoso, and O'Donnell, who have examined how these
_
interactions affect social and political structures in the dependent country.60 As is clear
from the above discussion, cliency involves very different kinds of interactions
(although economic aid and other financial transfers are capital flows and hence
contribute to dependence). Furthermore, cliency is fundamentally a state-to-state
relationship motivated by security concerns. By contrast, dependency generally
involves private actors in both countries and is motivated essentially by the desire to
exploit international disparities in factor endowments.
Despite these differences, cliency and dependency are both non-coercive in the
sense that neither country is forced by the other to enter into the relationship : In both
cases, public and/or private decision-makers in the two countries engage in the
relationship because it affords them (although not necessarily their respective societies)
mutual, if asymmetric, benefits. Because they are both non-coercive and very different
kinds of interactions, cliency and dependency are complementary and may very easily
co-exist. This appears to be the case in the relationships between the United States and
several countries in Central and South America, where strong commercial and security-
oriented bonds have traditionally gone hand-in-hand. As will become evident in later
chapters, economic dependence and even security concerns arising from economic
issues have, by contrast, played a relatively minor role in post-war US-Iranian relations.
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1.3.2. The Satellite Relationship
The satellite relationships of Eastern Europe were primarily security-oriented,
but, unlike the cliency relationship depicted here, were maintained with a high degree
of coercion. Economic interactions among the Eastern European countries were quite
strong and their economies were in fact highly integrated. However, economic ties
among these countries had always been subordinated to political and military
concerns,61 and it is the latter to which the concept of satellization generally refers.
Coercive domination in the satellite relationship is maintained in several ways.
The most prominent form of domination has been the threat or actual use of military
force to maintain a country in the satellite system, as has occurred in Hungary,
Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Closely related to this was the use of the Soviet secrete
police to spy on and occasionally arrest satellite leaders and activists, a practice which
was used more frequently in the Stalinist era than in later years. The ability to
implement these forms of coercion had also given Soviet leaders a large measure of
indirect influence over decision-making in the satellite countries, generally manifested
through informal channels. More direct control resulted from the occupation by Soviet
officers of high positions in the armies of the satellite countries. Similarly, much of the
military and economic policy of the satellites was controlled and co-ordinated through
the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and COMECON, which were dominated by Soviet
decision-makers.
Another major form of domination in the satellite relationship resulted from the
ideological similarities between the Soviet and satellite leaders and the strong personal
bonds that link them. The leadership in the satellite countries was initially installed at
the end of World War II, when contending political forces were extremely weak. It
subsequently emerged through the Communist parties of these countries, whose
ideological orientations were virtually identical to those of the Soviet Communist party
and whose loyalty was reinforced by Soviet coercion and by post-war East-West
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tension. The loyalties and similar world-views of the satellite leaders were instrumental
in maintaining the cohesion of the Soviet bloc.
Although the satellite relationship also involves transfers of the kinds of goods
and services exchanged under the cliency relationship, the coercive measures it entails
clearly distinguish it from cliency. These coercive measures also mean that
satellization has a stronger and much more blatant impact on the domestic politics of
the satellite country. Satellite leaders emerge only through a very circumspect selection
process, and their policy options are highly constrained. Political activities outside of
the party and the state apparatuses are rigidly repressed. Censorship and highly
controlled forms of socialisation and mobilisation help to further restrict activities
which might conflict with the goals and methods of the dominant power.
1.3.3. Colonialism and Imperialism
Colonialism and Imperialism differ from cliency both in having a substantial
coercive component and in having strong, if not exclusive, economic motivations.
Colonies have generally been established by armed conquest and maintained by an
occupying army and colonial administration, the upper levels of which are staffed
mainly by functionaries from the colonising country. During the early era of European
colonisation colonies were sought mainly to secure exclusive control over sources of
precious metals and other valuable commodities. In the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries colonies often took on an added importance as capital outlets, exclusive
markets for goods produced in the home country, and sources of cheap labour for light
industries such as textiles. The impact of colonisation on the political and social
structures of the colonised societies has been severe, and in many ways still persists.62
However, the absolute control it entails and its strong economic motives clearly
distinguish colonisation from cliency.
Imperialism is the most ill-defined of the four relationships discussed in this
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section, and for this reason it is not easily compared with cliency. All writers seem to
agree that imperialism refers to an aggressive, expansionist foreign policy, and that an
imperialistic relationship is consequently exploitative and hegemonic, though it does
not entail the formal control of colonialism. Marxists and many non-Marxists see
imperialism as a relationship that is motivated exclusively or primarily by private
economic concerns, much like those that motivated colonialism. 63 Other writers,
however, deny the importance of private economic motives and maintain that
imperialism is based on broader considerations of the imperialist power's national
interests.64
The economic motives attributed to imperialism by many writers distinguish
this conception of it from cliency in an obvious way. 65 However, imperialism also
entails a high degree of coercion that is perhaps less direct than in colonial and satellite
relationships but that nevertheless does not appear in the cliency relationship. This
coercion is generally manifested in the threat or actual use of military force. It gives the
imperialist power a large measure of informal influence over the subjugated country.
By contrast, the cliency relationship is maintained by the perception of mutual interests
on the part of the patron and client governments and by the realisation that co-operation
can further these interests. Because of the coercive influence it entails, imperialism can
have a very direct and blatant impact on the domestic politics of the subjugated country,
much like that of satellization.66
1.4. Overview of U.S. Cliency Relationships During 1950-1980
Table 1.1 contains data on various forms of US security assistance to 50 major
Third World countries in the post-war period, as well as figures on US direct
investment and trade with these countries. This table helps illustrate the discussion in
this chapter by helping to identify the motives which guided US policy-makers in
establishing these relationships. It is also useful in illustrating how the relationships
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between the United States and Iran have compared with other cliency relationships
which may be more familiar to the reader
The sample used in this table was chosen by selecting those Third World
countries which either: i) received a substantial volume of US military transfers or
economic aid; ii) were the target of a major US intervention; or iii) were engaged in a
major security agreement with the United States in the post-war period. It was made
sufficiently large to ensure that all countries which might possibly be considered US
clients would be included. The periods shown in column 1 give the years in which each
country had a close relationship with the United States and for which the yearly
averages in columns 2, 3 ,5 ,6 and 12 are figured. The period 1950-1980 is used for
those countries which were closely allied with the United States in the entire post-War
period. Shorter periods are used in cases where a country became independent after
1950, or where a treaty or conflict, or coup, revolution, or other change of government
substantially altered the country's relationship with the United States. The data given
in columns 2-10 show how the foreign policy tools referred to here as cliency
instruments have been used by the United States in the post-war period. Figures in
columns 2, 3 and 5 are given on a per capita basis to facilitate cross-national
comparisons and to indicate the relative magnitude of external versus clomestic
resources of a particular type.
- Table 1.1 is about here -
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1.4.1. Post-war US Clients
Although the United States has maintained allies in all regions of the Third
World, it is clear from this table that the strongest US cliency relationships have been
with countries in the Middle East and in East Asia. These two regions accounted for 21
and 57 percent of US economic aid to all Third World countries in 1950-1980
respectively, and 41 and 55 percent of US military transfers (both sales and aid). 67 The
United States has also stationed a large number of troops, maintained numerous
military bases, engaged in frequent military actions (including two major wars), and
made strong formal commitments to the security of countries in these regions,
especially in East Asia.
In the Middle East, Israel has been the major US client, followed closely by
Saudi Arabia and recently by Egypt. Since the 1967 war Israel has received US
economic aid and military transfers at a higher per capita rate than any other country in
the world, and has been almost exclusively dependent on the United States for
sophisticated military equipment. Saudi Arabia was the third largest per capita
recipient of US military transfers in 1950-1980. Egypt has rapidly emerged as a major
recipient of US military and economic aid in recent years. These three counqies have
also figured prominently in US security arrangements for the region. Although none
have concluded major formal security agreements with the United States, a variety of
important informal agreements has been reached with each.
Large amounts of US military and/or economic aid have also been given to
Libya (under King Idris), Iran, Turkey, and Jordan. Libya and Turkey provided the
major US military bases in the region during the post-war period, each hosting a large
contingent of US troops. Iran provided several important intelligence-gathering sites on
the Soviet border and was the target of a major covert US intervention in 1953. Iran
and Turkey were the key members of CENTO in the region, and Turkey is also a
member of NATO and provided troops for the war in Vietnam. Morocco and Lebanon
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can probably be considered minor US clients. Each received moderately high levels of
US economic aid and military transfers. Morocco has provided a major military base
for the United States, while Lebanon was sufficiently important to US policymakers to
warrant major intervention in 1958 and 1983. Of the Asian countries located between
Iran and Thailand shown in table 1, only Pakistan can be considered a US client or even
a US ally. Although the figures shown for Pakistan in 1950-1980 do not suggest a
strong cliency relationship, they are considerably higher for a period in the late 1950s
and early 1960s when Pakistan played an important role in the US strategy of
containing the Soviet Union and China. Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and especially
South Vietnam have been quintessential US clients. Each received very large volumes
of US military and economic aid and participated on a large scale in US military
activities in Southeast Asia. Much the same can be said for the Philippines, Taiwan,
and South Korea. Each provided major military bases for the United States and signed
a Mutual Defence Treaty with it. Taiwan and South Korea were major recipients of US
military and economic aid. The Philippines, with no immediate threat from its
neighbours, received moderately high levels of US aid. As shown in column 8, US
military forces have been used extensively in this region. The United States intervened
in South Korea on a large scale in the early 1950s and on a smaller scale in the
Philippines in the early 1950s and in the Formosa Straits in the late 1950s.
The US relationships with countries in Central and South America and Sub-
Saharan Africa have been considerably weaker than those with countries in the Middle
East and East Asia, at least in terms of the security-oriented indicators used in this
table. None of the countries in these regions received high levels of per capita military
transfers from the United States, although several were primarily armed by it. While a
number of these countries received fairly high per capita levels of US economic aid,
security concerns can clearly be identified as the primary motive for this aid only for the
countries of Central America and possibly Chile. Military bases were only provided by
Cuba, Panama, and Ethiopia in these regions, and these countries were the only ones in
44
which large numbers of US troops were stationed. US military forces were quite active
in the Caribbean and in Central America, with virtually every country in these regions
being the target of US intervention at some time in this century. US interventions in
South America and Sub-Saharan Africa have been limited to covert actions in Chile and
Zaire and counter-insurgency assistance in countries such as Venezuela and Bolivia.
While all of the countries in South America and Sub-Saharan Africa shown in the table
been have fairly close US allies, it would be difficult to argue that any other than
Panama and possibly the Dominican Republic have had relationships with the United
States approaching the levels of some countries in the Middle East and East Asia.
On the basis of this discussion, three broad categories of US clients can
tentatively be identified:
Stronz Cliency Relationships: Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Thailand, Cambodia,
Laos, South Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, South Korea.
Moderate Cliency Relationships: Libya, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan,
Panama, Dominican Republic
Weak Cliency Relationships: Morocco, Lebanon, Cuba, Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Bolivia, Chile, Liberia, Zaire, Ethiopia.
These categories are provided to give some idea of which countries the
concepts developed in this study are meant to apply to. The inclusion of many of these
countries in a particular category can certainly be debated. The weak clients are best
viewed as marginal cases which may have been legitimate clients for brief periods but
are clearly not comparable with countries in the strong and moderate categories. The
concepts developed in this study should be thought of as applying mainly to the strong
and moderate clients.
1.4.2. US Motives in Establishing Cheney Relationships
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Columns 11 and 12 give figures on US direct investment in 1950 and 1966
and total US trade in the periods shown in column 1 with these 50 countries. A
comparison of the different regions shows that no clear relationship exists between the
volume of direct investment or trade and use of the foreign policy tools shown in this
table. South and Central America had highest volumes of US investment and trade of
the five regions, and, with the exception of US bases and military actions in Central
America, among the lowest levels of the foreign policy tools. Sub-Saharan Africa had
generally the lowest volume of US investment and trade and levels of the foreign policy
tools not much lower than in South America. Asia and the Middle East received the
highest levels of the foreign policy tools shown but only modest volumes of investment
and trade, particularly in the early post-war period. Furthermore, no significant
correlation was found among the 50 countries between investment or trade and the
figures shown in columns 2, 3, 5 and 6.68
The establishment of cliency relationships by the United States has also not
been clearly associated with sources of essential raw materials. The desire to protect oil
deposits and shipping routes in the Persian Gulf has certainly been an important motive
in US policy toward the Middle East. However, it has not dissuaded US policymakers
from giving extensive support to Israel. Other sources of strategic raw materials in
Sub-Saharan Africa and in South America have evidently not warranted such attention
by the United States. The countries of the Mediterranean Middle East and East Asia
which have received high volumes of US security assistance do not contain, or even
border on, major sources of strategic raw materials.
While the protection of foreign investment, markets, and sources of raw
materials or other goods certainly cannot be ruled out, on the basis of this brief
discussion, as an important US goal in establishing cliency relationships, it is clearly
not by itself a sufficient explanation. Marxists such as Magdoff have suggested that US
foreign policy in general is based on motives such as the desire to protect private US
and Western economic interests, combat socialism, and maintain an open door for
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multinational corporations. 69
 Although these factors have undoubtedly influenced US
foreign policy in many instances, they cannot explain why the United States has
become more heavily involved in the Middle East and East Asia than in South America
and Sub-Saharan Africa.70 Furthermore, this argument does not consider the
importance of economic factors such as these to US national security. This amounts to
a failure to distinguish between the goals of the state and the private sector in the
formulation of US foreign policy. 71 It should be added that many other explanations of
US foreign policy, such as the desire to promote democracy, strengthen US allies, or
extend spheres of influence, also cannot explain these regional variations.
It is clear from table 1.1 that the United States has engaged in cliency
relationships mainly in areas along the borders of the Soviet Union and China where a
serious threat of expansion and penetration by these countries has been perceived. The
two exceptions to this pattern have been the US relationships with countries in the
Mediterranean Middle East and in Central America and the Caribbean. In the latter
regions the desire to combat Soviet influence in Guatemala in 1954 and throughout the
area after the Cuban revolution were certainly major determinants of US policy. In the
Mediterranean Middle East, Soviet involvement in Egypt under Nasser and in Iraq after
1958 were clearly of some concern to US policymalcers. However, the massive US
support for Israel cannot be explained solely on this basis, particularly since it increased
rapidly in the late 1960s and 1970s when Soviet influence in the region was declining.
While US support for Israel remains something of an enigma, cultural similarities,
sympathy for survivors of the Holocaust, and pro-Israeli influences in the American
political process are certainly important explanatory factors.72
Except in the case of Israel, it thus appears that US cliency relationships in the
post-war period have been motivated primarily by a desire to limit or contain advances
by the Soviet Union and China. This is consistent with the strong US relationships with
countries in East and Southeast Asia, in the Northern Tier and Persian Gulf regions of
the Middle East, and in the Caribbean and Central America. It is also consistent with
47
the weaker US relationships with countries in South America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and
South Asia, where Soviet and Chinese advances in the 1950s and 1960s were
considerably weaker. The desire to protect various economic interests has clearly been
an important goal in the Persian Gulf area, in Central America, and in the Caribbean.
However, other interests considered vital by US policymakers, such as protection for
key allies and certain ideological goals, have undoubtedly played an important role in
the establishment of cliency relationships as well.
,.,
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CHAPTER II
THE CONCEPT OF THE CLIENT STATE
This chapter further elucidates the concept of the client state, which was first
introduced in chapter 1. Some theoretical literature on the nature of the state and on
related concepts is first reviewed. This is followed by an examination of the role
played by the state in the process of industrialisation. The concept of the client state is
then elaborated in greater detail on the basis of this discussion, and is related to the
material presented in chapter 1 by examining how a client state can emerge under a
cliency relationship. This chapter concludes with a discussion of the possible
consequences of the establishment of a client state for the client society and for the
long-term interests of the patron power.
2.1. The State and Society
2.1.1. Definitions of State, Government, and Regime
sik.
The state is an administrative body which claims legitimacy in society by virtue
of the paramount role it assumes in organising and maintaining the social structure. Its
most prominent functions in fulfilling this role are: i) the maintenance of social
domination, through its monopoly over the legitimate means of coercion, its ideological
apparatuses, and its various redistributive and allocative organs; ii) maintenance of the
economy, through actions such as fiscal and monetary policy, social welfare policies,
and organisation of the economic infrastructure; and iii) the conduct of foreign policy,
including co-operative and hostile relations with other states and foreign interventions
on behalf of society as a whole and particular private interests.' The state may also
undertake a variety of other tasks which may be accorded varying degrees of legitimacy.
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These include foreign expansionism, self-aggrandisement, and the destruction of
opposition groups and organisations.
The state is distinguished from the government, defined as the group of
individuals who are formally authorised to exercise state power. 2 In practice this term
is often used to refer to the group of top state officials whose tenure is associated with
that of the head of state, such as the "Nosed government." The terms patron
government and client government were used in chapter 1 to refer to the individuals
who exercise state power in countries engaged in a cliency relationship. As is clear
from the discussion there, the patron and client governments are the main groups
directly involved in the cliency relationship. 3 The term client government will apply in
any client country, regardless of whether a client state (which refers to a particular
pattern of state-society relations) is said to exist. In a monarchy such as the one which
existed in Iran before the 1978-1979 revolution the royal court refers to the titular head
of state (who may or may not exercise effective state power) and his entourage.
The state is also distinguished from the regime, which refers to the system of
governmental roles and processes, including the methods of representation, repression,
and leadership selection.4 This term is also used to refer to the period of tenure of a
particular monarch or head of state having a distinctive style of leadership, such,as the
"Reza Shah regime". In this context "the regime" and "the government" are often used
interchangeably.
2.1.2. Contending Views of State-Society Relations
Despite the legitimacy it may be granted and its control over the coercive forces
and other powerful state apparatuses, the state is not independent of society and societal
pressures. Rather, by its very nature the state is normally engaged in a complex web of
reciprocal relations with the various groups in society. The paramount role of the state
in organising and maintaining the social structure ensures that its actions are of great
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interest to all domestic groups. Many of its policies inherently serve the interests of
some groups at the expense of others, making it the object of competition and pressures
from the groups affected by particular policies. Furthermore, the state is dependent on
certain kinds of support and material resources from different groups in society. This
dependence confers substantial power on these groups, enabling them to influence the
state's actions. State policy consequently reflects in a general way the changing
configuration of power in society, mediated through the conflicts and political
processes which characterise intra-social relations.
Even though this study focuses on the patron country (US) policy making
process, it is useful to review a number of conceptual frameworks which embody
different views on the relationship between the state and society to understand the
domestic politics of the client country. These approaches can be delineated along two
principal dimensions, as shown in figure 2. The first dimension reflects the degree of
equality in the influence exercised by different groups over the state. The second
dimension embodies the degree to which the state's policies are actually affected by
those groups which have influence over it. Five major views of state-society relations
are grouped along these dimensions in figure 2. Two of these views (those of the
statists and elite theorists, delineated with a question mark) do not explicitly address
one or the other of these issues, and so are placed in more than one category.
- Figure 2 about here -
The pluralist conception of state-society relations holds that all groups have
some influence over state policy. In this view influence is dispersed throughout society
mainly because of multiple, overlapping group membership and because the state
actively works to equalise group influence. 5 Prominent writers in this tradition such as
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Robert Dahl and Nelson Polsby argue further that these factors ensure that all groups
have virtually equal influence over the state. 6 However, more recent studies, including
a later work by Dahl, have found that even in countries with representative institutions
certain groups are often effectively excluded from participation.7
A very different view is held by elite theorists and by Marxists, who argue that
only one or a few particular groups can exert real influence over the state. For elite
theorists, influence is limited to top politicians and bureaucrats, corporate executives,
military leaders, celebrities, and the very rich. This influence is due to certain qualities
which characterise the members of these groups, such as their great wealth, powerful
positions, superior education, and extensive social connections. 8 Marxists argue that
the class which owns the means of production has preponderant influence over the
state. The preponderant influence of this class is due to the power inherent in its
control over the production process. Many Marxists concede, however, that the state
Figure 2 - Different Conceptions of State-Society Relations
Responsiveness of State Policy
to Societal Pressures
state policy entirely
determined by societal
pressures (weak state)
state policy largely
independent of societal
pressures (strong state)
Dispersion
of influence
Among
Groups
all groups have
nearly equal
influence
(democratic
regime)
pluralist statists( ?)
some groups
have much
more influence
than others
(authoritarian
regime)
instrumental Marxists
statists( ?) elite
theorists ( ?) structural
elite theorists ( ?) Marxists (relatively
autonomous state)
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must occasionally make concessions to the lower classes in order to fully serve the
interests of the dominant class.
The issue of which groups have influence over the state and are consequently
served by its policies is of such importance that the state cannot be fully understood
without explicitly identifying these groups. It is useful to specify the form of state by
referring to the groups which have preponderant influence over the state and whose
interests are consequently served by it. This term is adopted from the work of Nicos
Poulantzas, who uses it to identify the hegemonic fraction of the class which owns the
means of production.9 The client state was defined in chapter 1 as a particular form of
station in order to emphasise the idea that domestic groups exert little or no influence
over a state of this kind.
The form of state has an important bearing on the type of regime. A democratic
regime is one in which the state extends at least limited representation to all groups in
society. An authoritarian regime is one in which certain groups, generally popular
groups, are excluded from effective participation. The pluralist vision of universal
representation clearly holds only under a democratic regime. While the views of elite
theorists and Marxists imply an authoritarian regime. The type of regime can be further
identified by specifying the form of representative bodies (if any exists), the degree of
social mobilisation, the guiding ideology, and the mechanisms of social domination.10
The second dimension along which views of state-society relations are
distinguished in figure 2 concerns the degree to which the state's policies are actually
affected by those groups which exert effective influence over it. For pluralists, state
policy is the resultant of the conflicting pressures exerted by all groups in society, and it
is entirely determined by these pressures. This view reflects the liberal notion that the
welfare of society is maximised when all groups are represented and when the state
cannot act independently of society. 11 A very different view is taken by statists such as
Krasner's, who argue that state policy is often entirely independent of societal
pressures. The state frequently pursues goals which transcend class and other
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distinctions. These state goals may include economic growth, full employment,
national security, and domestic order. The state pursues these goals not because it is
compelled to by certain groups but because they fall within the purview of its obligation
to maintain the social structure. 12 To these legitimate goals may be added other state
goals such as foreign aggression and self-aggrandisement which may serve only the
interests of the government and which are generally pursued independently of societal
pressures. The statist perspective does not explicitly address whether influence over the
state is dispersed equally throughout society, and hence is placed in two categories in
figure 2.
While all Marxists agree that the state ultimately serves only the interests of the
class which owns the means of production, an important debate has emerged in recent
Marxist literature over exactly how this occurs. In a view which resembles the pluralist
argument, instrumental Marxists such as Ralph Miliband see state policy as determined
entirely by pressures exerted by the dominant class. The state serves the interests of
this class because its control over the means of production makes it sufficiently
powerful to impose its will on the state. 13 A different view is taken by structuralists
such as Poulantzas, who argue that the state is relatively autonomous from direct
pressures by the dominant class. While the state serves the long-term interests-of this
class by maintaining the existing mode of production, its relative autonomy enables it to
occasionally act against the immediate interests of the dominant class by making
concessions to other classes. These concessions may include social welfare policies,
recognition of labour unions, and limited representation in the form of free elections
and other democratic processes. The state makes these concessions in order to reduce
class conflict and thus preserve the hegemony of the dominant class.14
The pluralist/statist and instrumental/structural Marxist distinctions both
concern the degree to which the state is enmeshed by the pressures and influences of
various groups in society. Each can be seen as defining a continuum along which the
independence of the state from society varies. For pluralists and instrumental Marxists
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the state is weak, being dominated by pressures from those domestic groups which are
represented. For statists and structural Marxists the state is strong, and can act to some
extent independently of domestic groups.15
The main difference between these two approaches is that for Marxists the state
ultimately serves only the interests of the class which owns the means of production,
while for pluralists and statists the state's policies serve any group that wields sufficient
political power. Furthermore, Marxists argue that it is the mode of production which
fundamentally determines which class is dominant in society, since it identifies the
dominant means of production. Consequently, even if the state is entirely independent
of pressures from society it serves the interests of the dominant class simply by acting
to maintain the social structure. The views of statists and structural Marxists are thus
closely related, since, in the context of a capitalist mode of production, "one man's
(maintenance of the social structure) is another's long-term preservation of
capitalism."16
2.1.3. Mechanisms of Group Influence
The two dimensions along which views of state-society relations have been
distinguished here each relate to the ability of different groups to pressure the state so as
to obtain more favourable policies from it. As such, a society will be located along
these dimensions according to the degree of influence which the different groups in it
have over the state. Societies where the weakest groups are nevertheless sufficiently
powerful to exert some influence will tend toward the democratic model. Those in
which these groups are nearly powerless can be considered authoritarian. Societies in
which the most powerful groups still have limited influence over the state are
characterised by an autonomous or strong state. Those where the most powerful groups
dominate the state are said to have a weak state.
62
In order to determine where a society lies along these two dimensions it is
necessary to examine the conditions which affect the ability of different groups to
influence the state. The writers discussed above identify a number of important factors
which affect the amount of influence different groups can exert. These factors form a
basis for characterising state-society relations along these two dimensions, and for
understanding the dynamic conditions which bear on the form of state and the type of
regime.
The simplest explanations of how groups influence the state are given by elite
theorists such as C. Wright-Mills and by instrumental Marxists such as Gabriel Kolko
and Ralph Miliband. These writers argue that state policy serves the interests of the
elite or of the capitalist class because the state is primarily staffed by employees either
drawn from or owing allegiance to these groups. State policymakers make decisions on
the basis of their values, habits, and beliefs. These reflect their upper class
backgrounds or personal connections, and hence their decisions invariably serve the
interests of the upper classes. Lower class state employees undergo a process of
"bourgeoisification" in which upper class values and beliefs are instilled in them.17
Since legitimate representatives of the lower classes are not employed by the state, state
policy does not serve the interests of these classes.
A second, more sophisticated explanation of group influence sees state policy as
the resultant of direct pressures exerted on the state by conflicting groups, targeted at
either single issues or at a broad range of policies. This general approach is taken by a
variety of different writers, ranging from pluralists to instrumental Marxists. In this
view the state's actions are entirely determined by direct pressures exerted on it by
society. These pressures are applied to the state in the form of co-operation or
opposition on particular policy issues, manipulation of public opinion, financial
persuasion, coalitions with other groups, etc. The ability of groups to exert pressure in
these forms depends broadly on their degree of political power relative to other groups.
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The sources of this political power, and hence also the ability of different groups to
influence the state, are the main issues on which writers taking this approach differ.
Pluralists hold that a broad range of factors can affect the political power of
different groups. Truman summarises these in three main categories: i) a group's
strategic position in society, including its social status, membership among government
officials, and usefulness to the government; ii) its internal characteristics, such as its
organisation, cohesion, leadership, size, and wealth; and iii) certain characteristics of
state institutions, including their operating structure and group life. 18 Of these, Truman
places the greatest emphasis on group organisation, cohesion, and leadership, devoting
a chapter of his book to each. For pluralists such as Truman, the broad range of factors
affecting group power and variations in the degree to which groups actually exert their
power result in a rough parity among the groups seeking to influence the state. Thus
while elite groups may have higher social status, close ties with government officials,
and extensive financial resources, popular groups are generally much larger, may be
better organised, and may have more effective leadership.
For Marxists such as Miliband, a group's political power depends on its relation
to the means of production. Rather than denying the importance of the factors
emphasised by pluralists, Miliband sees them as being structured by underlying ocio-
economic conditions. Ownership of the means of production confers enormous power
on the capitalist class. This power is most visible in the form of financial resources,
but also includes the ability to aid or frustrate state policies and act independently
against other groups (such as organised labour) by using the resources owned and
controlled by this class. The state has great difficulty imposing its will on the capitalist
class, and must retain its confidence in order to effectively implement policies. By
contrast, the only source of working class power is the strike, based on its organisation
and size. Working class cohesion is often weak and its leadership corrupt. It is subject
to critical attacks by the state and the media, and is weakened by political socialisation
which reinforces the ideology and beliefs of the capitalist class.19
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This explanation of group influence based on the ability of groups to directly
pressure the state is much more convincing than the previous explanation based on the
group membership and affiliations of state employees. Biases in state policy favouring
one group or class fraction over others that are represented are due to the unequal
distribution of power among these groups. Changes in the orientation of state policy to
favour another group or class fraction result from changes in the underlying distribution
of power. By attributing some political power to the dominated classes, this
explanation can even explain why the state makes concessions to these classes, an issue
which has been the subject of much debate in recent Marxist literature. However, by
explaining all state actions on the basis of direct pressures by social groups, this view
does not allow for the sort of state autonomy discussed by statists and structural
Marxists. It cannot explain why the state may take actions which do not reflect the
interests of any specific group or which are contrary to the short-term interests of the
dominant classes.
An approach which sheds some light on this problem is taken by Harold Laski.
Laski argues that the state is dominated by, but not subordinated to, a dominant class.
Rather than acting on the basis of direct pressures, the state formulates policy on the
basis of ideological beliefs and principles which reflect the interests of this class. In
Laski's words: "history is meaningless when read as a struggle between competing
selfish interests.., it is rather the competition of ideals for survival." 20 Laski's key
point, however, is that the ideology which guides the state is the ideology of the group
which have seized and control state power. The state does not ultimately serve the
interests of the dominant classes because of direct pressures exerted by them, but rather
because they have installed it and presumably can overthrow it.21
This view suggests a third, indirect way in which groups can influence state
policy. A group, or a coalition of groups, which is sufficiently powerful to seize the
state apparatus, either by peaceful or by violent means, can install a government which
is to its liking. State policy will then generally reflect the interests of this group or
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coalition, since the government has been selected for its beliefs, loyalty, etc. Should the
state begin to act in a manner which seriously threatens these interests it will
presumably be overthrown. The state is relatively autonomous in the sense that its
actions are not entirely determined by direct pressures from the dominant groups. It
will nevertheless serve the long-term interests of these groups since they have installed
the government and since its tenure depends on their continued support. The degree of
state autonomy depends largely on the ability and willingness of the dominant groups to
change the government. Should the state go too far in making concessions to other
classes or in otherwise ignoring the short-term interests of the dominant classes they
will take decisive action.
This explanation of indirect group influence refines and complements the other
explanations discussed above. State officials do act in part on the basis of their values
and beliefs, as emphasised by elite theorists and by instrumental Marxists. However,
the important point is that these officials do not just happen to enter the government,
but are selected in some manner by the dominant groups in society (or by their
representatives). It is influence over this selection process, rather than the values and
beliefs of particular state officials per se, which shapes the guiding ideology of the state
and gives powerful groups inordinate, if indirect, influence.
As with direct group pressure, the ability to indirectly influence the state in this
manner depends broadly on a group's political power. However, indirect group
influence is based on a somewhat different set of factors than direct group influence.
Seizure of the state may occur either violently through a revolution or coup d'etat or
peacefully as powerful groups gain influence over the selection of state officials. In the
latter case, a group's indirect influence is due to factors similar to those which affect
direct influence. A violent seizure of power, however, requires that a group have
sufficient size, organisation, leadership, and coercive force, or that it join in a coalition
with such a group (often a military faction). Because of their size, popular groups have
an inherently greater ability to seize the state violently than do elite groups.
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Consequently, the state frequently seeks to neutralise threats from these groups by
repressing them or by offering them concessions. Extracting concessions through the
threat of violent take-over (whether latent or overt) amounts to a form of direct
influence. This is, in fact, often the most potent source of influence over the state for
popular groups.
2.1.4. Summary
It should be clear from this discussion that the state is, in general, bound up in a
complex system of relationships with the various groups in a society. Different groups
with different sources and degrees of power attempt to influence the state in order to
make its policies more favourable to them. This influence may take the form of direct
pressures, typified by actions such as lobbying, bribery, and agreements to exchange co-
operation on one issue for another, or indirect influence in the form of political
struggles to maintain or alter the form of state. The state is susceptible to direct and
indirect influence because the government needs co-operation in carrying out state
policies, because of the particular values and beliefs it holds, because it is corrupt, or,
most importantly, because it needs support in its struggle to retain state power., The
government satisfies these needs by tailoring state policy to serve the interest of the
groups it is dependent on. The state is strong or autonomous to the extent that the
government can resist direct pressures from the most powerful groups in society while
maintaining itself in power. It maintains an authoritarian regime if it feels some sort of
imperative that certain groups must be excluded and if it can effectively resist direct
and indirect pressures from these groups.
2.2. The Political Economy of State-Society Relations
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Before discussing how a cliency relationship can affect this complex system of
state-society relations, it is useful to view some of these concepts in a more concrete
and dynamic context. In this section several related studies dealing with the political
economy of development are discussed. These studies examine the roles of
authoritarianism and state autonomy in the process of industrialisation. Because of the
paramount role of the state in structuring society and because the state is constantly
subject to societal pressures, the relationship between the state and society is a key
factor in the historical evolution of society. These studies illustrate how state-society
relations are affected by, and how they shape, economic development. Since cliency
can have a substantial impact on state-society relations, these studies also provide a
useful basis for understanding the long-term consequences of cliency for economic
development and for other major changes affecting the client society.
Perhaps the most famous writer taking this approach has been Barrington
Moore, who argues that authoritarian exclusion of the lower classes was necessary for
late industrialising countries such as Japan and Germany to achieve industrialisation.
Authoritarianism emerged because of the historically weak position of the peasantry
and because of economic crises associated with late development. In order to be
competitive with the industrialised countries of the day, these countries had to keep low
by adopting "labour repressive" polices. Authoritarianism enabled the state to enforce
such policies and thus promote rapid industrialisation.22
A similar argument is made by Guillermo O'Donnell in the context of
contemporary underdeveloped (or late-late industrialising) countries such as Brazil and
Argentina. O'Donnell argues that the state was seized in these countries by a "coup
coalition" seeking to resolve economic crises associated with the exhaustion of the
"easy" stage of import substituting industrialisation. This group used the state
apparatus to roll back industrial wages and promote capital concentration in order to
"deepen" the economy by establishing a capital goods industry. 23 Other writers have
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argued that the goal of this group was to implement effective stabilisation policies to
curb the high inflation caused by import substitution.24
In a related approach, several other writers have argued that a state which is
autonomous from direct pressures by the dominant classes is able to undertake the
decisive policies necessary to industrialise or otherwise transform the economy.
Poulantzas views autonomy as a fundamental characteristic of the "exceptional state," a
form of state which corresponds to the period of transition between stages of a mode of
production. This transition is brought on by the inherent contradictions of capitalism,
which weaken the class which had been hegemonic in the earlier stage. The state is
autonomous because of the decline of this old class and because the dominant class of
the new stage is not yet sufficiently powerful to achieve hegemony. Autonomy enables
the state to carry out the policies necessary to bring about transition to the new stage.25
Ellen Trimberger takes a similar approach, viewing autonomy as an essential
precondition for the "revolutions from above" which transformed Turkey and Japan
from feudal to industrialising societies. Autonomy arose in these countries because of
the decline of the landowning classes and the establishment of a centralised
bureaucracy. As with Poulantzas, autonomy gave the state the latitude necessary to
transform the economy. 26 By contrast, Theda Skocpol argues that the state was not
sufficiently autonomous in France, Russia, and China to effect such a transformation,
and consequently was overthrown.27
The general thrust of these writers is that economic crises in late and late-late
industrialising countries altered the political structure of state-society relations in such a
way that the state was able to take a decisive role in transforming the economy. These
crises were largely a consequence of participation in the world economy. The need to
compete in foreign markets or avoid penetration of home markets by more advanced
countries created strong pressures to industrialise or to establish particular industries.
This made the capitalist class, or fractions of it, more powerful by giving it a more
prominent role in the economy, increasing its financial resources, etc. 	 The
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strengthening of the capitalist class or particular fractions of this class changed the
configuration of power among the groups competing to influence the state. For
Poulantzas and Trimberger it led to the decline of the landowners or the previously
hegemonic fraction, and consequently greater autonomy for the state from these old
classes. For Moore and O'Donnell, together with the imperative that wages be lowered
to make industry more competitive or stimulate investment, it led to the accession of a
government which excluded the lower classes.
In each case, the state's freedom from direct pressures by particular groups (in
the form of autonomy or authoritarianism) gave it the latitude necessary to undertake
policies which led to the transformation of the economy. However, it should be
emphasised that autonomy or authoritarianism as such do not necessarily guarantee that
the state will attempt to transform the economy, or that it will transform it in the proper
manner, or successfully. Rather, the freedom of the state from societal pressures is
simply a necessary precondition for taking the decisive actions required to effect such a
transformation.
Nevertheless, in the cases studied by these authors the state did attempt to
transform the economy. It did so for two main reasons. First, in these cases the state
became autonomous or authoritarian in a period of severe economic crisis. By virtue of
its role as the main body charged to take some actions to relieve this crisis. Second,
and more importantly, in each of these cases there were direct or indirect pressures on
the state to transform the economy, and to transform it in a certain manner. In the cases
of authoritarianism discussed by Moore and O'Donnell, the state came under the
control of a dominant class whose interests were tied to industrialisation or to the
establishment of a capital goods industry. In the exceptional state discussed by
Poulantzas, indirect pressures by the capitalist class as a whole compel the state to
effect transition to the next stage of capitalism. For Trimberger the autonomous
bureaucratic-military coalitions which carried out revolutions from above were forced
to industrialise in order to retain their control over the state.
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For each of these writers, while the state was free from direct pressures by
certain key groups and hence was able to undertake decisive policies, indirect pressures
nevertheless compelled it to act to resolve the economic crisis by transforming the
economy in a certain way. This suggests that a kind of self-regulating mechanism
operates through state-society relations which bears some resemblance to the liberal
vision underlying the pluralist approach. For pluralists, social welfare is maximised
when all groups have equal access to the state and when state policy is entirely
determined by direct pressure from these groups. In the view of the writers discussed
here, direct group pressures merely hinder the state. Furthermore, a clear stratification
exists in the influence different groups exert on the state, and the changes brought about
by the state do not reflect the general interests of society. Nevertheless, the welfare of
the dominant groups in society is maximised (in the form of state actions to resolve
economic crises) because these groups retain indirect influence over the state.
2.3. The Politics of the Client State
The main thesis of this study is that cliency can make the state more
autonomous and authoritarian by enabling the client government to undermine the
sources of power of different domestic groups and thus weaken their ability to exert
influence over it. This happens because the services and material resources transferred
under a cliency relationship can be used by the client government to weaken both
popular and elite groups. A state in which cliency has significantly contributed to
authoritarianism or autonomy in this manner is referred to here as a client state.
This section brings together the material presented in chapter 1 and section 1 of
this chapter to elucidate these ideas more concretely. The long-term implications of
this scenario for the domestic politics of the client country and for the interests of the
patron power are also briefly discussed.
71
2.3.1. The Relationship Between Cliencv and Authoritarianism
Authoritarianism was characterised above as a type of regime in which the
ability of popular groups to influence state policy is severely limited. Since popular
groups generally have meagre financial resources, do not occupy positions of authority
in the economy, and have weak ties with government officials, their ability to influence
the state depends mainly on their ability to engage in mass action. Cliency contributes
to authoritarianism to the extent that it enables the client government to undermine this
basic source of popular political power.
Mass action can be used to influence state policy in a number of ways. Since
the state must obtain at least some co-operation from popular groups to achieve such
basic goals as domestic order and a functioning economy, strikes and boycotts can be
used by these groups to gain certain concessions from the state. In the terminology
developed above this is a form of direct political power. Popular demonstrations and
organised acts of violence can similarly be used to win concession from the state or
force it to modify particular policies.
In a competitive electoral regime mass-based political parties and popular
participation in elections can dramatically change the composition of the government
,,
and hence the form of state. Short of such a dramatic change, mass action can still
exert extensive influence over state policy through the electoral process. In non-
democratic regimes, large-scale popular violence culminating in a revolutionary
seizure of power is, of course, the ultimate recourse of disenfranchised popular groups,
though one that is rarely used successfully. The possibility that they might seize state
power whether through elections or through popular violence, confers enormous
political power on the ascendant groups. This form of power was described above as
indirect political power.
In whatever form it takes, the ability of action to influence state policy depends
on the degree to which particular groups are mobilised and on the strength and
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effectiveness of their leadership and political organisations. Groups in which only a
small percentage of individuals are politically active are inherently weaker than highly-
mobilised groups. Organisations representing under-mobilised or inarticulate groups
may find it difficult to claim legitimacy and hence gain acceptance in political circles.
Groups which are poorly-organised or have weak leadership cannot compete effectively
with other groups and tend to respond slowly to novel or fortuitous circumstances. A
cliency relationship can enable the client government to undermine popular political
movements by providing it with resources which can be used to co-opt and demobilise
popular groups and weaken their leadership and political organisations. These
resources include military and economic aid, overt and covert interventions, and
various kinds of security agreements.
Economic aid, when given in sufficient quantities, can be an important political
resource in the hands of the recipient government. By augmenting domestic demand or
contributing to the economic infrastructure, foreign aid can stimulate the recipient
country's economy and can thus help to placate popular unrest. Greater popular
satisfaction due to improved economic conditions, even if improvements are due to
flows of foreign aid rather than to changes in the state's policies, can result in popular
demobilisation and can thus undermine support for political movements. Aid can be
particularly useful in this manner in times of economic crises, when popular unrest is
generally most acute. Moreover, economic aid can be selectively allocated to particular
regions or social strata, giving the recipient government a measure of flexibility in its
use as a political resource.
Military and security-oriented transfers, and economic aid which allows other
funds to be diverted to the security apparatus, can help the recipient government
undermine political organisations and successfully combat armed movements. Special
training can increase the effectiveness and morale of security forces. Transfers of
sophisticated equipment can improve the capabilities of the security forces in areas that
are important for maintaining domestic security, such as intelligence-gathering and
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paramilitary operations. Intelligence agencies which have received assistance of this
sort are generally better able to penetrate and disrupt opposition organisations. Military
forces which have received sophisticated training and equipment can more effectively
combat armed opposition groups. Since the threat or actual use of organised violence is
often the only means of political power for popular groups, transfer which strengthen
the recipient's security apparatus can severely weaken these groups.
Overt and covert interventions and security agreements calling for intervention
or other assistance under certain circumstances effectively increase the size and quality
of the security forces available to the recipient government. Interventions and security
agreements can thus have consequences similar to, and even more drastic than, those of
material transfers and training. Direct intelligence assistance and support for loyal
groups by the patron can enable the client government to infiltrate opposition
organisations and anticipate or undermine their programs. Covert actions by the patron
such as sabotage or assassination can disrupt a group's organisational structure and
undermine its leadership. Concerted actions such as these can force an organisation to
restructure itself to achieve greater secrecy, reducing its efficiency. Overt interventions
can, of course, have an even greater impact. They may lead to the outright defeat of
armed opposition groups or force them into protracted conflicts with high attrition rates.
In addition to the direct impact of these cliency instruments, a close and
enduring relationship between a patron and a client can generate a climate of fear and
pessimism which may further inhibit popular mobilisation. Individuals may come to
view political activity as hopeless in the face of a strong client state backed by a
powerful patron. Intervention by the patron in the domestic affairs of the client country,
or even evidence of the patron's willingness to intervene in the form of security
agreements or interventions in nearby countries, can have a particularly depressing
effect on political activity. Groups whose members have little confidence in their
ability to influence the state can have little hope of doing so collectively, no matter how
strong their political organisations and leadership may be.
74
It should be emphasised that the relationship between cliency and
authoritarianism elaborated here is not merely coincidental. Since cliency is conceived
primarily for the purpose of enhancing the client government's stability, the instruments
which transpire under a cliency relationship are selected specifically to achieve this
goal. For the most part these instruments consist of resources which can be used to
repress popular political movements. However, for the relationship between cliency
and authoritarianism to develope two features require to be present. Firstly, regular
commitment from the patron state and secondly, weak domestic political institutions in
the client state. The major exception is economic aid, which can also have important
political consequences and is often used with this goal in mind. Moreover, if the
client's stability is sufficiently important to the patron it will provide whatever
resources are necessary to achieve this goal, virtually guaranteeing certain domestic
political outcomes. Thus while many writers and policymakers use the term "stability"
in a politically-neutral sense, its pursuit can only be regarded as an inherently political
act.
2.3.2. Cliency and Relative Autonomy from Elites
A relatively autonomous state was defined above as one in which even powerful
social groups have little influence over state policy. The most powerful groups in a
society, even in a democratic society, are invariably elite groups of one kind or another
whose power lies in their wealth, social positions, and political connections. These
groups rarely engage in armed confrontation with the state, and hence security-oriented
transfers have little bearing on the state's autonomy from them. Furthermore, their
degree of mobilisation and the strength of their political organisations and leadership
are less important as determinants of power for elite groups than for popular groups.
Services and resources which enable the state to undermine a group's cohesion and
political organisations also have little bearing on the state's autonomy.
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Nevertheless, cliency can have important implications for the relative autonomy
of the state from powerful social groups. Economic aid and other capital transfers can
enable the state to play a large role in organising and financing development projects,
reducing its dependence on local banks and other sectors and increasing its control over
the economy. Capital transfers and special arrangements with the patron, often acting
in collaboration with multinational corporations, can be used to establish state-
controlled industries. This can serve to deny important sectors of the economy to
private capital and further increase the state's control over it. 28 Foreign aid can also be
used to displace taxes and other transfers to the state from wealthy groups, placating
these groups and reducing the state's dependence on them as sources of revenue. In
general, financial transfers and other policies of the patron can increase the client
government's control over the economy and enable it to act with greater autonomy from
powerful economic actors.
In addition to increasing the economic power of the state vis-a-vis powerful
domestic groups, foreign aid can be manipulated in other ways by the patron and the
client government for domestic political ends. Contracts financed under foreign aid can
be awarded prejudically to gain the loyalty and support of the recipients. Foreign aid
which is not tied to specific projects can be secretly channelled to key individuals or
political organisations. Corruption can be used in this way to establish elaborate
systems of patronage in which members of the elite become indebted to the state.
Political control of this sort can fragment and weaken elite groups, allowing the state to
act with greater autonomy from them.
2.3.3. The Client State
As the quantitative data presented in section 4 of chapter 1 indicated, the United
States has employed the foreign policy tools referred to here as cliency instruments in
varying degrees throughout the world. While the concept of cliency can be used to
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refer to only those relationships where these tools have been used in substantial volume,
a broad variety of cliency relationships nevertheless remain. These were characterised
above as ranging from strong to weak. Given this large variation, the impact of cliency
on the client's domestic politics should also vary as well, ceteris paribus. In order to
focus on the most extreme cases, the term client state is used here to refer to situations
in which cliency instruments have been used in sufficient volume to enable the state to
act independently of domestic groups, whether strong or weak. Such a state is
characterised as both autonomous and authoritarian.
It is evident that the countries referred to in chapter 1 as strong and moderate
clients do not all have states which are autonomous and authoritarian, and that
consequently the relationship between cliency and these domestic political outcomes is
not a simple, cause-and-effect process. At least two important factors can be mentioned
which mediate between cliency and these outcomes. First, the patron's commitment to
the strength and stability of the client government must be sufficiently strong and
durable for these consequences to occur. In countries such as Pakistan and Cambodia
in the late 1950s and 1960s the commitment of the United States was, at times, very
strong, but fluctuated dramatically. The client governments in these countries were
consequently not able to consolidate power sufficiently to establish client states.
Second, domestic political institutions must be relatively weak for the client
government to be able to undertake the measures necessary to establish a client state. In
Israel and to a lesser extent in Turkey, strong political parties and a highly mobilised
and sophisticated populace have prevented client governments from taking these
measures, despite high levels of U.S. security assistance.
Unfortunately, the international and domestic conditions bearing on the
establishment of a client state can only be investigated thoroughly with detailed,
comparative case studies. Such comparative studies are beyond the scope of this
analysis. This issue will be discussed further in the conclusion of this study in the
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context of a discussion of possible strategies for avoiding the undesirable consequences
of cliency.
Since a variety of domestic and international factors other than cliency can also
contribute to autonomy and authoritarianism, it may be difficult to positively identify a
client state in practice. One way of doing so is to ascertain the degree of dependence of
the client state on transfers from the patron by examining the consequences of a major
cutback in these transfers. If the client state, as a particular form of state, is dependent
on support from the patron, then withdrawal of this support should result in a change in
the form of state. However, this approach is only useful in retrospective studies where
the cliency relationship has ended and the client state has collapsed. Another way to
identify a client state is to establish a direct causal relationship between cliency and the
outcomes of autonomy and authoritarianism. If the establishment of a cliency
relationship coincides closely with a substantial shift toward autonomy or
authoritarianism a causal relationship may exist. A causal relationship can be more
clearly verified if cliency instruments can be specifically implicated in the process of
transition to autonomy or authoritarianism. Each of these approaches will be used in
this study.
2.3.4. Consequences for the Client Society
The main argument of this study, then, is that a country's domestic politics can
be strongly affected by international security structures in much the same way that it
may be affected by international economic structures, as was discussed in section 2.
This may not seem particularly surprising, nor at first glance does it seem more
problematic than the impact of international economic factors on a country's politics.
However, potentially serious problems may arise when a state is no longer subject to
societal pressures.
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Several studies were discussed in section 2 which argued that a state which is
autonomous or authoritarian may be sufficiently independent of pressures from
particular groups in society to fundamentally transform the economy. In the cases
examined in these studies a severe economic crisis weakened certain groups, permitting
the state to act without regard for their interests. With the decline of these groups the
state was able to undertake policies which led to economic recovery at their expense. It
pursued these policies because it felt an imperative to transform the economy,
reinforced by direct or indirect pressures from other powerful groups seeking a
particular type of recovery.
Should some other factor (such as cliency) weaken domestic groups and make
the state more autonomous or authoritarian, the state will have the same latitude to
transform the economy at the expense of these groups. However, in the absence of an
economic crisis there is no clear imperative to transform the economy in a certain way.
Furthermore, if the state is independent of pressures from all domestic groups, powerful
groups will not be able to pressure the state to move the economy in a particular
direction. Consequently the state may be able to pursue economic policies which are
contrary to the interests of all domestic groups, and of society in general. The self-
regulating mechanisms embodied in both the pluralist view and the political economy
approach used in the studies discussed above may be seriously disrupted in this way.
The state and society may become thoroughly disarticulated in the sense that the state is
no longer constrained by societal pressures to pursue policies which are in the interests
of either particular groups or of society as a whole.
This line of reasoning can be extended to other areas in which the state may take
a leading role in transforming society. Areas of particular interest in the case of Iran are
Westernisation and secularisation. A state which is free from societal pressures can
undertake policies to transform society in any manner it sees fit. Having undermined
the political power of both the nationalist movement and the clergy in the 1950s and
1960s, the client state in Iran was able to undertake Western-oriented development
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projects, establish close ties with governments and businesses in the West, and
introduce a series of reforms which conflicted with traditional Islamic values. These
policies were strongly opposed by many sectors of society and contributed to popular
dissatisfaction with the state.
Another area in which cliency can greatly strengthen the client state and result
in a similar disarticulation between the state and groups seeking to pressure it is in
regional relations between a client country and its neighbours. A client whose military
forces are enhanced to the point where it achieves regional hegemony obviously cannot
be pressured by military threats from other countries in the area. Such a country may
become so powerful that it is in a position to impose its will on all other countries in the
region. The self-regulating mechanism which operates in this case is the regional
balance of power, a concept with liberal origins similar to those of pluralism. 29 Israel
has been the prototypic example of this pattern in recent years. While this is an area of
obvious theoretical importance and of direct relevance for U.S. interests in the Middle
East, it lies beyond the scope of the present study.
The disarticulation of state-society relations or of regional relations can have
serious long-term consequences for both the patron and the client. In the absence of
pressures from domestic groups, the client state is free to pursue policies of its own
choosing. These may be quite unpopular, or may be contrary to the interests of
particular groups. The client state's economic policies may be unsuitable for prevailing
domestic and international conditions and may lead to severe economic problems in the
future. Its policies in other areas such as land reform, income redistribution, political
participation, and cultural or religious issues may cause great popular dissatisfaction.
Over a period of time the cumulative effects of bad economic policy or popular
discontent may lead to increasing instability. Aggressive actions against neighbouring
countries may provoke military build-ups, the entrance of other superpowers into the
region, and other reprisals, and may dangerously drain the client's economy.
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These various consequences present a serious paradox for the patron. While its
initial motive in establishing a cliency relationship may have been a desire to obtain a
strong and stable regional ally, the long-term consequences of its involvement may in
fact produce quite the opposite result. This issue will be discussed further in the
conclusion of this study with particular reference to the case of Iran.
4..
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CHAPTER III
THE PHILOSOPHY OF US FOREIGN AND SECURITY
POLICY MAKING
3.1. Introduction
This chapter shall attempt to trace the philosophy of US foreign and security
policy making. Every state has a foreign and security policy. To create and manage
such a policy is essential to its existence as an independent actor in an international
system dominated by the power, prestige, and influence of other nation-states with
different cultural experiences, historical traditions, institutional structures, national
goals, and political aspirations. As long as there is no universal agreement as to the
moral, ethical, and legal codes which might govern the behaviour of nation-states
towards one another, tensions will persist, conflicts of interest will arise which will
have to be tolerated, accommodated, and resolved. Hence, a given state's reactions to
other nations will continue to dominate the abstract analysis of academics and the
„
operational policies of decision makers. It means that nation-states and their foreign
policy will continue to be explained in the continuing and interlocking tensions of
domestic and foreign realities.
Before examining the case study of US security policy towards Iran in part two,
it is essential to broadly understand the philosophy of US foreign policy-making.
Because reviewing the historical precedents and philosophical roots at the base of the
US political system, can facilitate the objective and symmetric criticism of US security
policy towards a Third World state. After briefly discussing the American culture, we
shall trace the five typical characteristics of US philosophy in policy-making, beginning
with Isolationism. However, to obtain the characteristics of the philosophy of US
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policy making in general, this chapter will not only focus on the specific aspects of US-
Iran relations but also on significant global and historical situations.
Foreign policy decisions are made in the context of the political culture, or set
of attitudes towards politics, of the society in which the decisions are made. In some
countries, the political culture may be diverse, with several sets of values competing for
authority. The United States is unique among the great powers (with the possible
exception of Britain) in having a political culture which is the opposite. It is not only
extremely homogeneous, but it has also been highly stable ever since the US entered the
international arena. The continuity, stability, and uniformity of its government, politics
and attitudes towards America's place in the world means that an examination of its
conservative culture and traditions is perhaps more important than when considering
other countries, in which other factors such as geography, size or economic
circumstances may go a long way towards creating a general understanding.
American foreign and security policy itself appears, at a first glance far from
being consistent. It would appear to have undergone monumental changes during its
history. Following the entangling alliance with France during the revolutionary war,
there was a century and more of neutralism, succeeded quite suddenly by a switch to
hegemony and involvement on a scale which has caused some observers to accuse the
United States of attempting to create a world empire since 1945. The neutralist phase
itself was interrupted by the War of 1812, by a burst of imperialism in the 1890s, by
enforced intervention in each of the two world wars of this century, and by brief periods
of diplomatic leadership, Great-Power style, in the 1900s and in the aftermath of World
War I. Yet beneath these apparent alternations between active and passive foreign
policy, it is possible to discern an entirely consistent pattern, as Hans J. Morgenthau has
argued in his book In Defence of the National Interest l and elsewhere. In its simplest
form, this pattern has consisted, first, of an assertion of United States dominance in the
Western hemisphere, comprising the north and south American continents, the
Caribbean, and the Pacific Ocean at least as far as Hawaii. This hemispheric hegemony
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might be described as the "vital interest" of the United States in relatively narrow sense,
and it was established in the early stages of emergence of the United States of America.
Further, it has been a traditional and consistent US foreign policy to support a general
balance of power in Europe in order to prevent the growth of any one super-power there
which might pose a major threat across the Atlantic Ocean. In the same way, the
United States has been concerned to establish and maintain a rough balance of power in
the Far East, although the complexities of the Asian environment have given little
opportunity for a coherent US foreign policy to emerge during the period since its first
diplomatic intervention in Asia in 1899. This elementary formula, control of the
Western hemisphere plus intervention on the side of the weaker powers whenever the
balance seemed to be in danger in Europe or Asia, does give some understanding of US
foreign policy, partiality before 1945. But it is by no means a comprehensive
explanation, and it gives no impression of the distinctively American philosophy of
foreign affairs which was first expressed in President Washington's celebrated
'Farewell Address' and which is necessary to an understanding of the attitudes of
successive generations of American national leaders which in turn gives the foreign
policy of the country its diplomatic 'style', and has its roots in the national character
and historical experience of the American people.
3.2. Isolationism
3.2.1. Early Isolationism
No adequate understanding of post-1945 (post-war) American foreign policy is
possible without insight into the isolationist mentality which governed the diplomatic
behaviour of the United States from the founding of the republic down to World War IL
An understanding of the isolationist viewpoint is essential for two reasons. The first is
that every state's foreign policy is to a significant degree an outgrowth of its diplomatic
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history and experience. To cite merely two examples: It is impossible to comprehend
modern United States - Latin American relations without at least a rudimentary
awareness of the issuance and evolution of the Monroe Doctrine; or, from the end of
World War II until the termination of the Vietnam War. American foreign policy was
massively influenced by "the lessons of the 1930", when the United States (along with
the Allied powers of Europe) failed to act decisively against German, Italian, Japanese,
and other sources of aggression. Presidents Truman and Johnson, for example,
repeatedly cited these lessons as justification for their staunch opposition to Communist
expansionism after 1945.2
The second reason why attention must be devoted to the isolationist period and
viewpoint is that many vestiges of a traditional isolationist mentality continue to
influence public and official attitudes toward foreign affairs in the United States. When
the United States took the lead in establishing, and later joined, the United Nations in
1945, isolationism was officially repudiated as the guiding principle of American
foreign policy. Two years later - when the Truman Administration enunciated the
"Truman Doctrine" (or containment strategy) for resisting Communist expansionism,
the United States committed itself to an "interventionist" foreign policy. Implementing
this strategy required the state to assume defence and diplomatic obligations throughout
the world and led to active American involvement in every major region. Despite these
developments, new forms of isolationist thought evolved after World War II. These
neo-isolationism and tendencies drew heavily from the more traditional isolationist
approach; and many of the underlying assumptions made by devotees of the old and the
new isolationism were identical or remarkably similar.3
Isolationism has pervaded the American approach to foreign relations since the
earliest days of the republic. America's pattern of isolationist thought is well illustrated
by its foreign policies during the 1920s and 1930s. What is not so widely recognised is
that isolationism goes much deeper than merely the desire to avoid foreign
entanglements. It is above all a habit of mind, 'a cluster of national attitudes, a feeling
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of spiritual separation from other countries, especially Europe, with roots penetrating
deeply into the nation's heritage and experience:4
Isolationism is more than a doctrine advanced to explain the objective facts of
America's geographical relationship with the rest of world. Instead, it is supposed to
explain what American people believe to be the proper relationship between themselves
and other countries. Isolationist thinking permeates the American cultural experience,
its philosophy, and what may be called more generally (the American way of life.) It is
basically a conviction that Americans are different from other people; that they do not
look to foreigners for guidance but that foreigners should look to them; that their
national destiny is to serve as a beacon to pilot all mankind into new paths of greatness
- but that all this should be done primarily by precept and example.5
The influences that have contributed to isolationist thinking are many and
complex. Here we can do no more than allude to some of the more important ones.
The desire for separation from the vicissitudes of Europe brought settlers to the New
world. The wish to begin life anew, to leave behind the turmoil, the hopelessness, the
bigotry of the Old world - these ambitions brought the religious dissenter, the skilled
artisan, the speculator, and the felon to American shores. From all walks of life they
came, and with one objective: to find a new birth, as it were, in a far-off continent.
The American revolution cut the political ties with England, and as the years
passed, Americans came to believe more firmly than ever in their uniqueness.
Presidents Washington and Jefferson both cautioned their countryman and
countrywoman that America and Europe had different interests and advised that
America's best course was to concentrate on keeping these interests distinct. 6 Very
early in the nation's history, isolationism became the underlying principle of foreign
policy. So, one pretext after another was found to justify America's refusal to honour
the French alliance during the Napoleon wars. President Monroe in 1823 asserted that
the United States had but one objective in its relations with the Old world: a free
translation of Monroe's admonitions would be that America wanted the European
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countries to mind their own business and, if they must persist in power struggles, to
keep them out of the Western hemisphere. The United States, shielded by the British
navy, experienced remarkably few challenges to the Monroe Doctrine during the course
of almost a century.7
From the Monroe Doctrine until World War II the American people were
profoundly isolationist. We must regard participation in World War I as an interlude.
Its politico-strategic significance generally passed unnoticed within the United States.
After World War I, Americans looked forward to a return to "normalcy", or
preoccupation with domestic affairs; they quickly became disillusioned with foreign
affairs, preferring to "let Europe stew in its own juice" and to refrain from participation
in the League of Nations. For example, the United States was prepared to do little more
than reprimand Japan verbally for its aggression against Manchuria in the early 1930s;
and it was unwilling to join with other countries in dealing decisively with numerous
instances of Axis expansionism in the years which followed. Shaken by the impact of
the Great Depression, the American society was overwhelmingly preoccupied with
internal problems. Many leading isolationists remained convinced until Pearl Harbour
in 1941 that America would escape involvement in another global conflict. Americans
believed that creation of their 'new society' demanded almost exclusive attention to
domestic problems and pursuits. This fact prompted one of the nation's leading
historians, and in time a prominent spokesman for the isolationist viewpoint, Charles A.
Beard, to prefer the term continentalism to isolationism in describing the nation's
foreign policy stance. A more recent observer, Max Lerner, has emphasised basically
the same idea, but with the additional thought that isolationism and post-World War II
interventionism (or internationalism) shared a common goal: both were ultimately
designed to enable American society to devote itself chiefly to internal pursuits.8
The isolationist principle found concrete expression in several diplomatic
behaviour patterns and propensities. The best-known perhaps was America's
traditional refusal to enter into military alliances with other countries; the concept of 'no
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entangling alliances' was consistently adhered to until after World War 11. Isolationism
also dictated the nation's non-intervention in European political conflicts except (as
President Monroe's message provided) when America's own security interests were
directly affected. A position of 'neutrality' toward Europe's war - a stance which the
United States tried to maintain in the early stage of both the First and Second World
Wars - was also a component of isolationism. Another element in the isolationist
approach was what was sometimes called the Doctrine of "a free hand": the United
States would preserve maximum freedom of action diplomatically. Thus, the Monroe
Doctrine (and, some 75 years later, the 'Open Door Policy" toward Asia) was issued
_
unilaterally by the United States; and Washington remained the sole interpreter of these
policies.9 The Carter Doctrine issued early in 1980 was a recent example of another
important unilateral foreign policy declaration by the United States, committing
America to the defence of the Persian Gulf area.10
The isolationist approach to external questions was marked by two conspicuous
omissions. One of these was a clear American understanding of the role of power,
particularly armed force, in global political relationships. Few Americans were aware
(and many may still be unaware) that during most of the nineteenth century the British
fleet largely provided whatever 'enforcement' was needed to gain international
compliance with the Monroe Doctrine. Not until after World War II did Americans
accept the idea that an adequate and modern military establishment is essential for the
achievement of many major foreign policy goals.
The second fundamental weakness in the isolationist viewpoint was the failure
to comprehend, and to modify national policies in the light of, significant changes in the
nature of the international system. Innumerable examples of this weakness might be
cited. One was America's failure to comprehend the implications of the emergence of
an increasingly powerful and assertive Japan after 1900. Another was the lack of
awareness in the United States of the steady decline in British power in the twentieth
century. After World War II, Great Britain no longer ranked among the more powerful
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members of the international system. Among its other consequences, this British
decline meant that in instance after instance (and the issuance of the 'Truman Doctrine'
to protect the security of Greece was an example), the United States was compelled to
assume international obligations once borne by Great Britain and its empire. Rapid and
ongoing technological changes, the emergence of airpower, and the growing firepower
of modern weapons - rendered all nations more vulnerable and largely cancelled out
many of the security advantages which geographical barriers (like the Atlantic Ocean or
the Arctic icecap) had given the United States. Still another reality largely ignored by
isolationists was America's own growing dependence upon a long list of 'strategic'
imports from abroad. Insofar as economic self-sufficiency had sustained the isolationist
position throughout much of the nation's history, by 1940 this precondition of
successful isolationism was rapidly being superseded by new realisation in which the
prosperity and security of the United States depended as never before upon access to
raw materials import and upon continuing sales of American goods overseas.
3.2.2. Isolationism after World War II
World War II ended the era of classical American isolationism. Habits ofpind,
prejudices, and in some cases misconceptions which had nourished the traditional
isolationist approach continued to survive and to influence the US behaviour in foreign
affairs. Yet neither the historic isolationist nor the newer neo-isolationist viewpoint
comprised a unified, logically consistent 'system' of thought. In the isolationist
approach, as other points of view about the country proper diplomatic course, the
American penchant for eclecticism could be discerned. Today, as in the past,
isolationists often advocate incompatible ideas and favour mutually exclusive courses
of action.
In the post-war period, however, two broad schools of isolationist thought could
be identified. One of these could be labelled 'liberal neo-isolationism' and was often
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espoused by liberal spokesmen in the Democratic and Republican parties, as well as by
prominent citizens' organisations." Contemporary liberal neo-isolationism draws
freely from the old isolationist tradition. Prominent themes in liberal neo-isolationist
thought are the ideas that the United States should avoid relying upon military force to
achieve its diplomatic objectives; that Washington should lean heavily upon the United
Nations and upon international law to accomplish its external objectives; that it should
respond generously to the economic needs of the Third World; that the United States
should become identified with, and should support, revolutionary political movements
abroad, which are directed at abolishing the status quo and creating more equitable
social, economic and political systems in other societies; that American officials should
directly encourage and support the emergence of democracy in other countries. Many
contemporary liberal neo-isolationists believe that the most effective influence which
America can exert upon the international system is the power of its own example in
successfully eliminating racial conflicts, eradicating poverty, and providing equal
opportunities for all citizens within its own borders.
The basic premise of the liberal neo-isolationist was that extensive American
involvement in the affairs of other countries was objectionable for two reasons: more
often than not (as in the case of Vietnam), it compounded the foreign soGiety's
problems and resulted ultimately in lessened American power and influence in the
region; and it was highly inimical to American domestic programmes and goals,
causing the state to neglect pressing internal problems, producing a high level of
internal dissension over foreign policy issues, and leading to the emergency of the
'imperial presidency' over which Congress and the American people had little
control. 12
The conservative version of neo-isolationism shared the same basic goal -
retrenchment in the country's overseas commitments - but it supported this conclusion
for different reasons. 13 Advocates of conservative neo-isolationism today share the
view of traditional isolationist that the international environment is in the main inimical
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to the achievement of American foreign policy goals. Even more than in the late
nineteenth century, or in the early post-war period, the external milieu is unfavourable
for the beneficial application of American power. Soviet Russia's continuing military
build-up (vis-a-vis a relative decline in American defence spending); Western Europe's
apparent continued indifference to the problem of its own defence; continuing political
upheaval and instability throughout the Third World; America's failure to use its
military power to achieve 'victory' in the Vietnam War; the country's steadily
worsening balance-of-payments deficit, created in large part by the policies of the
Middle East oil-producing states - such developments convinced conservative neo-
isolationists that the 'internationalism' practised by the United States for some 25 years
after World War 11 achieved few beneficial results.
As was also true of liberal neo-isolationism, the conservative variety was far
from monolithic." Its proponents differed widely, for example, on the precise criteria
which ought to govern American interventionism abroad and concerning the countries
and regions whose security constituted a 'vital interest' for the United States. An early
version of conservative neo-isolationism - advocated by ex-US President, Herbert
Hoover during the 1950s - was the 'Fortress America' strategy. 15 The United States
should confine its diplomatic and military activities abroad largely to the Western
Hemisphere. A more recent proposal in this vein urges the United States to concentrate
its diplomatic and security efforts on the "Northern Hemisphere" - more specifically,
Europe and Japan - where its vital interests supposedly lie. Implicit in this approach is
the idea that most developments in the Third World are of marginal importance to the
United States. 16 A more recent alternative proposal, advocated by a former US State
and Defence Department official, calls for the United States to reformulate its
diplomatic strategy around the concept of the seas and a long list of countries (from
Western Europe to East Asia) where American commercial interests lie. 17 As is
evident, securing agreement upon the criteria which ought to be employed for defining
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America's 'vital interest' poses as much difficulty for conservative neo-isolationism as
for other approaches to American foreign policy.
3.3. The Ideology: Liberalism and its Critics
3.3.1. Liberalism
An optimistic interpretation of the relationship between capitalism and
democracy is central to the driving ideology of US foreign policy: the ideology of
liberalism. It is, of course, conventional for practitioners and defenders of American
foreign policy to deny that it has an ideology. It certainly has goals, but ideology, no.
Writing in 1945, Thomas Bailey outlined the traditional goals or 'fundamental policies'
as: isolation, non-intervention or nonentanglement; the Monroe Doctrine (the protection
of a sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere); freedom of the seas; the Open
Door (especially in China) - the 'right of American citizens to engage in industry
abroad on an equal basis with other foreigners'; pacific settlement of disputes; Pan-
Americanism; and opportunism (minor adjustments without reference to
fundamentals). 18
 The principal post-1945 goal was the containment of communism, an
objective to be achieved within an internationalist policy context. But, as for ideology,
it is, according to Arthur Schlesinger, "out of character" for pragmatic Americans. 19
 Of
course, 'ideology' bears many meanings and, no doubt, the term can be defined so as to
separate it from American liberal pragmatism. Such a separation, however, seems to
serve little purpose other than the polemical one of being able to characterise opposing
positions as 'ideological': over-zealous, dogmatic, undemocratic, totalitarian. Within
Marxism, 'ideology' embraces both 'false consciousness' and forms of thought which
function to preserve or represent class interests. For the Marxist, obviously, there is no
question as to the 'ideological' status of ideas underpinning and seeking to justify US
foreign policy. Outside Marxism, 'ideology' may be defined as 'more or less coherent
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collections of political beliefs and values which take a doctrine and identifiable shape'
or 'value system'. In these senses, US liberalism is clearly an ideology among other
ideologies, and it is worth remembering that Louis Hartz, the most celebrated modern
interpreter of American liberalism, had no doubts about this."
American democratic liberalism, whose main progenitor was John Locke, may
be characterised as embodying commitments to the interdependence of democracy and
capitalism; to individual liberty and the protection of private property; to limited
government, the rule of law, natural rights, the perfectibility of human institutions, and
to the possibility of human progress. It is allied with a strong sense of national mission
and American exceptionalism; the belief that American democratic history provides a
model for the world. At its heart, Lockeian liberalism embraces a commitment both to
national self-determination and to the view that the world belongs to the industrious
and the rational.21 Enemies of liberalism are, on the right, conservative ideologies
which exude pessimism about the possibility of progress through human agency; and,
on the left, ideologies which assert that human freedom may only be realised through a
transcendence of private property and capitalism. As an ideology underpinning US
foreign policy, liberalism oscillates between the poles of non-entanglement and
interventionist internationalism. Historical in Presidential age Washington' s , farewell
address, non-entanglement has been held up as a consequence of American
exceptionalism. Non-entanglement would allow the United States to shape its frontier
destiny, remain aloof from distant quarrels, and provide a model for the world in the
process.
With the closing of the frontier and, especially, with US assumption of global
leadership after 1945, non-entanglement gave way to the liberal internationalist ideal:
the protection and promotion of liberal, capitalist values on a global scale. President
Woodrow Wilson appropriated the term 'liberal' to justify American entry into World
War I. Liberal internationalists like President Franklin Roosevelt used the denigratory
label 'isolationist' to stigmatise the older, non-entanglement tradition. 22 After 1945, the
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cause of liberal internationalism became inextricably bound up with the idea of
'containing' expansionist, Soviet-directed communism. Containment, articulated
within a culture of self-righteous anti-communism, was always a rather unsatisfactory
concept. Its progenitor, George Kennan, came to disagree with the global interpretation
of containment advanced by the Truman administration. When tied to a defensive
vocabulary, and particularly when used to underpin 'limited' wars, containment also
conflicted with the crusading, quasimassianic tone of US liberal internationalism.23
3.3.2. Alternatives to Liberalism
Within the history of US policy making what alternatives have been presented
to liberal ideology? There are at least five candidates: self-interested realism;
conservatism; isolationism; Wilsonian idealism; and left liberalism. These will now,
very briefly, be considered in sequence, with the underlying implication that they are
most appropriately viewed as variants on and tendencies within the overarching liberal
ideology. This is not to suggest however that there are not real and important
differences between these points of view - between, for example, self-interested realism
and left liberalism. But it is not being argued here that voters in liberal;,capitalist
democracies are offered no 'real' choice in these matters. It is also the case that both
realism and conservatism have the potential to constitute ideologies antagonistic to
Lockeian liberalism. Rather, the point is that, at least in the American context, these
viewpoints have exhibited a large measure of convergence, and an unwillingness to
challenge the dominant liberal ideology. Even accounts of American foreign policy
which stress its moral idealism and evangelising mission generally acknowledge the
role of national interests. The dialectical tension between 'ideals' and 'self-interest'
lies at the heart of conventional treatments of US foreign relations. 24 Robert Garson
puts the point well: 'foreign policy is the result of the intermingling of preconceived
assumptions (ideology if you like) and calculations about the national interests.' 2s A
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full-blown realist interpretation would have that US foreign policy achieves rationality
and purpose only to the extent that it embodies accurate, power-oriented, calculations of
national interest. Arguing against the legacy of Wilsonian idealism, Nicholas Spykman
wrote in America's Strategy in World Politics that the 'preservation and improvement
of their power position' constitutes the goal of state's foreign policies.26 The point to
be made here, however, is that power-based, national interest-oriented realism has been
an influence upon, rather than a substitute for, the liberal ideology of US foreign policy.
Realist, geopolitical ideology in recent American foreign policy has operated as a facet
of liberal internationalism, which itself embodies a firm (if usually unstated)
commitment to the national interest. Realism has had an important effect on the history
of the Cold War. Realist critics of the American involvement in Vietnam contributed
decisively to the changing public debate over the war. However, when self-proclaimed
upholders of real politic have guided US foreign policy, they have altered the direction
of American diplomacy rather than its underlying foundations and assumptions.27
Conservative foreign policy positions in the United States tend to be identified
with a strong commitment to high levels of defence spending and an intense level of
anti-communism. They also are inclined to romantic notions about the assertion of
American power. A version of conservatism has been articulated in recentyears by
writers like Norman Podhoretz and Irving Kristol. Hostile to the perceived foreign
policy practices and legacy of the Carter Administration, these `neo-conservatives'
exhibit a self consciously tough-minded world outlook; they also have a firm
commitment to free market liberalism and reject welfare capitalism. Again, such views
may be regarded as constituting a variant of, or tendency within, liberal internationalism
rather than as an alternative to it. Nonetheless, conservatism, especially in its
scepticism toward perfectibility of human institutions, can be said to represent a
genuine alternative to liberalism. From a `neo-conservative' position, Jeane
Kirkpatrick has berated liberals for failing to acknowledge the existence of 'human
wickedness', taking refuge in 'pale euphemisms and blind theories of inevitable human
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progress' •28 An authentic conservative tradition does exist within the history of
American foreign policy: anti-imperialists, anxious about American security, sceptical
about 'Manifest Destiny' and national missions, concerned above all with the
preservation of liberty at home. Defined in these terms, conservative sentiments were
expressed by Daniel Webster at the time of the acquisition of California and New
Mexico (1846-48) by the United States from Mexico. Webster feared the growth of an
American imperialism: 'this country should exhibit to the world the example of a
powerful republic, without greediness and hunger of empire' 29 Henry Clay argued in
1852 that the best way for the United States to show 'to other nations the way to
greatness and happiness' was by maintaining liberty at home as a model for imitation.
Samuel Flagg Bemis, diplomatic historian and celebrator of American liberty as
expressed in the foreign policy wrote in 1936 that, after 1898, the American people
decided to acquire an empire and take their place in the world: 'Actually, the United
States had already taken its proper place in the world before 1898. That was in North
America'.
Robert Taft also developed a coherent conservative position during the Korean
conflict (1950-53). One aspect of this perspective concentrated on the domestic effects
of war: partly inflation, but also the inevitable domestic militarisation and centralisation
of power. Another related to the constitutional issues of excessive executive
unaccountability and secrecy. This Republican Senator from Ohio also stressed the
dangers of America 'becoming an imperialistic nation', which failed to recognise the
moral and practical 'limitations on what the United States can do'. 3° This anti-
imperialist strain within American conservatism was to generate a debate in the 1970s
on the putative continuity between older conservative and Vietnam generation - New
Left positions. During the Korean war, Taft pointed to the possibility that
interventionist liberalism might destroy the rights and lives of people the US intended
to defend against communism. In A Foreign Policy for Americans, Taft argued that
foreign remote peoples to be free ran counter to American democratic ideals. 31 Taft
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himself saw these democratic ideals as liberal: individual liberties defined within the
context of market liberalism and governmental non-interference. If we define
liberalism in these terms, and also note that American liberalism embodies a strong
commitment to the idea of America's special mission to protect liberty, we see here a
major problem with the articulation of American conservative passions which
inevitably tend to spin towards liberalist traditions. As Richard Crockatt has put it, the
US lacks a tradition which unites the European organic conservatism of Edmund Burke
and the dirigisme of Alexander Hamilton. 32 Taftian conservatism, although taken up in
later years by conservative intellectuals like Karl Hess, in any case found it hard to
survive the Cold War. Anti- imperialist criticisms of the Vietnam war came from the
Left rather than the Right of the political spectrum. In this connection, a comparison of
Barry Goldwater's hawkish Why Not Victory?(1962) with Taft's fears about the
creation of a 'garrison state' in A Foreign Policy for Americans is instructive.33
The main tenets of the foreign policy idealism associated with President
Woodrow Wilson were outlined in Wilson's 1918 'Fourteen Points' speech: open
diplomacy, anti-colonialism and self-determination, free trade. This idealistic
internationalism was to find echoes in the 'world order' internationalism of the Carter
Administration.34
 Clearly, however, neither Wilson's nor Carter's internationalism
were outside the ambit of liberal ideology. On the contrary, both were driven by a
notion of human perfectibility guided by the example of American democracy and
responsiveness to the needs of American capitalism. Wilson declared in 1912 that US
producers had 'expanded to such a point that they will burst their jackets if they cannot
find a free outlet to the markets of the world'. T.J. McCormick, summarising the work
of 'corporatist' historians, equates Wilsonianism' with `globalised corporatism';
('Americanised corporatism' is defined as 'a sort of corporate, pro-capitalist
reformism'). Carter's policies were affected, at least temporarily, by the programme for
post-Vietnam inter-capitalist co-operation advanced by the Trilateral Commission.
Both Wilson and Carter, in fact, oscillated between 'idealist' and 'realist' versions of
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liberalism. Wilson intervened in six Latin American conflicts to secure regimes
acceptable to the United States government. American troops fought against the Red
Army in the Russian civil war. The Carter Presidency, overtaken by events, had by
1980 adopted a confrontational posture towards the Soviet Union.35
Left liberalism may be regarded as an attempt to take Wilsonian idealism
seriously: to amputate its interventionist and militarist tendencies. Former vice-
president Henry Wallace advocated open diplomacy with the USSR in the late 1940s.
He attacked the Baruch Plan of 1946 (to set up an international atomic development
authority) as insufficiently generous in its promise to share knowledge of atomic
energy. In 1947, he admonished: 'Once America stands for opposition to change, we
are lost'. Unthinking counter-revolutionism would lead to America becoming 'the
most hated nation in the world' •36 Wallace was attacked as an appeaser and dismissed
as Secretary of Commerce in 1946. He was an optimistic liberal, believing firmly in
American democratic values, 'peace and prosperity': the alleviation of distress through
post-war reconstruction and the expansion of democracy and free trade. Post-Vietnam
left liberals continued to protest the influence of giant corporations and the 'military-
industrial complex', in the name of democratic values. Globalistic ambition had caused
political leaders to lose sight of domestic problems they argued. In his 1968 Campaign,
Robert Kennedy attacked President Johnson's claim that the war presaged 'a Great
Society for all of Asia'. Kennedy urged that 'we cannot build one in our country'. 37 In
1984, the Reverend Jesse Jackson delivered a speech to the United Nations entitled
'Foreign Policy - But Not Foreign Values'. He took up, indirectly, Robert Kennedy's
point about the neglect of domestic reform and linked it to the need to recover
America's true liberal democratic mission: 'If we are to remain the hope of the free
world, our challenge is not military escalation but a world-wide war on poverty, disease
and illiteracy. Domestic policy is foreign policy'.38
In Ideology and US Foreign Policy, Michael Hunt makes an eloquent plea for a
'Republican' foreign policy rooted in the notion that 'American greatness should be
measured against domestic conditions'. He traces the cultural roots and acceptions of
American foreign policy ideology, identifying a commitment to American
exceptionalism and sense of mission, an acceptance of racial hierarchy, and hostility to
revolutionary change abroad. Education is presented as a way out of this cultural
bondage: 'Education.. .offers one powerful antidote to the long-prevalent core ideas of
US policy. American values, especially the American conception of liberty, do not
export as well as we would like to think. It is time Americans... accepted the limits of
our power to shape other societies, time we pondered the contradiction we have long
perpetrated by seeking to impose our conception of self-determination and development
on peoples with aspirations quite different from our own'.39
3.4. The American Mission
The sense of mission was also the outcome of the search by Americans for a
precise definition of their national purpose and the development of an American
worldview. After all, this was a young country full of nationalistic enthusiasm and it
was felt that the development of a conviction of national purpose was an historical
necessity. In the first place, it provided a basis for continuity for a new nation which
had no developed historic past.4° Second, it established a concept in which the
American citizen could define the meaning of his or her life and his/her institutions, and
set goals for his purpose and destination.
This conviction of mission also provided grounds to incorporate religion into
the new American ideology. This combination supported the basic American concept
of liberty and freedom in all spheres of life. Religious tolerance was being assimilated
in a new political environment and it was the beginning of a new pluralistic democratic
society.
Strong religious convictions and a sense of mission developed a deep belief that
the American people were divinely designed for certain great achievements. Herman
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Melville wrote: 'And we Americans are peculiar, chosen people, the Israel of our times;
we bear the ark of the liberties of the world'. 41 Edward Johnson in 1630 saw the new
country as 'the place where the Lord will create a new Heaven, and a new Earth, new
churches, and a new commonwealth together'. 42
 Jedidiah Morse, the scientist and
historian, wrote in 1789:
Here [America] the sciences and the arts of civilised life are to
receive their highest improvement. Her civil and religious liberty
are to flourish, unchecked by the cruel hand of civil or
ecclesiastical tyranny. Here genius, aided by all the improvements
of former ages, is to be exerted in humanising mankind.., in
expanding and enriching their minds with religious and
philosophical knowledge, and in planning and executing a form of
government, with as few of their defects as is consistent with the
imperfection of human affairs, and which shall be calculated to
protect and unite, in a manner consistent with the natural rights of
mankind, the largest empire that ever existed.43
The mission of America, according to Albert Gallatin was:
'to be a model for all other governments and for all other less
favoured nations, to adhere to the most elevated principles of
political morality..., and by [your] example to exert a moral
influence most beneficial to mankind'.44
George Baneroff believed that the United States would eventually 'allure the
world to freedom by the beauty of its iustration'. The Reverend Timothy I5wight
believed the United States to be "by Heaven designed, the' example bright, to renovate
mankind". Alexander Hamilton believed that the American revolution set a precedent
that would force Europe to 'inquiries which may shake it to its deepest foundations'.
And Jefferson called the American experiment 'the last best hope of mankind', and 'a
barrier against the returns of ignorance and barbarismI.45
Obviously, the idea of an unique American mission flourishing under such
tremendously favourable psychological and political orientations has had an important
impact on United States foreign policy. Already blessed by the natural support of the
environment of the New World and the security derived from its geography and
location, more credentials were added to the doctrine of an unique American mission by
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the political and social contributions of the American revolution. The success of the
revolution made the new nation conscious of its unique position as a republic in a world
of monarchies. Psychologically, the Americans were well prepared and even anxious to
proclaim their political and social concepts to the rest of the world. They were
developing liberal political and social institutions and 'naturally' were constructing
their government with respect for the natural rights of man. In spite of their isolationist
inclinations, most Americans felt a concern and sympathy for foreign people who still
suffered under tyrannical governments. In 1782 Benjamin Franklin predicted:
Establishing the liberties of America will not only make the people
happy, but will have some effect in diminishing the misery of
those, who in other parts of the world groan under despotism, by
rendering it more circumspect, and inducing it to govern with a
lighter hand.46
John Adams predicted in 1785 that the United States was 'destined beyond a
doubt to be the greatest power on the earth, and that within the life of man'.47
Thus, the Americans started the formulation of their ideas in foreign relations under the
impact of the political notion of a mission. Reformation of less fortunate people was to
be at the forefront of this mission of America.
The climax of the 'Age of Enlightenment' coincided with the American revolution, and
liberals across the Atlantic, such as Condorcet, paid glowing tributes to the new
republic. This French liberal philosopher said America was living proof of the
universal truth of the principles of the Enlightenment, on which human progress
depended. He wrote: "it is not enough that the rights of man be written in the books of
philosophers and inscribed in the hearts of virtuous men; the weak and ignorant must be
able to read them in the example of a great nation. America has given us this example."
Therefore, the outbreak of the French revolution was seen by Americans in the
image of their own glorious revolution. It was the American revolutionary mission that
was taking France in its grip and freeing the French people from the yoke or monarchy
and setting them on to the path to democracy.
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Tom Paine was a militant opponent of tyranny and joined the revolutionary
struggle in France. He advocated that the revolution was the logical continuation of the
struggle for the rights of man which had been inaugurated in thirteen colonies. Paine
wrote:
'I see in America the generality of people living in a style of plenty
unknown in monarchical countries; and I see that the principle of
its government, which is that of the equal rights of man, is making
rapid progress in the world...1.48
Paine linked the continuity of revolution to the American spirit of liberty and
freedom and maintained that America would be the scene of coming reformation of the
world. He concluded: From the rapid progress which America makes in every species
of movement, it is rational to conclude that, if the governments of Asia, Africa, and
Europe had begun on a principle similar to that of America, or had not been very early
corrupted, therefrom, those countries must by this time have been in a far superior
condition to what they are.49
Replacement of monarchy by a constitutional regime was regarded as the
embodiment of the American spirit and the fulfilment of its liberal teachings. With the
passage of time and the rising tide of liberal trends in Europe, the Americans' faith in
„
their sense of mission was further strengthened. American public opinion swept in
favour of the revolt of the Greeks against their Turkish rulers in 1821. American
statesmen, including President Monroe, became warm advocates of the Greek cause.
Elsewhere in Europe the mass uprisings for national self-determination and political
and economic reforms aroused popular feelings and sympathy in the United States. But
in the wake of the momentary failure of these revolutionary movements, the American
liberals were forced to believe that their mission to advance the cause of world liberty
would have to be confined to perfecting the democratic model at home.
However, the doctrine of an American mission continued to have an indirect
connection with United States foreign policy. Scientific and technological
breakthroughs provided new inputs to the American sense of pride and confidence and
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enhanced its prestige abroad. The dynamic progress made in the fields of science and
industry was having important international significance and adding tremendously to
the prestige of American. America was breaking all political, social, economic, and
technological barriers to human progress and for more and more people it became the
land of promise and opportunity. The American inventions and techniques of mass
production and the increasing reputation of its literature abroad may have done much to
spread American institutions and ideas than any explicit interventionist policy.
Moralism has been the guiding principle and ethics have been the underlying
concern - liberty, peace, and democracy have been the ultimate ends of American
foreign policy. Thus American foreign policy hinged both in rhetoric and in practice
upon ethnocentric moralistic grounds. To Americans foreign policy was thought to be
the cosmic struggle between right and wrong; the perpetual repulsion of tyranny; the
true belief in individual liberty, freedom, and equality; total dedication to the rule of
law; and peaceful settlement of disputes with an ethical, democratic missionary zeal
undergirded with intense moral idealism. This attitude produced a false antithesis in
the American mind between morality and power politics; in effect, arrogating to the
United States all the moral values and placing the stigma of immorality on the
corrupting theory and practice of power polities pursued by other nations.5°
As Orestes Brownson noted in an essay entitled 'The American Republic':
small. Of these entrusted with great duties, the Jews were to 'Each
people had a mission selected by God, ...some great, some
establish worship of a single God, and belief in the Messiah. The
Greeks were chosen to develop beauty in art and truth in
philosophy. The Romans to develop law, order, political systems.
The United States has divine orders to continue these, and to
contribute its own, that is, its mission is to bring out in life the
dialectic union of authority and liberty, of the natural rights of man
and society'.51
There is an unbroken chain of continuity of thought deeply rooted in the
American spirit of missionary zeal. The hope for the world has always been closely
linked with American ideals. Thus, a Massachusetts orator told his Fourth of July
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audience in 1827: "The spark kindled in America, shall spread and spread, until all the
earth shall be illuminated with its light."52 Theodore Roosevelt reaffirmed the faith in
American mission and wrote in 1901: "We people of the United States, as to whether
or not we shall play a great part in the world, that has been determined for us by
fate,..."53 Adlai Stevenson, speaking in 1952 during the Korean war, phrased his
message in a biblical spirit:
'God has set for us an awesome mission: Nothing less than the
leadership of the free world. Because He asks nothing of His
servants beyond their strength, He has given to us vast power and
vast opportunity. And like that servant of Biblical times who
received the talents, we shall be held to strict account for what we
do with them1.54
This moralism allowed Americans to justify their increasingly interventionist
conduct of international affairs. Psychologically, it was impossible for them to perceive
a role without [good] aims and ideals. Politically, the stage had already been reached in
which America was involved in international affairs simply because of the reality of its
political power base and expanding economic system. Subsequently, the net effect of
Theodore Roosevelt's interventionist and aggressive diplomacy around the world was
the maintenance of a strong United States position in Latin America and monitoring of
the continuance of the precarious balance of power among the nations in the-Far East
and Europe. But Americans maintained that all such foreign policies were conducted in
the cause of peace and democracy. 55 The rapid changes in the international
environment, however, presented a paradox. Along with the pursuit of ideals of peace
and democracy, for example, went peripheral involvement in war and power politics
and the paradox of a growing peace movement in the midst of mounting appropriations
for armaments and battleships. For virtually the first time in its history, except in war,
the United States began to take very seriously the establishment of a strong military
force. 56 But the moral rhetoric of American foreign policy continued to be the
underlying basis of its aims. Exercising its new-found powers, America moved toward
leadership, intervening in the cause of peace and democracy and urging the view that
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peace must be enforced, if necessary through what was certainly the ultimate paradox
by war. In this fashion, in a period of only some twenty years, a foreign policy that had
been formulated to free Cuba was transfigured, via the Philippines and the Far East and
then World War I, into a holy crusade which overwhelmingly began to be seen as a
mission to make the world safe for peace and democracy. For such a task the American
people felt themselves equipped not only by history but also by the aggressively
jingoistic foreign policies asserted in the era from William Mokinly to Woodrow
Wilson."
Thus, in the period from the turn of the century to America's entrance into
World War I, there began to be seen the beginnings of a major shift in the thinking
about American foreign policy. "Without yielding their faith in the goals of peace and
democracy as mainsprings of that policy, the American people became more willing to
accept new means to accomplish these ends. The methods of peace through power, and
of democracy by intervention and force rather than by example, though not without
precedent in American history, came to achieve nevertheless a new degree of official
sanction and popular support."58 Imperialistic ambitions and the passing of a century of
relative security meant that military considerations would have to play an increasingly
important part in foreign affairs. And, involvement in world politics now also , entailed
sending American soldiers and sailors as well as missionaries and traders to the far
corners of the world.
This moral imperative of US foreign policy found its strongest expression in
Wilsonian internationalism. Wilson's ideals were in fact a projection of American
identity in universal terms. To Wilson, American ideals were in perfect harmony with
the principles of liberated mankind and were applicable to any society at any time.
Americanisation of the world appeared to be the ultimate ideal of Wilson's vision.
Therefore, even entry into World War I was voiced in strident moral, ethical, and holy
terms. In Wilson's concern with the internal stability of nations along with their
international harmony, he adhered to his belief that the foreign and domestic policies of
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a country could not be separated. Therefore, in his mind, peace and democracy were
linked as related goals in American foreign policy and the hint of America's need to
intervene in the internal affairs of other nations became a latent tenet of US foreign
policy.
The American way of life has laid special stress on the concept of assurance in
every endeavour. Expectancy is the mark of the American temper, which has found its
classic expression in the quest, the mission, the journey toward destiny.
The combination of moralism, expectancy, confidence, assurance, and the idea
of destiny has generated a kind of "faith" in the American style of handling
international politics and foreign relations. This concept of faith derives its sanctions
from spiritual as well as material culture. Faith united the goals of American material
prosperity with its aims of ultimate good in mankind. Within this definition of faith
Americans combined the emotional element of ecstatic openness toward the spiritual
presence in the reality and usefulness of their material culture. Therefore, there is no
essential contradiction and confusion in the American mind between seeking goals of
national self-interest and international betterment. Every war becomes a holy war -
until Vietnam - and idealism and moralism tends to give American foreign policy an
extremely ethnocentric and potentially aggressive character. As George F. Kalman has
pointed out, this spirit of moralism identified with the 'Manifest Destiny' of American
democracy led to the fervent involvement of the United States in such crusades as the
Spanish-American war and World War I - which were supposed to be the wars to end
all wars. 59 And surely this faith in American national purpose was the motivating force
behind the frontier spirit - that physical and psychological belief that the American
could and should extend his abilities and infiltrate every nook and cranny of the
continent. In fact, many cherished the notion that once the continent was explored,
American psychological and entrepreneurial energies would be obliged to discover new
frontiers in which to find expression, new opportunities to expand and grow. Of
course, this frontier spirit, based on the acceptance of the idea of faith in national
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purpose, foreshadowed many of the latter-day manifestations of American capitalism,
dollar diplomacy, manifest destiny, and cultural imperialism in twentieth century
3.5. The Public and Foreign Policy
A further point, an American foreign policy historically (and even today) has
always been formulated by an elite group. 6° Nevertheless, the American public from
time to time has been passionately involved in foreign policy issues. But their
involvement has usually been emotional-based. Thomas Bailey, discussing American
attitudes toward foreign affairs, had much to say about the sectionalism, Anglophobia,
suspicion of foreigners, and other emotional attitudes behind early American behaviour.
Slogans such as 'atrocities', holy war, 'Huns' and 'Hang the Kaiser' moved the
American public; and the nations of manifest destiny, isolationism, American mission,
and the Monroe Doctrine fed mostly on the people's emotions.
The American people have always been able to find a glow of ethics in their
foreign policy. Their actual influence on foreign policy questions, however, has never
been too deep. On the whole they have been rather consistently indifferent to the
questions of foreign policy. Gabriel Almond has called this attitude a 'mood' .-which is
the outcome of America's material culture. To Americans internal prosperity and
personal success are the immediate questions and challenges to which one looks and
which shape one's world. Americans are in a constant race with time and self-
recognition of their respective achievements by the society. Thus, the American's
outlook and outward orientation is limited; he is more [inward] and is apt to be
unconcerned with the larger questions of policy-making. He gets involved only when
his personal interests are threatened. At other times, his deeply nationalistic attitudes
command and motivate his inclinations on foreign policy questions.61
Americans have created an artificial paradise of their own, a world full of
material prosperity and the race to continually accumulate more. Therefore, outlook on
110
foreign policy is based on some sort of 'balance sheet' concept, an estimate of profit
and loss calculations. Nevertheless, it is not an 'amoral' attitude. It has its own
philosophy, historical justification, and creative forces. On the positive side, it has
produced interesting and valuable changes in consciousness and released the forces of
pragmatism to 'march forward' ahead of everyone. This consciousness has given birth
to a society which is 'self-centred' and progressive within its own definition of a self-
created paradise: nothing succeeds more than success. It is a never ending force
wrapped around people, moving them at a very fast pace within their own cycles and
generating more and more wealth, more and more prosperity, and more and more
conformity to their already well-established norms, values, attitudes and ideas.
Obviously, the American public happily shares the views of the media and its opinion
leaders on international questions and they seek guidance from the political elite and
especially the president on foreign policy issues.
This process of dependence on the political elite in the arena of world politics
has minimised the effects of public opinion on foreign policy making. No doubt rising
public resentment against the Vietnam war had some impact on President Johnson's
decision not to seek re-election in 1968. On the other hand, the American public had
supported Wilson's moralism leading to the interventions in Latin America; gave moral
consent to support Western governments to consolidate power in China at the
beginning of this century and felt justified in suppressing the Boxer Rebellion; accepted
in principle the [immoralism] of communism; felt morally obliged to support the
Truman Doctrine; wholeheartedly stood behind the rhetorical preaching of John Foster
Dulles; felt spiritually elevated in fighting the war of [free people] and [freedom] in
Korea; hated Castro in Cuba; rejoiced in Kennedy's hour of glory in the Cuban Missile
crisis; feared the Soviet plans to spread the [communist sin] in Europe and Southeast
Asia; generously contributed taxes to build up heavy defence against the communist
threat; mourned the [loss] of China; welcomed Madam Chiang Kai-shek to America.
And yet, strangely, in the final analysis the American public has accepted the restraints
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and limitations of the Nixon Doctrine. Painlessly, they have listened to changing tunes
on old issues, thereby almost effortlessly changing their moods at the whims of
presidential changes in perception. Amicably they accepted the new realists of China in
the 1970s and supported friendly gestures to the Soviet Union. Old enemies became
new friends; old fears vanished into romantic feelings; the American public historically
and even today accepts the guidance of the political elite in the foreign policy process
on the questions of world polities without much sophisticated questioning.
For example due to the public opinion from the Vietnam War and the Watergate
scandal, Carter was able to be elected president as 'Mr. Clean', a man who would
transmit his religous convictions to the world and whose policies would carry on aura
of morality. However a mere four years later the embassy hostages crisis in Iran which
began on 11th April 1979 and was subject to considerable negotiation and an abortive
military raid, caused his downfall. The failure of last-minute efforts to reach a
settlement in November 1980 was regarded as the reason for the landslide Republican
victory over president Carter in the American elections later that month. The crisis
ironically was resolved on the last day of the Cater administration.62
3.6. Democratic Experiment and Political System
Not least important is the reality of the political structure and the American
system of government which necessitates the creation of a nucleus, around which runs
the machinery of foreign policy formation. America with its expanding political and
economic influence requires expertise knowledge to deal with foreign relations. This
has naturally made the president more powerful and concentrated in him essentially all
the powers necessary to deal with foreign issues and crisis situations. Throughout
American history these have tended to accentuate his predominance even more.
Naturally, under these circumstances, the political leaders project their views on foreign
issues and help develop (or manipulate) images in the public mind. This process by no
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means developed any sophisticated philosophy of international politics among the
people, and even ideological matters remain blurred in their minds. Norman L. Hill has
noted:
The people are handicapped in their thinking on world problems
not so much by a lack of information on current issues - although
they are handicapped in this respect - but rather by their lack of a
well-considered philosophy of international politics. They read
the papers without the ideological tenets, background knowledge,
and assumptions necessary to transform facts, rumours, events,
and allegations into tenable opinions on policy problems. Without
a guiding philosophy, the thinking of the people tends to be
shallow.63
Yet, set into a cultural pattern that is intoxicated with speed, and necessitated by
a political system which thinks of itself as the historical [number one nation] the ideal
choice for the American public has always been the acceptance of elite guidance on
international politics. The question of the guiding philosophy does not pose any
problem. After all, the ideals of moralism, manifest destiny, democracy, the Monroe
Doctrine, and the isolationist tradition to provide a rich heritage to depend on and give
real and fairly substantial meaning to a concept which is more forceful and has deep
links with the past. No nation grows without links to its past; and the future is very
much a reflection of the past history. Past history binds the glory of a nation with the
future accomplishments of its people; it is a relationship of soul with life; the ending of
one well end the other. And America has grown within its bonds to the past; the
American people have never found any reasons to regret their historical
accomplishments - and there are enough reasons to justify their philosophy of life. The
American public's contentment with material progress in their society has made and
added to the blend of spiritual happiness in the form of a vague but reassuring belief
system toward the world.
3.7. Conclusion
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So far this chapter has traced the typical characteristics of US philosophy in
policy-making in the context of global and historical situations. These concepts will
provide one of the objective standards to analyse the US foreign and security policy
towards Iran in part two of US and Iran case study.
Even though, US policy-making process has the typical characteristics, it has
been changed based on its national capability and interests. As we already discussed in
the Introduction and in this chapter, Isolationism as non-involvement in European
affairs had prevailed until President Wilson involved in "world(European)"affairs as a
war partners. During the World War I, as the United States became a global power, its
foreign and security policy began to change and the US public had accepted wars as
just. During the cold war era, the United States, as the strongest economic and military
power, key security policy makers and business elites constructed a national security
state to deal with global affairs. However, as we discussed before, interventions in the
third world sates are psychologically impossible without good moralism and ideals.
They justify their intervention in the name of peace, democracy and liberalism.
In this context, we can understand president Truman's determination to resist
Soviet aggression in the Iran-Azerbaijan crisis of 1945-1946. Based on this event the
foundation of a long-range US policy toward Iran was laid. It was a policy based on his
understanding of the nature of the Soviet system and its expansionist proclivities that
Soviet threats and aggression should be contained, with force if necessary. In this broad
conceptual framework Iran played a strategically significant role: as Russia's direct
neighbour and a target of Soviet imperialism; as a vital link in the chain on non-
Communist states bordering on the Soviet Union; as a rich source of oil, and as an
access route to the Indian Ocean. 64 US intervention increased substantially in the
aftermath of World War ll as the US foreign and security policy making elite brought
numerous instruments to bear on the cold war struggle with the Soviet Union. Foreign
economic and military aid, for example, has totalled nearly $825 billion during the last
four decade. US intervention policy toward Iran since end of World War II should also
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be viewed in the same context. Washington's preoccupation with keeping Iran free
from Soviet influence can be seen by their role in the 1953 overthrow of the nationalist
government of Mohammad Mosaddeq and the reinstatement of the shah to protect the
West's control of Iran's oi1. 65 The US role in the 1953 overthrow of Mosaddeq
government is one good example of conflict between national security interest and their
moralism which will be discussed later in part two of case study.
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CHAPTER IV
THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF SECURITY
POLICY MAKING PROCESS
This chapter shall examine the institutions that are significant in formulating US
security policy towards Third World countries. As already discussed in the introductory
chapter, chapter two and this are essential to analyse the US policy towards Iran more
realistically. The US constitution has been characterised as an open invitation for
struggle between the executive and the legislative branches for implementing policy.
Therefore this study will describe in detail each institution's role along with the
influence of important individuals on significant global events not focusing on specific
US-Iran affairs. Because good foreign and security policy analysis should combine the
objective and the methods of both the scientific and the humanistic approaches to
political analysis.
The US democratic system is governed by a network of legal, governmental and
organisational rules. At the very beginning of American independence a constitutional
formula was established for the construction of a governmental system which would,
through such means as the separation of powers, checks and balances, and federalism,
avert tyranny and guarantee the dignity and rights of the individual. In essence, the
action channels for American foreign policy were constrained by a conscious effort on
the part of the Founding Fathers to fragment governmental power territorially,
institutionally, and legally. The elements of bargaining within a governmental and
democratic framework of consensus and conflict were built into the foreign policy
process right from the beginning. Hence, special attention must be given to a
description of the formal patterns of authority and the distribution of power as it is
structured in the foreign policy-making process. Formal authority and actual power
realities do not, of course, always coincide as we will find in the later chapter on US-
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Iran relations. However, in a democratic environment, the legal, constitutional
framework sets the rules by which decision makers interpret the setting in which they
must act. The rhetoric that must be used to justify (legitimate) their decisions to the
domestic constituents and the action channels that can be used to implement policies
must be consistent with the principle of democratic control of foreign policy.'
4.1. Policy Making Process
The key components of the US policy making process, following closely the
terminology and concepts of Gabriel Almond can be broadly described as follows: an
elite structure characterised by a large number of autonomous and competing groups, a
mass structure characterised by a small, informed stratum, attentive to elite discussion
and conflict, and a much larger base, normally, ignorant of and indifferent to policy and
policy-making.2 However, as will became apparent from the rest of this chapter, the US
foreign and security policy is more hierarchical compare to the other great powers.
The condition responsible for the competitive character of the elite structure is
obvious; members of the policy elite normally differ and differ significantly about both
the ends and the means of foreign policy. The autonomy of the elite structUre is the
result of the fact that power is both widely dispersed among the participants in the
policy process and drawn from a variety of sources independently of each other. The
group character of elite politics reflects both of these circumstances. The diffusion of
power means that various members of the policy elite must group together on the basis
of some amalgam of interest if they are to have any prospect of seeing their individual
preferences compete successfully against the goals and programmes advanced by
others. The absence of a single locus of power or a base from which it can be
monopolised also means that policy, once formulated, must continue to depend upon
the voluntary co-ordination of elite groups if it is to be effective.
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It is the dependence of the elite, one upon the other, for both the formulation and
the conduct of policy, and the absence of any single chain of command whereby their
co-operation can be assured, that Roger Hilsman has highlighted with his description of
the policy process as one 'conflict and consensus-building'. For the would-be policy
advocate must do more than contend with the opponents of his programme; he must
develop support for it throughout the relevant parts of the elite structure and, on
occasion, the mass structure as well. If, by means of persuasion and judicious
accommodation to the interests of others, he is able to bring the weight of opinion to his
cause, the resulting agreement will probably insure the adoption of his policy and its
effective implementation. Failing such support, or lacking the political skills and
prestige prerequisite for an opportunity to secure it, or confronted from the beginning
by a wide and politically unassailable consensus to the contrary, the realistic policy
advocate will turn his political energies to more promising issues. For however wise
his idea and cogent his argument or extensive his personal influence, his will remain a
voice in the policy wilderness.3
The characteristics of elite structure and elite relations just outlined are general to
all policy-making situations, although the number, size, and kind of elite groups
necessary for the formulation and conduct of policy - and therefore, th kind of
consensus required - will, of course vary greatly with the issues and circumstances with
which this study will later be concerned involve mainly government elite and
government structure. It will be useful to continue the development of the above
concepts primarily in this context.
It is, to begin with, important to note that there are two basic causes for policy
conflict among the government elite and these lead to two different kinds of groupings
among them. Many of these conflicts simply reflect the diversity of opinion Americans
are likely to hold, in the absence of sanctions to the contrary, regarding the state of the
world and what America should do in it. The groups that coalesce in support of one or
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another of these views appear, for the most part, to cut across formal institutional and
organisational lines (Congress, Executive, State, Defence).
In contrast, some policy conflicts are 'institutionally grounded'. These are
differences that result from the peculiar responsibilities (with respect either to values or
to skills) of various government institutions and organisations. Not sharing the same
responsibilities (or, put another way, not charged with the representation of the same
values or skills), government organisations will necessarily bring divergent interests
and approaches to common problems. When conflicts of this order occur, the lines of
battle are more likely to conform to the boundaries of the organisations involved.
These are also the more enduring of the two kinds of group conflict.
Specific ideas about what to do in the world will change, and with them the ad hoc
groupings that once espoused them, but divergent responsibilities are built into the
structure of government. The allocation of responsibility may be changed, but the
effect is usually to shift the location of battle rather than to bring it to an end.
The presidential system has perhaps been more capable of adaptation to changing
international exigencies than a parliamentary system. But could it be that the very size
of the government - the incredibly complex organisational structures into which the
millions of federal employees fit, and the maze of channels through which innovative
ideas must pass before they become new policies - is itself a force working against 'the
understanding of change and the formulation of new purposes'? Apart from the cabinet
departments, the federal roster includes over sixty different agencies and over 1,250
advisory boards and commissions. Of those, at least forty different agencies have some
kind of foreign affairs responsibility. Add Congress - which often appears more like
535 separate interests than one unified body - and we can begin to understand why the
very size of government fosters a process in which today's policies often turn out to be
tomorrow's as well. How the United States organises itself for the making of foreign
policy, in other words, is assumed to shape the nature of American action abroad.
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To guide the study's inquiry, this chapter will draw on a conceptualisation of the
foreign policy - making process as a series of concentric circles (see figure 3) suggested
by Roger Hilsman. His view, in effect, bends the boxes and branches of the standard
government organisation chart so as to draw attention to the core, or source, of the
action. Thus the innermost circle in the policy-making process consists of the
president, his immediate personal advisers, and such important political appointees as
the secretaries of state and defence, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), and various under and assistant secretaries who bear responsibility for carrying
out policy decisions. The most important decisions involving the fate of the nation are
made, in principle, at this level.
The second circle contains the various departments and agencies of the executive
branch. If we exclude from that circle the politically appointed agency heads and their
immediate subordinates, whom we have already placed in the innermost circle, we can
think of the individuals within the second circle as the career bureaucrats who provide
continuity in the implementation of policy from one administration to the next,
regardless of who occupies the White House. Their primary task - in theory - is to
provide top-level policy makers with the information necessary for making decisions
and then carry out those decisions.
- Figure 3 will be seen next page -
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Figure 3. The Institutional Setting - The Concentric Circles of Policy Making.
SOURCE: Adapted from Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation, (New York: Doubleday, 1967), pp. 541-
544.
The outermost circle is what Hilsman referred to as the 'public one,' consisting of
Congress, domestic interest groups, public opinion, and the mass media. Collectively,
the institutions, groups, and individuals at this level are least involved in the day-to-day
foreign policy process.
Emphasising the conceptualisation, this study will take three different approaches
to describing the foreign affairs of the government in the subsequent sectors. First,
attention will focus on the way presidential factors, but especially the relationship
between the president and his immediate group of advisors (with special reference to
the National Security Council and the president's national security assistant), affect
American foreign policy. In a sense, the question addressed is how particular
presidential preferences combine with the generalised presidential form of government
to promote what may be a distinctively American institutional approach to foreign
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policy making. Second, the information-gathering and policy-implementation tasks of
some of the many government organisations involved in the foreign policy-making
process will be considered. If foreign policy making is primarily an executive function,
then he must be examined how the structural characteristics of the foreign affairs
government define authority and divide the labour among those responsible for the
making and execution of foreign policy. Finally, this chapter will examine the
government sources included in the third concentric circle by examining the role of
Congress in foreign policy making. Here this study will explore how the separation of
powers - or the sharing of power by separate institutions, some would argue - is related
to security and foreign policy outcomes
4.2. The President and his Advisers
Examination of the president's role in the policy process will be guided by several
analytic models. Three of them that are especially relevant - the pluralist, the ruling
elite, and the human behaviour models - lead to focus analysis on the following
questions: What are the formal and informal sources of presidential power? How much
power do presidents and the advisers have? What are the constraints on presidential
power? How does a president's background and personality affect policy-making.
The president is not only an individual participant in the policy process; he is also
part of the institution of the presidency. The presidency is an institution in three
respects. First, it is an institution in the sense that any president has certain formal
authority conveyed by the constitution. Second, it is an institution in the tangible form
of a specific organisation, the Executive Office of the President. Third, it is an
institution in the informal behavioural sense that there are widespread expectations
about the role the president will play in policy-making.
The Constitution specifies several functions for the president in the conduct of
foreign policy, but his authority in each area is also limited by constitutionally
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prescribed congressional authority. The president can negotiate treaties, but the Senate
must ratify them. The president is Commander-in-Chief of the military, but its
operations require congressional appropriations of funds. The president can appoint
ambassadors, high level officials, and military general grade officers, but the Senate
confirms the appointments.
Although these constitutional provisions are important determinants of presidential
power, they are not the only ones - and indeed not even the most important ones. The
president's power depends to a great extent on other factors, which affect his position in
the executive branch, his relations with Congress, and his public standing.
4.2.1. Executive Office of the President
Within the executive branch, the president's position is substantially strengthened
by the staff support he receives from the Executive Office of the President - a large
group of people who are individually and collectively among the most powerful
participants in the policy process.
The Executive Office of the President was created in the Roosevelt administration
to provide more staff assistance so that the president would be better able to control and
co-ordinate the executive branch of the government. Since that time, the size,
composition, and responsibilities of the office have changed considerably; these
changes have been partly the result of differences in the individual presidents'
backgrounds and policy-making styles. Since the Executive Office of the President is
intended to serve as the president's own advisory staff, it is altered somewhat by each
new president to suit his own preferences. Furthermore, the growth of the rest of the
executive branch has also led to a general increase in the size and responsibilities of the
Executive Office of the President.
All its major organisational components, as listed in Table 4.1, are involved in
foreign policy-making. A few of the components, however, are especially important in
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foreign policy-making. One is the White House Office, which includes many of the
president's closest advisers. Although their titles and backgrounds usually do not
suggest foreign policy interests, they are nevertheless frequently among the most
important participants in foreign policy decision-making. This is especially the case
when a foreign policy issue has significant political consequences inside the United
States. Since most of these senior White House advisers are long time associates who
have advised the president during his campaign for the presidency and even before,
they are especially sensitive to the impact of foreign policy issues on the president's
domestic political support. When President Carter, for example, was trying to build
public and congressional support for the Panama Canal Treaties, he assigned the task of
co-ordinating the administration's efforts to Hamilton Jordan, one of his top political
advisers. Such other White House staff members as the press secretary, speech writers,
and congressional liaison specialists also often become involved in foreign policy
discussions.
- Table 4.1 will be seen next page -
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Table 4.1: Components of the Executive Office of the President.
Component Staff Size
White House Office 351
Office of Management and Budget 539
National Security Council 64
Council of Economic Advisers 35
Office	 of	 the	 Special	 Representative for	 Trade 41
Negotiations
Office of Science and Technology Policy 24
Council on Environmental Quality 32
Council on Wage and Price Stability 43
Domestic Policy Staff 50
SOURCE: US The Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1980, Appendix
(Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1979), pp. 1020-21.
The Office of Management and Budget is the largest component of the Executive
Office of the President. Its director is often a close associate of the president and
general purpose adviser on a broad range of issues. Most of its staff, however, are
career government employees who specialise in preparing the presidential budget
submission to Congress, reviewing other legislative proposals, and providing general
managerial oversight of executive branch agencies.. They are especially important in
defence spending issues. Other components of the Executive Office of the President
are also regularly involved in particular kinds of foreign policy issues - the Office of
Science and Technology Policy, for example, in advanced weapons issues.
The one component that is exclusively and centrally involved in foreign policy-
making is the National Security Council.
4.2.2. National Security Council
The importance of the national security affairs advisor for the president's
involvement in the formulation of foreign policy is highlighted by the fact that this
advisor plays a very significant role in the operations of the National Security Council
(NSC). This is not a statutory role but one that has developed since President
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Kennedy's administration when McGeorge Bundy was the national security affairs
advisor.
In statutory terms, the National Security Council consists of the president as
chairman, the vice-president, and the secretaries of state and defence. Other high-
ranking officials frequently invited to sit in on the NSC sessions include the secretary of
the Treasury, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the director of the Central
Intelligence Agency. Other invited participants may be the heads of Department of
Energy and the Office of Management and Budget, the attorney general, the director of
the FBI, and sometimes during earlier periods the US ambassador to the United
Nations. The statute creating the NSC was passed in 1947. Its specified task is:
'to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic,
foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as
to enable the military services and other departments and agencies
of the government to cooperage more effectively in matters
involving national security'. 4
Although it seems obvious that the co-ordination of foreign, military and domestic
policies for the assurance of national security should have the highest priority, the
utilisation of the NSC has not been uniform. Under President Eisenhower, the NSC
followed a clearly defined schedule and met every week. Presidents Kennedy and
Johnson relaxed the NSC schedule, and meetings took place less frequently. President
Nixon in his first term, returned to the weekly schedule; however, beginning in 1971,
NSC meetings sometimes occurred only once a month or even less often. President
Ford more or less followed the pattern Nixon had established toward the end of his
tenure, whereas President Carter restored the NSC to greater prominence. Three senior
interdepartmental groups (SIGs) have been established; they are chaired by high
officials of the departments of state and defence and the CIA, and their function is to
deal with aspects of national security flowing from the formulation and implementation
of foreign policies, defence policies, and intelligence policies.5
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Over the years, not only the personal preferences of presidents but also the
professional experience, style and bureaucratic skill of the national security affairs
advisors as well as of the secretaries of state and defence have shaped the organisational
framework of the NSC.
Henry Kissinger, as special assistant for national security affairs under President
Nixon, modified and strengthened the NSC structure further, as can be seen from
Figure 4. But strengthening the structure must not be equated with increasing its actual
power in the foreign policy-making process. Indeed, as already noted, the NSC
meetings, after a good start, met less and less frequently in the Nixon and Ford
administrations, and what meetings were held assumed a pro fonna nature, whereas
major decisions were taken by Nixon and Kissinger in personal consultations. This
pattern of consultation in foreign policy formulation was further intensified and
'legitimised' when Kissinger became Secretary of State in 1973.
Regardless of the actual power exerted by the NSC on foreign policy formulation
and implementation. Figure 4 shows the very complex nature of the NSC framework at
that time and the strong personal influence of Henry Kissinger. He chaired the Senior
Review Group (SRG), the Defence Program Review Committee (DPRC), the Forty
Committee, and the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG); he was a member of
the under-secretaries group (USG); he also had representatives on each
interdepartmental group (IG), the Verification Panel, and the Vietnam Special Studies
Group. The IGs numbered six, five covered the major regions of the world, and one
represented politicomilitary affairs. The USG had as its major task the co-ordination of
implementing the presidential decisions. The DPRC was to co-ordinate defence
spending with foreign policy objectives, while the Verification Panel had as its primary
function the monitoring of negotiations on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
(SALT). The Forty Committee supervised covert intelligence activities conducted by
agencies of the US government, and WSAG was in charge of the White House
operation centre in the event of sudden international emergencies.
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Under the Carter administration and Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinslci the
organisation pendulum of the NSC swung again in the opposite direction, and the
structure became less complex. The WSAG was discontinued, and, although the SRG,
IGs and USG were retained, most authority was given to a cabinet-level Policy Review
Committee, which sought to define foreign policy problems and co-ordinate research on
long-range foreign policy issues. A Special Co-ordinating Committee handled
immediate crisis problems. Brzezinski reduced the policy-making power of the NSC
and strengthened its role of providing information and advice from the executive
departments and agencies concerned with national security to President Carter. For this
reason, Brzezinski spent at least an hour each day with the president, briefing him on
the latest intelligence developments and discussing with him foreign and national
security policy problems and possible solutions.6
- Figure 4 is about here -
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4.2.3. Relations with the Congress
On many issues, the president encounters considerable congressional resistance to
his wishes. The constituents, responsibilities, and personal political stakes are different
for members of Congress and the president. The president is likely to view tariff issues,
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for instance, from the standpoint of their effects on the national economy, American
trade relations with other countries, and of course his own political fortunes. Since
tariff increases are inflationary, domestically, and harmful to American relations with
its trading partners, internationally, the president is likely to take these consequences
into account more than most members of Congress do. Although members of Congress
may be concerned about those consequences, they are likely to be more concerned
about the local economic impact and the effects on their own political standing. If a
tariff increase is beneficial to local employment and profits in a congressional district or
state, a representative or senator is likely to support it.7
4.2.4. The President as a Person
We all bring an accumulation of personal experiences and emotions to our decision
making, and the president is no exception. As political scientist James David Barber
has observed, 'Every story of Presidential decision-making is really two stories: an outer
one in which a rational man calculates and an inner one in which an emotional man
feels. The two are forever connected'.8
Much of what a president feels as he makes decisions depends on how he feels
about himself - in particular his self-esteem. Some presidents have had a decent regard
for themselves and the self-assurance and security that accompany a strong, healthy
ego. Others have been ego-defensive and insecure. The sources of such variations are
diverse, complex, and subtle, but the variations are evident, and they affect presidential
performance.
The effects on presidential style are the most obvious. Personally insecure
presidents - Johnson and Nixon - have been relatively tense, distrustful, secretive, and
hostile towards their critics. More personally secure presidents - Truman, Eisenhower,
Kennedy, Ford and Carter -have been more relaxed, trusting, and open, even friendly
with their critics.
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The Nixon administration, for instance, put its political opponents on an 'enemies
list' to be harassed by the Internal Revenue Service and to be excluded from the White
House invitation lists for dinners and other occasions; other administrations have
invited their critics to White House functions in spite of their disagreements. Nixon
and Johnson saw only a relatively small number of close advisers because their
insecurities made it difficult for them to meet with advisers whose loyalties and
opinions were less supportive; other presidents have had a larger circle of advisers.
Nixon and Johnson demanded extraordinary secrecy and relished surprising their
critics; other presidents have expressed their thoughts and plans more publicly.
Variations in presidential style are also a reflection of differences in personality,
that is, basic behavioural and attitudinal tendencies. Barber has identified two
dimensions of personality that are particularly important determinants of presidential
performance. One in activity or energy. This dimension of behaviour, however,
reflects more than mere variations in physical energy. It also reflects several other
active-passive personality contrasts, such as the tendency to be dominant or submissive,
extrovertive or introvertive, aggressive or timid.
The second dimension identified by Barber refers to the president's feelings about
his work, whether positive or negative. Some have clearly enjoyed being president;
others have not. All have felt the heavy burdens of presidential responsibilities, but a
few have often been gloomy and depressed in presidency.
These two dimensions - active-passive and positive-negative - can be combined to
produce four personality types and four types of presidents active-passive, active-
negative, passive-positive, and passive-negative. Active-positive presidents are the
most likely to be effective because they are assertive, persistent, and goal-orientated.
Passive-positive and passive-negative presidents tend to be ineffective. Their tendency
to withdraw from conflict makes it difficult for them to engage in the political battles a
president needs to fight to get what he wants; their reluctance to be assertive makes it
difficult for them to lead.
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Active-negative presidents may be fighters and thus often able to get what they
want, but they also tend to be destructive. The energy they put into their presidential
roles is a reflection of a compulsive striving for power and status. They need these
emotional rewards as compensation for their weak egos and as assurance against their
insecurities. They also tend to become inflexible and dogmatic about the policies they
adopt. They cannot admit to mistakes or defeats; such admissions would be too
threatening to their already low self-esteem.
The effects of personality on presidential behaviour were even more evident in
Kennedy and Nixon's case. Externally, president Kennedy's beliefs that the principle
threat to many Third World countries arose internally due to governmental dishonesty
and incompetency. The administrations assessment of the shah of Iran fell into this
category, therefore efforts were made to convence the shah that unless he adjusted his
policies to solve the economic problems and widespread corruptions at the highest
echelons of the government, it could result in a Soviet takeover. Therefore Kennedy's
active beliefs altered US policy towards Iran by reducing military grants and increasing
economic assistance programmes. 9 Before becoming president, Nixon wrote in his
book, Six Crises, that 'reaction and response to crisis is uniquely personal in the sense
that it depends on what the individual brings to bear on the situation - his own traits of
personality and character, his training, his moral and religious background, his strengths
and weaknesses'.1°
Several of Nixon's Vietnam decisions reflected his own strengths and
weaknesses". In November 1969, he prepared a major speech on Vietnam policy
without consulting his secretary of defence. He wrote the speech himself, mostly while
alone at Camp David (the presidential retreat in the mountains near Washington) with
little advice from his speechwriters for his national security adviser. Contrary to
expectations, he announced there would not be any new troop withdrawals, and he
implied that only the domestic critics of his policy could defeat or humiliate the United
States in Vietnam. Five months later, however, he announced that 150,000 American
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troops would be withdrawn - a decision that was made without consulting the secretary
of defence or the secretary of state.
A week after that, he decided to invade Cambodia with thousands of American
troops. He decided in favour of the invasion even though the secretary of defence, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the secretary of state, the attorney general, and NSC staff
members warned that the military benefits of doing so were uncertain and that a strong
negative domestic reaction was likely. Indeed, he made the decision the night after his
secretary of state had testified in Congress that the administration would continue to de-
escalate in Vietnam and surely avoid any commitment of ground troops in Cambodia.
Over the next two days and nights, the president prepared a television address to the
nation, mostly working alone at night. His draft of the speech said the operation would
enable the United States to capture the communist headquarters for all of South
Vietnam. When the secretary of defence learned of this statement, he suggested taking
it out, since no such headquarters even existed. When the president's national security
adviser briefed reporters on the speech just before the president appeared on television,
he recommended they not expect the military action to lead to the capture of an enemy
headquarters. The president's address nevertheless announced that the troops entering
Cambodia would 'attack the headquarters for the entire communist military operation in
South Vietnam' (he also noted that it 'was not an invasion of Cambodia'.) The actual
consequences of the decision were to increase domestic turmoil over the war, including
the killing of student demonstrators by National Guard troops at Kent State University,
but not to reduce significantly communist military operations in Cambodia or South
Vietnam. 12
In short, presidential performance is partly a function of the president's personality.
However, the personal sources of a president's style, power, and policies are always
operative within the institutional constraints of the presidency. Public, congressional,
and even bureaucratic expectations about presidential behaviour all restrict an
individual president's leeway. An incident toward the end of the Nixon presidency is
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suggestive. As the prospect of impeachment loomed and as Nixon's political fate and
psychological state were increasingly in doubt, the secretary of defence sent an unusual
message to American military forces: They were to obey only orders coming through
the normal chain of command, which includes the secretary of defence and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. The significance of the message was that the secretary was in effect
telling the troops they should not obey an order coming directly from the president, who
might have forcibly tried to resist any efforts to remove him from office.
Yet in spite of the institutional constraints, in spite of common congressional
resistance, and in spite of the vicissitudes of his public standing, a president is able to
adopt his preferred policies and to do so according to his own decision-making style to
a great extent. This is particularly true when the security of the country is perceived to
be at stake or when policy can be formulated relatively secretly.
Many of the most significant decisions concerning relations with Russia and China
have reflected individual presidents' personalities and power. Those presidential
decisions include in particular: Truman's decisions that established containment of
communism as the guiding principle in American foreign policy; Kennedy's decisions
during the confrontation with the Soviet Union over missiles in Cuba; and Nixon's
decisions to seek a reduction of tensions (detente) in relations with Russia and China.
These presidential decisions therefore determined American policy at important points
in the early, peak and late phases of the Cold War era. They are among the most
consequential American foreign policy decisions since World War II.
4.3. The Foreign and Security Affairs Bureaucracy
According to Henry Kissinger, 'The purpose of bureaucracy is to devise a standard
operating procedure which can cope effectively with most problems'. In doing so it
frees high-level policy makers to concentrate on the unexpected and exceptional and to
purse policy innovations. When it fails to identify options or when those options prove
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to be irrelevant, bureaucracy becomes a hindrance, forcing policy makers to redirect
their efforts away from problem solving to forging a bureaucratic consensus. The
critical problem identified by Kissinger is integrating the roles of the professional
expert and the political generalist. From one perspective this is a management problem
solvable by identifying organisational tasks, establishing lines of communication and
accountability, and carefully selecting personne1.13
Viewed from another perspective, this tension reflects the fundamentally dual
nature of all organisations, and it defies a managerial solution. Organisations can be
divided into formal and informal subsystems. The formal system is built around the
legal lines of authority structuring the organisation and consists of the official rules and
regulations which govern the behaviour or organisational members. It is a goal-
orientated system whose logic and coherence are derived from the tasks assigned to it
by forces outside the organisation. In the case of public bureaucracies, Congress, the
president, and interest groups all participate in defining official organisational goals.
The informal system springs up spontaneously around the formal system and consists of
the unwritten rules of conduct and fundamental assumptions which guide the day to day
behaviour of those employed in the organisation. The two systems frequently collide:
Where the formal system is concerned with goal achievement, the informal system is
concerned with the survival of organisational members. But no formal system can
survive for long without an effectively operating system of unwritten rules and codes of
conduct. They are needed to give an organisation the flexibility that allow it to cope
with contingencies and problems that were not anticipated when the organisation was
set up. At the same time it also confronts policy makers with a challenge. As a
spontaneous structure the informal system defies total control and attempts to
manipulate it will fail.
The major concern in this section is with the security and foreign affairs
bureaucracy. The management dilemmas and the basic organisational realities that
sketched above are present here. Three organisations dominate the foreign and security
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affairs bureaucracy: the State Department, the Defence Department, and the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA). This section examines their formal structure and informal
value systems in order to understand better how they influence US foreign and security
policy towards Third Wand countries.
4.3.1. The Department of State
The president's time cannot be occupied with every aspect of foreign policy
formulation; indeed, many decisions are made at lower levels. For the majority of these
decisions, the staff work and preliminary decision making takes place in the
Department of State, which has the prime interest in and functional responsibility for
the relations of the United States with foreign countries and intergovernmental
organisations (IG0s).
The chief officer of the Department of State is the secretary of state, who by law
and delegation of presidential powers is, at least in formal terms, the president's
principal advisor in formulating foreign policy and principal agent in policy
implementation. This person is also the first ranking member of the cabinet and fourth
in line (following the vice-president, Speaker of the House, and president pro temper of
the Senate) in the event of presidential incapacity. However, the secretary's effective
influence in foreign policy-making varies depending on experience and personality as
well as the president's predilection for personal advisors, including the special assistant
for national security affairs, which has sometimes led to informal consultation and
decision making.14
To manage all these tasks, the Department of State is organised along both
geographical and functional lines, as can be seen from Figure 5. The geographical
breakdown is reflected by the Bureau of European Affairs, African Affairs, East Asian
and Pacific Affairs, Inter-American Affairs, and Near East and South Asian Affairs.
The Bureau of International Organisation Affairs can be regarded only partially as a
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geographical subdivision and resembles more a functional unit. Other functional
bureaus deal with economic and business affairs, human rights and humanitarian issues,
policicomilitary affairs, international narcotics matters, terrorism, refugee programmes,
and intelligence and research. Some bureaus have primarily administrative functions -
the comptroller, inspector general, the legal advisor, congressional relations, protocol,
and consular affairs.15
The various bureaus in the State Department are headed by assistant secretaries of
state and major subdivisions by deputy assistant secretaries. In the geographical
bureau, the relations with individual foreign countries are handled by country directors
managing a collective 'country desk', which, depending on the importance of the
country involved, is serviced by an appropriate number of officials. The country
director is not only in daily communication with the American embassy in the foreign
country but also has frequent contacts with the embassy of that country in Washington
and with his or her counterparts in other executive departments that have a particular
interest in the country whose affairs that director handles. The country director plays an
important role in the execution of foreign policy actions toward individual countries,
because he or she is usually authorised to send telegrams to American embassies over
the signature of the secretary of state. Most of these telegrams deal with routine
problems; when controversial issues are involved, however, the desk officer may have
to seek occurrences from other officials who are responsible for the relations with
countries that might be affected.
Between the secretary and the assistant secretaries is the deputy secretary, not only
the alter ego but also the chief deputy and advisor of the secretary, who runs the day-to-
day operations of the department. The main assistants to the deputy secretary are the
under-secretaries for political affairs, economic affairs, security assistance, and
management. Depending on the complexity of the situation for which policies must be
formulated, the levels of policy formulation range from the country director to the
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secretary of state and, on major issues, to the presidential level. Input is also likely to
come from the US diplomatic missions abroad.16
- Figure 5 will be seen next page -
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Minor decisions can be made by the country directors, but their influence is also
felt in policy decisions made on higher levels because of the information and
recommendations they provide for the higher echelons. More significant decisions on
foreign policy formulation may come from the assistant secretaries, but they too are
likely to furnish only salient inputs in terms of information and policy positions to the
top echelons of the State Department where the truly significant decisions are made.
For the most crucial and basic decisions, the secretary has to go the White House level,
where ideally his policy recommendations will find a favourable response.
Position papers by proponents of particular policies, clearances, and concurrence
by involved officials, and opposition by other officials characterise as well as
complicate the policy-making processes on most levels. As the files become heavier
and proceed laterally on their way up, they reflect the interests and attitudes of the
policy-making participants
4.3.2. The Department of Defence
The Department of Defense (DOD) is the key organisation in security policy
formulation stems from several sources. The military establishment provides important
resources and capabilities for the potential implementation of policies and therefore
needs to be intimately involved in the formulation of all policies whose execution might
depend on these capabilities. Military officers provide training to the armed forces of
foreign states and supervise the maintenance of arms and equipment supplied to
different countries under various US programmes. Finally, the military establishment
develops strategies and tactics for the armed services that need to be related to foreign
policy needs. The development of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) in the early
1980s is a case in point. The RDF is composed of elements of all major military
services; the Carter administration initiated its creation toward the end of the 1970s.
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Its main purpose was rapid military intervention in the Persian Gulf region and other
parts of the Middle East in the event of Soviet aggression anywhere in that area.17
The foreign policy concerns of the Defence Department are revealed in its Annual
Report, FY 1982 regarding the United States' basic national interests for the coming
years:
"- To maintain the security of our nation, as well as that of our
allies and friends around the world. We seek to deter any
aggression that could threaten that security, and, should deterrence
fail, to repel or defeat any military attack.
- To manage East-West relations, in conjunction with our allies,
so as to preserve our interests and the peace. It is incumbent on
the United States, as the leader of the Atlantic Alliance and the
centre of other collective security frameworks, to cultivate the co-
operative aspects of East-West relations, while simultaneously
leading renewed efforts on the competitive aspects, channelling
them into less dangerous routes wherever possible.
To respond to the twin challenges of global economics and
energy supply. Interdependence has long been a truism, but the
extent of our resource dependence, the vulnerability of our supply
lines, and the need to do more than merely"I8
In terms of variables to explain the content of particular foreign and sucurity
policies, it is necessary to make careful judgements as to which variables might have
the greatest explanatory power. This section discussion suggests that in most policies
dealing with security matters, the Defence Department has the major influence,
including those dealing with US-Soviet and US-Third World states relations. However,
as the policies bear on economic matters, the Departments of Commerce and
Agriculture will also have important interests and concerns whose pursuit will, in all
likelihood, be backed by powerful lobbies. Finally, for most foreign economic policies,
the most relevant variables may be found outside the State Department; the
organisational and substantive interests of the Department of the Treasury, Commerce
and Agriculture will play a major role.
4.3.3. The CIA and the Intelligence Community
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4.3.3.1. Structure and Growth
Created in 1947, the CIA is not the first efforto centralise intelligence within the
government. In 1939 Roosevelt established an Interdepartmental Intelligence
Committee to co-ordinate the activities of the FBI, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and
the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department.° This arrangement proved
unsatisfactory, and after experimenting with another organisational arrangement,
Roosevelt assigned the task to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The OSS was to
'collect and analyse strategic information' as directed by the JGS and to 'plan and
operate such special services' as instructed by it. The OSS, in turn, became a victim of
post-war demobilisation.
The break-up of the OSS did not end the ongoing dispute over whether a central or
federal intelligence system was best suited for the post-war era. In the end the federal
principle prevailed when in 1946 Truman established a National Intelligence Authority
(NIA) and a Central Intelligence Group (CIG). The NIA was to plan, develop, and co-
ordinate intelligence. The CIG operated under the direction of the NIA and was headed
by a director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Its job was to co-ordinate, plan and
disseminate intelligence and to carry out covert action. One of the considerable
handicaps that the DCI laboured under was that all of the people working under him in
the CIG were still formally part of other intelligence organisations and, in a sense, were
only on loan to him. Both the NIA and CIG were dissolved by the 1947 National
Security Act when they were replaced by he NSC and CIA respectively.20
Three points need to be stressed before outlining the make-up of the intelligence
community. First, the concept of a community implies similarity and likeness, and it
suggests the existence of a group of actors who share common goals and possess a
common outlook on events. In these terms the US intelligence community is a
community only in the loosest sense. More accurately, it is a federation of units
existing with varying degrees of institutional autonomy in their contribution to the
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intelligence function. Second, the concept on an intelligence community is not inherent
in the definition of intelligence or in the common practice among states. The National
Security Act of 1947 which created the CIA and assigned it the task of co-ordinating
the activities of other departments whose activities were to be co-ordinated. Third, the
intelligence community is not a static entity. Its composition, as well as the relative
importance of its members, has changed over time as new technologies have been
developed, the international setting has changed, and bureaucratic wars have been won
and lost.21
The status of charter member is best conferred upon the CIA; the State
Department's intelligence unit, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR); and the
intelligence units of the armed forces. All of these were given institutional
representation on the NSC at the time of its creation. Three institutions which have a
long-standing but lesser presence in the intelligence community are the FBI, the
Treasury Department and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). While the FBI's
counterintelligence role has remained constant, significant changes have occurred with
regard to the other two. Early accounts of the Treasury Department's role in the
intelligence community stressed its drug enforcement mission. By the Ford
administration the Treasury Department was responsible for the overt collection of
foreign financial, monetary, and general economic information, and its drug
enforcement role had been dropped. The fate of the AEC is somewhat different. The
task of collecting, evaluating, and providing technical information on the nuclear power
programmes of other states is still very much alive. It is the organisation which no
longer exists. The AEC gave way to the Energy Research and Development
Administration in the Ford administration, and this, in turn, has given way to the
Energy Department.
The first major addition to the intelligence community occurred in 1952 when
Truman issued a presidential directive transforming the only recently created Armed
Forces Security Agency into the National Security Agency (NSA). 22 This operates as a
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semi-autonomous agency of the Defence Department and is charged with (1)
maintaining the security of US message traffic, and (2) interpreting, traffic analysing,
and cryptanalyzing the messages of all other states. In 1961 the Defence Intelligence
Agency (DIA) joined the intelligence community as its newest major member. The
DIA emerged as part of the centralisation process then occurring within the Defence
Department. The major objectives behind its creation were to unify the overall
intelligence efforts of the Defence Department and to more effectively collect, produce
and disseminate military intelligence. Over the years DIA has emerged as the principal
challenger to the CIA in the preparation of intelligence estimates. The Defence
Intelligence Agency's challenge to the CIA's status as first among equals has reached a
new height in the Regan administration. Both the Regan transition team and the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence called for upgrading DIA's estimating capabilities so
that it might more effectively challenge the estimates produced by the CIA.
Organisationally, the CIA is divided into four operational components. Each is
headed by a deputy director who reports to the DCI. 23 The Directorate of
Administration is responsible for recruitment, training, support activities,
communications, and the physical security of CIA buildings. The Directorate of
Science and Technology (DDS&T) is the newest directorate. It was established in the
early sixties out of the conviction that technology had begun to change the nature of the
intelligence function and that the CIA had to stay on top of this trend. The results of
these efforts have been considerable. The U-2 and SR-71 planes and satellite
reconnaissance systems all owe much to the efforts of this directorate.
The third operating unit of the CIA is the Directorate of Intelligence (DDI). It was
created in 1952 through a reorganisation of the CIA's intelligence-producing units and
is the largest of the CIA's directorates. Three major offices exist within DDI. They are
the Office of Strategic Research which deals with the war-making plans of other states,
especially those with nuclear capabilities: the Office of Economic Research which
provides reports and analyses on such subjects as Soviet grain production, OPEC oil
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production, the economic impact of weather patterns, and the strength of major foreign
currencies; and the Office of Political Research which addresses topics such as
terrorism, governmental stability, the link between foreign and domestic policies, and
the impact of culture and religion on politics.
The DDI is the primary producer of government intelligence documents which
range in frequency from daily briefs (at varying levels of secrecy) to weekly, quarterly,
and yearly summaries, to occasional special reports. The best known of these reports
are the National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs). Until 1973 they were produced by the
Office of National Estimates which was part of the DDI. At that time the office was
replaced by a National Intelligence Officer system which currently operates out of the
DCrs office. The change was made in order to increase the responsiveness of the
intelligence community to policymaker needs and to improve the overall quality of the
product. The purpose of NIB remains the same: to present the intelligence community's
best judgement on a given topic.
The last directorate is the Directorate for Operations (DDO). This is the most
controversial component within the CIAs system and one frequently recommended for
splitting off or outright abolition. Like the DDI it was created in 1952. The Directorate
for Operations has three basic missions; the clandestine collection of information,
counterintelligence, and covert action. Within the DDO there exists a staff for each
mission. The Foreign Intelligence Service monitors, assesses, and directs the
clandestine collection of information, the counterintelligence staff is concerned with
protecting the CIA from foreign penetrations; and the covert action staff plans and
carries out covert action. The actual operations of DDO are grouped on regional lines
and subdivided into stations. Each station is headed by a station chief and is generally
housed in the US embassy. Their size varies from that of a few individuals to several
hundred.
4.3.3.2. Foreign Policy Impact
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It is difficult to determine the impact of covert intelligence operations toward third
world states, but the CIA involvement in Central America and other places suggest that
indirectly ultimate policy-making may well be influenced. As we will discuss in US-
Iran case study, the August 1953 coup was entirely supported by CIA. This coup,
planned by Allen Dulles, the director of the CIA, and John Foster Dulles, the secretary
of state, and executed by Kermit Roosevelt at a cost of $1 million, resulted in the
overthrow of Mossadeq's government.24
The purpose of intelligence is to provide policy makers with enough warning to
allow them to act in the face of a challenge to national security. This is not easily done.
Surprise is a fundamental reality of international politics, and no foreign policy or
defence establishment can expect to escape completely from its negative consequences.
Yet intelligence is not easily integrated into the policy process. 25 The conventional
wisdom holds that policy and analysis must be kept separate, or policy will corrupt
analysis. The alternative view holds that analysis cannot be kept value free or separate
from policy-making. This position holds that analysts must articulate and evaluate
policy options as well as force policy makers to confront alternatives.
The relationship between the CIA and the president is the key determinant of its
impact on the policy process. This relationship is marked by a series of tensions which
often serve to make the impact of intelligence on policy less than what it could be under
optimum circumstances. The first tension is between the logic of intelligence and the
logic of policy-making. 26 The logic of intelligence is to reduce policy options by
clarifying issues, assumptions, and consequences. The logic of intelligence is to keep
options open for as long as possible. One way to do this is to keep secrets from
intelligence agencies. The second tension is between the type of information the
president wants to receive and the type of information that the intelligence community
is predisposed to collect and disseminate. Commenting upon his experience at INR,
Thomas Hughes states that policy makers were most eager to get information that
would help them convince Congress or the public about the merits of a policy. They
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were most frustrated with information that was politically impossible to use and
generally sceptical about the incremental value of added information for policy-making
purposes."
Third, intelligence produced by the intelligence community is not the only source
of information available to the policy makers. Inputs are received from interest groups,
lobbyists, the media and personal acquaintances leaving the president free to choose
which intelligence he wishes to listen to. No one can make a policymaker accept or act
on a piece of intelligence.
4.4. Congress
By constitutional design and according to the democratic model, Congress should
be responsive to public preferences; and it should have a substantial impact on policy.
According to the pluralist model, Congress ought to represent group interests and to
provide a forum where conflicts among those interests are resolved by bargaining and
compromising. We also expect power to be decentralised in Congress' internal
procedures; and we further expect Congress to be in continual conflict with the
executive branch as a result of the constitutional provisions for 'checks and balances'.
In contrast, the ruling elite model assumes that Congress is unresponsive to public
preferences and interests; that its membership is widely agreed on conservative policies;
that it is dominated by a few members; and that it is in a co-operative relationship with
the president, the bureaucracy, and big business.
Thus, the following questions are raised: What specific roles does Congress play in
the policy process? How is Congress related to the Executive branch in the policy
process? What internal procedures does it follow? What impact on policy does it
have?
4.4.1. Relations with the Executive Branch
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4.4.1.1. Shared Power
Several constitutional provisions give Congress specific functions in foreign
policy-making; declaration of war, appropriation of funds, ratification of treaties,
regulation of foreign trade, and confirmation of appointments to high-level positions in
the executive branch. But the executive branch is also very much involved in each of
these five functions. As commander-in-chief, the president is involved in war making.
Requests for funds originate in the executive agencies and are reviewed and decided
upon by the president, who recommends them to Congress; and the executive agencies
spend the funds that are appropriated by Congress. Treaties are negotiated by the
executive branch and then submitted to the Senate for ratification. Foreign trade
agreements are negotiated by the executive branch, under authority delegated by
Congress. The president nominates ambassadors and cabinet and sub-cabinet officials,
and then the Senate decides whether to confirm those nominations.
Thus, the congress shares authority in its performance of these functions with the
executive branch in general and the president in particular. These facts about
congressional-executive relations in foreign policy-making require modification of the
common notion that their relationship is one of separated powers or functions. In fact,
only the institutions are separated; the powers (or functions) are actually shared, not
separated.
In any case, a constitutionally-based interpretation of congressional involvement in
policy-making and its relationship with the executive branch provides only a superficial
understanding of congressional power. This approach refers only to authority, or
formalised potential power, rather than actual power. Furthermore, there is a constant
struggle between Congress and the executive branch over authority in foreign policy-
making. The struggle may wax and wane over time, but there is nevertheless a constant
and continuing tension. The tension with the executive branch and the limitations on
Congress' power are evident in several congressional roles in policy-making.28
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4.4.1.2. Declaration of War
Since World War II, there have been two wars and numerous military interventions
or other acts of war without any formal congressional declaration. These cases include
not only Korea and Vietnam but also Lebanon in 1958, the Congo in 1964 and 1967,
the Dominican Republic in 1965, and Cambodia in 1970. There have also been cases
of direct support of military operations, such as happened in Guatemala in 1954 and
Cuba in 1961.
In several of these cases and on other occasions, however, Congress did pass joint
resolutions that provided support in advance for some kind of presidential action. In
the case of Vietnam, Congress passed the 1965 Guild of Tonkin Resolution, which
provided support in advance for administration action. It said, in part, that the congress
approved of the 'determination of the President.. .to take all necessary measures to repel
any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further
aggression'. In 1955 Congress passed the Formosa Straits Resolution, which authorised
the president to 'employ the armed forces of the United States as he deem[ed] necessary'
to defend Formosa. Two years later in 1957, Congress passed a Middle East
Resolution, which also authorised the president to 'employ the forces of the United
States as he deem[ed] necessary' to protect the area against 'overt armed aggression
from any nation controlled by international communism1.29
Furthermore, in the cases of both Vietnam and Korea, Congress passed defence
appropriation bills and supplemental appropriations that included funds specifically for
the war, thereby providing at least tacit consent. During the Vietnam War in particular
there was considerable controversy over the legal question of whether these resolutions
and appropriations constituted the equivalent of a declaration of war and provided a
legal basis for the administration's conduct if it - legal questions that were never
resolved by the Supreme Court. However, the practical effect of the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution became clear in 1971, when Congress voted to rescind it. The Nixon
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administration simply said that the resolution was not necessary to provide a legal basis
for the conduct of war; the president, they argued, had sufficient constitutional authority
as commander-in-chief to continue American involvement in it.
Apart from formal congressional declarations or resolutions of appropriations,
members of Congress have sometimes become involved in war policy-making through
consultations with the president. In 1954, when the French were being defeated at Dien
Bien Phu, President Eisenhower was considering the possibility of sending American
combat troops into Southeast Asia; he solicited the advice of several leaders of
Congress before reaching a decision. The congressional leaders advised the president
that he should intervene with combat troops only if he could obtain a promise of active
support from several other countries. Since that promise was not forthcoming,
Eisenhower decided against military intervention. In that particular case, a limited form
of congressional involvement clearly had an impact on the decision.3°
Later in 1973, Congress passed the War Powers Act (Public Law 93-148) over the
veto of President Nixon. This act provides that the president can deploy American
combat troops abroad without prior congressional approval such as declaration of war -
but that he can do so only if he finds that the United States is threatened with an attack
or that it is necessary in order or protect American troops or citizens abroad. The act
also provides that the president must consult with Congress 'in every possible instance'
before he makes such a decision (a restriction that clearly gives the president an
opportunity not to consult with Congress in advance). The act also provides that the
president has to report to the House and the Senate within forty-eight hours after taking
action; he must provide information about the circumstances in which he acted and the
nature of the action he took. These provisions, then, clearly provide the president with
ample opportunity to take the initiative and allow the Congress only a passive role - at
least in the initial stage of an incident.
Other provisions in the War Powers Act, however, enable Congress to restrict the
deployment of troops.. Within sixty days, it can pass a concurrent resolution prohibiting
153
the continuation of the troop deployment, and this concurrent resolution cannot be
vetoed by the president. After a period of sixty days from the time of the initial action,
Congress must pass a concurrent resolution to permit the continuation of the troop
deployment. In other words, in the first sixty days congress must take a positive action
to prohibit the president from continuing the deployment, whereas after the first sixty
days it must take positive action to allow the president to continue the deployment.
There is another provision, though, that qualifies the sixty-day limit; the president can
have an additional thirty days to withdraw the troops if he declares that the time is
necessary to accomplish their withdrawal safely.
4.4.1.3. Treaties and Executive Agreements
In 1920, in a dramatic exercise of its power, the Senate refused to ratify the
Versaille Treaty, which included the World War I peace treaty with Germany and the
covenant of the League of Nations. But such a dramatic exercise of its power was also
a rather rare event. In two centuries, the Senate has failed to ratify only eleven treaties.
It has ratified over 1,200. Since 1945 alone, it has ratified over 400 and failed to ratify
only one. Furthermore, the Senate normally ratifies treaties by substantially more than
the necessary two-thirds of voting. In 1975 and 1976, the 94th congress ratified all
thirty three treaties submitted to it by favourable votes of more than eighty percent of
those voting. All but five of the thirty-three were ratified by unanimous votes.
On the other hand, the Senate has occasionally qualified its ratification by
amendments or reservations to treaties. Before it ratified the Panama Canal Treaties in
1978, the Senate adopted twenty-four amendments, conditions, reservations, and
understandings. One of them, named after its sponsor, Senator DeConcini, imposed an
important change in the terms of the treaty; it provided that the United States could 'use
military force in Panama' if the canal were closed.31
For the past several decades, the treaty ratification process has been substantially
circumvented by 'executive agreements'. The Supreme Court has declared that
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executive agreements have the same legal standing as treaties, even though they are not
ratified or otherwise specifically approved by congressional action. The vast majority
are 'statutory executive agreements' that the executive branch has negotiated with a
foreign government on the basis of a congressional statute giving the executive branch
the authority to do so. But other executive agreements have been reached without any
such congressional delegated authority. Figure 6 indicates the dramatic increase in the
number of executive agreements, particularly statutory executive agreements, compared
with the relative constant number of treaties.
Some of these executive agreements have entailed major policy decisions. They
have included, for example, the significant World War 11 agreements at Cairo, Tehran,
Yalta, and Potsdam, and more recent important air base agreements with Spain,
Portugal, and Bahrain. Furthermore, executive agreements have often been kept secret
from Congress. An investigation by a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee found that the United States had secret agreements with Ethiopia, Laos,
Thailand, South Korea, Spain, and other countries.
As a reaction to the number, importance, and secrecy of executive agreements,
Congress passed the Case Amendment in 1972. It requires the president to send
executive agreements to the House International Relations Committee and the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee within sixty days after they are signed. Those
committees, however, cannot act on the executive agreements, either to accept them or
to reject them; nor can Congress as a whole act on them. Rather, the two committees
are given copies of the agreements only for the purpose of being informed about their
contents. Further, the president can request that the committees keep the contents of
the agreements secret from the rest of Congress. However, there has also been a change
in the procedures prior to the initiation of a negotiation that might lead to an executive
agreement or a treaty: The State Department consults with the leaders of Congress and
the relevant committees in the House and the Senate to determine whether the
negotiations will be formalised in an executive agreement or a treaty.32
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Figure 6. Changes in the number of treaties and executive agreements,
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SOURCE: Computed by the author from data in Congressional Quarterly, Guide to Congress, 2nd ed.
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1976), p. 257; and U.S. Congress,
Congressional Research Service, International Agreements, report to the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), Figure
1, p. 21.
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4.4.2. Appropriations
In general, Congress must approve expenditures before executive agencies can
make them. Congress passes authorisation bills that establish spending limits and
appropriation bills that establish funds for agency use. In the exercise of this power,
congress sometimes imposes substantial cuts in the agencies' requests or restricts the
kinds of expenditures that are permitted. The budget requests for the operations of the
State Department and the Agency for International Development, in particular, have
frequently been subjected to careful scrutiny and detailed control in the subcommittees
of the House Appropriations Committee. During the 1950s and 1960s, Congress
normally reduced the administration's economic assistance budget requests by 20 to 30
percent.
Until the 1970s, however, Congress typically had only a marginal impact on the
defence budget. Although it did occasionally make some changes in the total amount
(and in the distribution of the total among kinds of expenditures) it usually changed the
administration's total request by only 1 or 2 percent. Congress as a whole has exercised
no direct influence in the appropriations process for the Central Intelligence Agency.
The details of the intelligence agencies' budgets are actually kept secret from the vast
majority of the members of Congress. Those figures are known only to a few members
on the intelligence, armed services, and appropriations committees.
Even when Congress has appropriated money for a specific purpose, an executive
agency has sometimes not spent it or has spent it for other purposes. In 1961, when
Congress appointed $700 million for manned bombers that the administration did not
want, Secretary of Defence McNamara announced that none of the money would be
spent. In the late 1960s, during the height of Vietnam War, the Pentagon shifted
several million dollars of funds appropriated by Congress for Taiwan to Vietnam and
then later asked Congress for a supplemental appropriation to replace the funds that had
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been diverted. In the fiscal years of 1969, 1970, and 1971, the Navy spent $110 million
more than its appropriations for personnel moving expenses.
In an effort to gain more control over executive expenditures, Congress passed the
Budget Reform Act 1974. This law increased congressional control over expenditures
through its provision concerning impoundment (an administration decision not to spend
fund appropriated by Congress). Both houses of Congress must now approve of any
proposed 'rescission' within forty-five days after being notified by the president of his
intention not to spend the funds. In the absence of congressional approval, the
president must spend the funds.
In another attempt to gain greater control over the appropriations process,
specifically concerning weapons development, Congress passed a 1975 amendment to
the Arms Control Disarmament Act. It requires executive agencies to submit 'arms
control impact statements' to congress along with their budget requests for weapons
development. The initiative in the preparation of these impact statements, however, lies
in the agencies that are responsible for the weapon development programmes and in the
National Security Council. Furthermore, the actual impact statements are prepared by
the same agency developing the weapon, and the early impact statements were
superficial - in many cases only a few sentences long. As a result, they did not
substantially affect the weapons procurement budgeting process.
4.4.3. Confirmation of Nominations
The president is occasionally unable to obtain Senate confirmation of a person he
has nominated to a high administration position. A notable instance was the Carter
administration's inability to obtain approval for Theodore Sorensen to be the Director of
the CIA. Previous administrations had also occasionally encountered sufficient
opposition for them to withdraw nominations or decide not to submit names for formal
consideration. The Nixon administration decided not to nominate Paud Nitze to be the
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assistant secretary of defence for international security affairs in view of the opposition
from Senator Goldwater. Goldwater was a member of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, which would have made its recommendation to the full Senate. There have
been other occasions when an informal poll or consultations with key committee
members have revealed so much opposition that the president decided not to proceed
with a formal nomination.
Yet there is rarely sufficient opposition to prevent presidents from obtaining the
confirmation of the vast majority of the people they want in their administrations.
Confirmation hearings are often rather friendly and uncritical proceedings in which the
nominee is not subjected to careful scrutiny and does not have his or her views on
policy issues analysed in any detail. Indeed, except for cabinet-level officials, Congress
typically has little interest in the confirmation process. Subcabinet officials and other
officials routinely receive pro forma confirmation of the appointments. Moreover,
many high-level appointments in the executive branch are not subject to Senate
confirmation at all. The special assistant to the president for national security affairs
and members of the White House staff are not within Congress.
4.4.4. Interest Groups and Dynamic
Although it is generally acknowledged that US foreign and security policy is
hierarchically determined, especially in the era covered in this study, there are several
influences that can affect the policy process at the level of congress. This includes
interest group lobbying, the role of elections and the need to raise funds to fight
elections. An example of the lack of influence of interest groups can be seen in the role
of oil interests during the Clinton Administration and its policy of dual containment.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Iran's geo-strategic position has increased in
relation to the natural oil and gas reserves in the Caspian region. US commercial wants
to be allowed to be involved in developing these resources but the presidential policy of
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the unilateral economic boycott is harming its own domestic industry. On the other
hand, these same oil interests were able to influence president Eisenhower but not
president Truman to move against Mossadeq when he nationalised oil in Iran.
The influence of elections and fund raising is best illustrated by the Jewish lobby
again in the Clinton administration. During the 1992 elections, funds of almost $4
million were raised for 403 candidate in the congress elections.33
The lobby was then successful in having Martin Indyk. A pro-Israeli appointed as
presidential advisor and ensuring the administrations pro-Israeli approach to the peace
process
4.5. Public Opinion and the Media
Public opinion and the media stand at the periphery of the foreign policy decision-
making process. Public opinion tends to be permissive and supportive of presidential
decisions in foreign policy. Indeed, the level of public support for the president,
increases dramatically in a foreign policy crisis - whether the resolution of the crisis is
favourable to the American position or not. 34 Furthermore, public opinion is not always
marked consistency: Polls may indicate that a large percentage of the American people
consider a specific policy decision to be a mistake but nevertheless will support a
presidential decision with which it disagrees. Critics of the policy can cite the first set
of poll results, the administration the second. Each is partially correct, but the net result
of the confusion is that the president can cite public support for his actions and use the
power of his office to continue pursuing his chosen policies. Our discussion of public
opinion will begin with a consideration of the broad limiting role of public view-points
- of when public opinion is weak, when it becomes stronger, and the forces pushing it
in various directions. We shall then consider the role of public opinion in a somewhat
different context - the ways in which public opinion might be translated into policy
decisions.
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4.5.1. Support of Opposition to the President and his Policies
The role of public opinion in foreign policy is permissive and supportive of
presidential discretion. The principal reason is that the vast majority of Americans are
poorly informed about and uninterested in foreign policy. Most foreign policy issues
are simply too far removed from their everyday frames of reference. A voter, who may
be a worker, a farmer, a businessman, or a professor, will have (or will believe that he
has) a certain degree of knowledge and familiarity in dealing with issues related to his
sphere of livelihood( e.g. unemployment and job security or farm price subsidies), and
he is also likely to hold views on various topics that relate to him as a citizen, father,
and so forth (open housing, equal job opportunity, police protection, drugs, the quality
and cost of medical care and education). On domestic policies he will therefore be
more likely to hold his own views, even if they should differ from those of the
president. On foreign policy issues, however, most voters do not have the knowledge,
frame of reference, or sense of personal competence that they do with affairs that are
less remote. 35 This lack of factual content and intellectual structure of public opinion
means that the mass public tends to react to foreign policy issues in terms of moods and
seeks guidance from the president.
"A reassuring statement will be received with complacency The
general public looks for cues and responses in public discussions
of foreign policy. It does not listen to the content of discussion but
to its tone. A presidential statement that a crisis exists will
ordinarily be registered in the form of apprehension reactions. In
both cases, the reaction has no depth and no structure."36
Two things should be clear. First, it is the president to whom the public looks for
information and interpretation of the outside world and how it affects American
security interests. This means that he has considerable freedom to set his direction and
mould public opinion. Second, public opinion does not usually guide the president; it is
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more frequently formed as a response to presidential action, not only because of public
ignorance but because in foreign policy presidents frequently have to act before any
firm public opinion has been formed. Gabriel Almond found two factors of particular
importance in attracting and reducing public attention to foreign policy: '(1) the extreme
dependence of public interest in foreign affairs on dramatic and overtly threatening
events; (2) the extraordinary pull of domestic and private affairs even in periods of
international crisis'. 37 Perhaps the best way of summing up the role of public opinion in
foreign policy is to emphasise its followership.
Since the Truman Doctrine in 1947, public opinion has been responsive to
presidential leadership and, therefore, has been as rigid or flexible as presidential
policy. As will be briefly descussed in chapter five, the reason for restricting US aid to
Iran during the period from 1948 to 1950, compared to Greece and Turkey, was caused
by public opinions. Truman's administration considered that Congress and American
public would not regard Iran as sufficiently important to warrant high level of US aid.
It has supported hard-line anti-Soviet and anti-Chinese policies when they were official
policy (as they were from Truman's day right through to Johnson), and it has supported
moves toward a relaxation of tensions and negotiating conflicts of interests (as during
the Nixon era). Both kinds of moves received widespread popular acclaim. The public
looked to the president for its cues. In a crisis this phenomenon is particularly
noticeable; the public rallies around the president even if the crises was bungled by the
president, as Kennedy did the ill-fated refugee invasion of Cuba in 1961. During the
opening periods of the two limited wars in which the United States has become engaged
since World War II, the initial commitments received very high levels of public and
congressional support, and they stayed high despite great costs, including high casualty
rates, during the opening phase of the war. The fact that presidential action is
prerequisite to the formation of public opinion on foreign policy issues was especially
clear during the Vietnam War. There was little in the way of any opinion - either for or
against - during the Kennedy Administration's incremental commitment of advisers, or
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even after the Gulf of Tonkin. Extensive public awareness of Vietnam came only with
the sudden, visible commitment of more than 500,000 men. But perhaps a more
astounding example of public opinion's followership role and inconsistency occurred
with President Nixon's decision to send American troops into Cambodia. Just prior to
the decision, only 7 percent of the respondents favoured such a move; after the move 50
percent approved! Ford's approval rating jumped 11 percent immediately after the
Mayaguez incident. Indeed, the public is so predisposed to view the foreign policy
postures of chief executives positively that a July, 1974 Gallup poll found 54 percent of
the respondents approving of how Nixon handled foreign policy. The president, who
was to resign within a month in the midst of the Watergate scandal, had an overall
approval rating of only 26 percent favourable responses.
Yet, while permissive and supportive, public support is not unlimited.38 If a
presidents policies are not successful, if they fail to achieve their objectives in a
reasonable amount of time and at a tolerable cost, the public reserves the right to punish
the president and his party at election time. A Marshall Plan for the economic recovery
of Western Europe, while sizeable in scale, received large-scale support. It had a time
limit of four years and was not particularly burdensome for the taxpayer, and the result
of a rebuilt and reinvigorated Europe was highly visible. In contrast, foreign aid
programmes for developing areas have always been relatively unpopular. The aid
seems to be unending and it clearly wins little overtly expressed goodwill for the United
States. Nor does it stimulate fairly rapid modernisation to the point where economic
progress becomes increasingly self-sustaining. Since forecasts predict an increasing
gap between the rich industrialised western countries and the poor, essentially rural
non-western countries, the future seems to hold only a continuous, almost external aid
programme with no promise of quick success and relief from this capital transfer effort.
Military interventions follow the same pattern. When the president first announces
an intervention the public - and Congress - will support him. Indeed, this recurrent
phenomenon has led John Mueller to suggest that as long as presidents can commit
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troops, proposals that wars can be avoided if Congress were required to vote its
approval are unlikely to work, for once the commitment has been made the tendency
will be to 'rally around the flag'. 39 An intervention such as the Dominican intervention
in 1965 may be widely criticised by foreign policy experts in and out of government,
congressmen, and journalists, but if it is brought to a successful conclusion, or at least
what appears to be a successful conclusion, relatively quickly, the president will suffer
no electoral reprisals. On the other hand, popular support for a Korean or Vietnamese
war will decline over time if the price appears to be disproportionate to the objectives
sought.
Public and congressional support for the conduct of the war does not decrease
significantly, despite high casualties and/or taxes, while the general belief in a
reasonably short war and success on the battlefield remains prevalent. Conversely, this
support erodes as hostilities drag on and the continued high costs of the conflict appear
increasingly pointless as the expectation of the victory disappears. In Korea, Chinese
entry into the war led to a major drop of support for Truman five months after the
American intervention; in Vietnam, the drop took longer, starting in the spring of 1965
and reaching a low point in late 1967, which after a brief upsurge, was reconfirmed by
the Communist Tet offensive in early 1968. 4° Even President Johnson, a skilful
manipulator, could not hold off the cost of the war forever; he had postponed this cost
by not drafting most American middle- and upper-class males, mainly students; not
calling up the reserves; and postponing a war surcharge tax. But the support eroded,
and Tet was the final proof that victory was no nearer than before and that the high
costs of the war were fruitless.
Thus, in limited wars, public opinion does not become relevant. Support for the
wars in Vietnam and Korea declined as the costs, especially the casualty rates,
increased over time. The impact of the casualty rate on the level of opposition to the
war was considerably stronger for the Vietnam conflict than for Korea. 41 That may be
an indication that the nightly exposure of Vietnam casualties by the television networks
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had a considerable effect on the increase in opposition to the war. In both the
Vietnamese and the Korean cases, the evaporation of presidential support permits other
sources of information to gain a public following.
The two principal alternative sources are congressional hearings and the media.
Lacking the power to change the president's Vietnam policies, Senator Fulbright used
the mechanism of his Foreign Relations Committee hearings to dramatise opposition to
the war. At times, the major television networks would carry live coverage of these
hearings. At a minimum, the hearings would be covered on the evening network news
programmes and in the major newspapers across the country. The influence of such
hearings - which are often long and tedious and may not bring out any new information
- may be slight, but it is often almost all that opponents of a policy have in their
attempt to affect public opinion. With the growth of the medium of television, the roles
of the congressional committee hearings and the media have become ever more closely
intertwined. Television gives opponents of a policy a more direct line to the public than
did newspapers or radio - it provides for visual contact as well as the reporting of
events. However, the gains that opponents of a policy have made through this newest
medium have also accrued to the president. Indeed, the chief executive can always
obtain free network time for an address to the nation, and he can use such speeches to -
rally public opinion behind his policies. On balance, the advent of television probably
has meant more to opponents of the president's policy than to the chief executive
himself. Since public opinion is generally permissive and supportive of presidential
initiatives, any gain in exposure of the opposition's point of view may well enhance the
opponents' strength. A president simply needs less exposure to rally support for his
position than does the opposition.
The media are more than just devices for presenting alternative views of public
officials to the mass public or, in turn, representing the mass public to the foreign
policy establishment. The media also have their own impact on public opinion.
Although most voters are not terribly concerned with foreign policy issues, the nightly
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television coverage of events in Vietnam brought an overseas war into millions of
American homes each night. Furthermore, the media have not always presented
presidential decisions in a favourable light. Virtually every president of the United
States in recent years has believed that the press was hostile to him, 'out to get him'.
Indeed, the Nixon administration brought its hostilities toward the media - the
television networks and national news magazines as well as the newspapers - out into
the open. Johnson was less hostile to the press but did criticise several reporters and
nationally syndicated columnists for their opposition to his Vietnam policies. Johnson
once had occasion to query Senator Church about the senator's anti-war position at a
White House reception. The president asked the senator where he was getting his
information on the war effort. Church replied that his information came from the
columns of the noted journalist Walter Lippmann. The president reportedly replied,
'Well the next time you want a dam in Idaho, ask Walter Lippmann for it'.
Yet, even when public opinion has been mobilised - by the media, the
congressional critics, or just be sheer uneasiness over the course of a foreign policy - its
role still remains rather limited. The problem is that the public does not always speak
with one voice. Sixty-four percent of a November, 1965, sample of Americans did not
think that American involvement in Vietnam was a mistake, as compared to 21 percent
who believed that it was. By October, 1967, the balance had shifted to the position that
the war was a mistake (44 percent in favour, 46 percent opposed to the initial
involvement). By the summer of 1968, a sizeable majority took the position that the
war was a mistake. 42 Yet the pattern of support for proposals to end the war - including
both a stepped-up military posture and total withdrawal - had not changed accordingly
from 1965 to 1968. Meuller has thus argued that, at any given time, 'support should be
considered a chord rather than a note'. 43 The president can use this pattern of
inconsistency among the voters to indicate that there is not enough support for any
other alternative policy warranty a shift in his position. If the lack of consistency in
public opinion polls does not provide the president with a distinct message on how to
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choose foreign policy alternatives, might not be the electoral arena? It is to his facet of
public opinion's impact on foreign policy - and to the linkage between public opinion
and congressional opinion - that we now turn.
4.5.2. Popular Control of Foreign Policy
Public opinion, according to many theorists of democratic government, does not
serve as a guide to policy-makers who must choose among alternative courses of action
every day. Rather, at election time the citizenry is called upon to choose its leaders and
then to let those leaders determine policy choices until the next election. The electoral
mechanism thus gives the voter what has been called 'popular control of government'.
The voter, according to this thesis, does not instruct the men and women he chooses at
the ballot box on what policies to adopt. Rather, he selects a candidate who represents
policy politicians closest to his own. This is the electoral function of public opinion.44
An even stronger demand upon public opinion is made by other democratic theorists:
that public opinion should be 'converted' into public policy by the representative system
of government. These theorists expect a member of Congress to represent - or, 're-
present' - the views of his constituency in his voting behaviour in Congress. How well
the public's viewpoints are translated into policy decisions of their representatives gives
us an idea of how well the democratic political system is working. This 'conversion'
function of public opinion demands more than the electoral function. The latter merely
assumes that the voter can replace an office-holder whose views he does not like at the
next election. The conversion function assumes that it is the task of the office-holder to
represent faithfully the majority position in his constituency between elections as
wel1.45 In this section, we shall examine both views of the function of public opinion.
The concept of electoral system as a choice between two competing sets of policy
choices does not indeed seem to hold true for the 1952 election. The evidence is rather
straightforward that Truman's decline in popularity and the subsequent Republican
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victory in 1952 can be attributed to the public's adverse reaction to the Korean War.46
In general, however, there appears to be no great amount of policy voting on either
domestic or foreign policy issues. On the one hand, the two parties have not always
offered the voter a clear-cut choice on policy alternatives. On the other hand, there is
even less evidence that voters are aware of whatever differences there may be between
two candidates for an office.
Since voters tend to be less interested in questions of foreign policy than in
domestic policies, it is not surprising to find that policy voting on foreign affairs
questions is rather rare. A study of voters in the 1956 and 1960 presidential elections
led Warren E. Miller to conclude that, an absolute minimum, the net contribution of the
parties' foreign policies stands toward changes in voting behaviour from one election to
the next was one-half of one percent.47 In an election as close as the 1960 contest, this
margin may be substantial. When looked at by itself, however, the effect of policy-
stands on voting is negligible. A Roper poll reported that in the 1976 elections, voters
saw domestic issues as more important in their voting decisions than foreign policy
issues by a margin of more than 12 to 1. The results for foreign policy for more recent
studies are no more heartening for the advocate of a political system that converts
public opinion on foreign policy into public policy through elections. A study by
Gerald M. Pomper found that, from 1956 to 1972, voter attitudes and partisan
affiliation became more strongly associated in five areas of domestic policy but did not
change for the one foreign policy measure (foreign aid) he examined." There remained
in 1972, as there had been in 1956, 1960, 1964, and 1968, virtually no relationship
between public opinion and party identification on this foreign policy measure.
If the parties do not take divergent policy stands on issued, then the voter has no
way of holding either party responsible for the decisions that are actually reached. And,
since the party label of a candidate is the easiest way a voter can separate him from his
opponent, this lack of consistency on foreign policy position offers little hope that the
effects of public opinion will be felt through the ballet box. There is some evidence of
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a relationship between general dissatisfaction with Johnson's performance as president
and anti-Democratic votes in 1968. 49 However, there was virtually no policy voting on
the Vietnam issue in that election: The patterns of support for Humphrey and Nixon
were almost totally unrelated to the voters' positions on Vietnam. 5° The reason
however, was not that the voters were not polarised on Vietnam. Rather 57 percent of
the sample saw either no difference or very little difference in the Vietnam planks of the
two candidates! 51In fact, Nixon appeared to do slightly better among advocates of
pulling soldiers out of Vietnam than did Humphrey, 52 and considerably better among
advocates of a stronger military posture. Indeed, the evidence is mixed as to whether
there was any relationship at all between Johnson's popularity and the increasing
opposition to the war in Vietnam.53
If there is little support for the concept of popular control of governmental policy
through the electoral arena, then we should not expect a much stronger linkage between
the public and their representatives in Congress. If this is the case, then the democratic
dilemma becomes even more pronounced. If Congress finds the means to reassert
itself on foreign policy but is acting otherwise than its constituents want it to, what does
this mean for foreign policy under a democratic government? The very idea behind the
conversion process is that public opinion is translated into public policy through the
actions of the representatives in the legislature. To do so, members of Congress must
of course know the views of their constituents.
In studies of the influence of constituency views upon the attitudes and behaviour
of members of the House, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes found that the
conversion process works quite well on civil rights, moderately well on social welfare
issues, and virtually not at all on foreign policy questions. On civil rights questions in
particular, the views of constituents were in general consistent with the representatives'
roll call votes.54 If we assume that a congressman might not always be able to identify
the feelings of his constituents and instead bases his voting behaviour on what he
believes his constituents think, then the conversion process on civil rights roll calls is
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extremely strong. This is not surprising, since civil rights questions are redistributive
issues. Both the representative and his constituents perceive 'winners' and 'losers'
domestically, and it is reasonable to suppose that they identify the same groups as
'winners' and the same groups as 'losers'.
For foreign policy votes, on the other hand, there is at least a weak tendency for
members of the House to take stands different from those espoused by their
constituents. When representatives' perceptions of constituency attitudes are employed
instead of simple constituency attitudes only a moderately positive relationship between
perceptions and votes in noticeable. The upshot is that most representatives do not
have a very good idea of what their constituents want. The linkage between actual and
perceived constituency attitudes is more than three times as great for civil rights bills as
it is for foreign policy roll calls. And, finally, the personal attitudes of representatives
show virtually no relationship to constituency attitudes on foreign policy votes. 55 It is
thus hardly surprising that Richard F. Fenno found that members of the House
International Relations Committee saw their service on that body as not particularly
helpful to their re-election efforts, in contrast to membership on such committees as
Interior and Post Office.56
These results suggest that measures designed to strengthen the role of Congress in
the foreign policy process will not necessarily bring foreign policy more in line with
public opinion. If anything, public opinion seems to follow presidential opinion more
than it does congressional opinion. Even when guided by opinion leaders in opposition
to the president, the public tends to be more responsive to the chief executive. Yet,
when opinions do become divided on a policy area, such as the war in Vietnam, the
failure of the party system to play the role of opinion leader serves as a strong check on
the conversion of public preferences into public policy in the foreign policy arena.
Still, a president cannot forget public opinion before he makes decisions; he is
indeed very conscious of it, as it affects his desire to be re-elected or for his party's
candidate to win, and he is therefore quite aware of what might happen if the citizen-
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consumer does not like his policy-products (Carl Friedrich has called this 'the law of
anticipated reaction'). Before World War II, the isolationist consensus set the
constraints within which foreign policy decisions had to be made. Even joining the
International Court of Justice became impossible; Roosevelt's call in 1937 for the
democracies to 'quarantine' the aggressors met with a public furore. After World War
II, Truman did not oppose the rapid demobilisation of the armed forces despite
increasing tensions with the Soviet Union. The public wanted to relax, to bring boys
back home, to concentrate once more on domestic and private affairs. Not until
eighteen months after the war against Japan had ended, after the perception of repeated
demonstrations of Soviet hostility and numerous vetoes in the United Nations, did the
Soviet threat appear sufficiently clear that Truman felt he could go before Congress and
the public and ask them to support the policy of containment. And the reaction to
Vietnam and our frequently criticised role as world policeman suggests that U.S. policy
in the post-Vietnam period will have to assume a 'lower profile' if it is to retain public -
and congressional - support.
The four circles of power we have proposed do seem to indicate the relative impact
of each set of actors on the foreign policy process. The president, because he can listen
to whom he wished, and because he can generally command the support of the public
(and Congress as well), stands at the centre of the decision-making process.
Surrounding him are key personal advisers and the leaders of the major foreign policy
agencies in the government. These leaders in turn depend upon the actors immediately
below them in their respective departments for detailed advice and recommendations,
which they carry into the innermost circle.
4.6. Conclusion
This chapter has generally traced the constitutional framework of US security
policy process. The basic purpose of any state's foreign policy is promotion of its
171
national interests, and US foreign policy is no exception. Also the function of each
institution is designed to achieve its national goal. Therefore, the policymakers in
major institutions try to achieve these purposes by employing their available means
effectively. Even though, each institution tries to enhance the national interests, they
are not always co-operative, rather competitive or conflicted due to its own interest.
The part two of the case study of US and Iran relations, we will examine and
appraise decision making process between the presidents and related institutions to
develop the cliency relationships. The people who make decisions and determine
policy for nation-states do not respond necessarily to the objective facts of a situation
and the international environment. It is what a state's decision makers think the world
is like, not what it is really like, that determines their behaviour and essentially the
output of the policy process which becomes identified as a nation's foreign policy. 57 It
will be helpful to remember throughout the analysis in this study that no one factor
alone is responsible for structuring the foreign policy of a state: therefore, in the case of
the US fundamental national values, strategic debates, role definitions, bureaucratic
conflicts, and the variables of the American civic culture intersect and conflict in the
foreign policy arena before final policy outcome is established.
In sum, foreign policy is not the outcome of a logical, one-track, step-by-step
process; rather, it is the end result of a tough, competitive battle in both an internal
national political process and an external international political arena. These concepts
will provide one of the objective standards to analyse the US foreign and security policy
towards Iran in part two of US and Iran case study.
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CHAPTER V
DOMESTIC POLITICS AND GREAT POWER INFLUENCE,
1800 - 1951
This chapter establishes the basis for examining the impact of cliency on Iran's
domestic politics by discussing the trends and dynamics of Iranian politics in the
previous era. Two main interpretative themes are stressed. The main theme is that the
first half of the twentieth century saw the gradual emergence of an authentic democratic
movement in Iran. This movement had its historical and intellectual origins in the
constitution and republican movements of 1906-1925. Its social base was expanded
substantially with the modernisation programmes of the 1920s and 1930s. The Iranian
democratic movement reached its peak in the 1941-1953 period, which was
characterised by widespread popular political activity, a vocal and largely uncensored
press, relatively free elections, a broad spectrum of challenge to the power of the royal
court. This period stands out in sharp contrast to the previous era in which Iran was
ruled by a modernising autocrat and the subsequent era of authoritarian dictatorship
under a client state.
The second theme stressed in this chapter is that while foreign involvement in
Iran's internal affairs had been extensive in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
it declined markedly after 1925. In contrast to the previous period in which Iran was
divided into spheres of influence, its military was controlled by foreign powers, and its
economy was burdened with foreign loans and concessions, Iran after 1925 became
much more independent, despite Allied military occupation during World War II.
Iran's greater independence during this period, particularly after 1946, helped to nurture
the incipient democratic movement. Conversely, the re-establishment of a foreign
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presence in Iran with the creation of a client state in 1953 had an extremely destructive
effect on Iran's democratic movement.
5.1. The Great Powers in Iran before US Involvement, 1800 - 1941
Although Iran was never formally colonised, a number of European countries
became deeply involved in its affairs in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
The two main foreign actors in Iran before World War II were Great Britain and Russia.
As Britain extended its formal control over India and as Russia expanded into the
Caucasus and Turkestan (on Iran's north-western and north-eastern borders) in early
and mid-nineteenth centuries, the interest and rivalry of these countries in Iran became
keen. Iran and Britain concluded several treaties between 1801 and 1814, aimed
primarily at blocking Russian expansionism. Iran fought and lost wars with Russia
over the disputed region of Georgia in 1804-1813 and 1826-1828. This dispute was
ended in 1828 with a treaty establishing the present Russia-Iranian border west of the
Caspian Sea, followed in 1881 by a treaty establishing the eastern border. Iran also
fought a war with Britain in 1856-1857 over the region of Heart in western
Afghanistan, which was followed by a treaty recognising Afghanistan, which was
followed by a treaty recognising Afghan independence.'
The economic penetration of Iran by foreign powers began in the second half of
the nineteenth century, as Nasr al-Din Shah (1848-1896) and Mozaffar al-Din Shah
(1896-1907) sold concessions to foreign agents to finance a standing army, luxury
imports, and royal journeys to Europe. The first major concession was for a British
telegraph line to India, signed in 1863 and completed in the following year. In 1872 a
far-reaching concession was granted to Julius Reuter (a naturalised British subject),
covering all transportation and mining (other than precious stones and metals) in Iran.
The Reuter concession was cancelled in 1873 due to pressures from Russia, Reuter's
inability to secure a British loan, and opposition in Iran from wealthy merchants
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adversely affected by the concession. A concession was granted in 1888 to Britain for
commercial navigation of the Karun River in south-western Iran, followed by an 1889
agreement with Russia that it would be given all future railroad concessions. Banking
concessions were granted to Reuter of Britain and to Russia in 1888 and 1891. In 1900
Russia was given control of all customs receipts in exchange for a major loan.2
The rapid growth of foreign involvement in Iran's economy began to provoke
broad popular opposition in the late nineteenth century. An 1890 British concession for
domestic sales and exports of tobacco led to a massive nation-wide boycott, organised
by influential clergymen and merchants. This boycott is generally regarded as the first
major nationalist movement in modern Iran. 3 The Russian banking concession and the
loan granted in exchange for customs receipts mentioned above gave Russia great
influence over the wealthy classes in Iran and amounted to a virtual surrender of the
country's finances. These actions also provoked popular opposition, particularly
among elements of the middle class, and were an early impetus to the constitutional
movement. In 1901 a concession was granted to William D'Arcy of Britain for oil and
gas rights in all but the northernmost parts of Iran. This concession, which was re-
negotiated in 1933, became the basis for all subsequent activities by the Anglo-Iranian
Oil Company (AIOC) and was the subject of frequent controversy in Iran during the
next half century.4
In the nineteenth century Britain and Russia were the main foreign actors in
Iran. These countries competed vigorously, first over strategic issues and later over
commercial concessions. However, with the polarisation of the major European powers
into hostile camps before World War I and with the entrance of Germany into the
Middle East (symbolised most prominently by the Berlin-Baghdad railway, begun in
1902), a rapprochement gradually developed between them. This was codified in the
1907 Anglo-Russian convention establishing spheres of influence in Iran. Under this
agreement, Russia gained control over roughly the northern half of Iran, including the
most commercially-attractive areas other than the oil-rich south-west. Britain gained
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control over the south-eastern region bordering on what is now Pakistan, with the
central and south-western sectors remaining neutral. Russian predominance under this
agreement reflected its political and economic hegemony in Iran at this time, due
mainly to its proximity to the most populous and dynamic areas in the Northwest and
its dominance of Iran's trade and finances. The 1907 Anglo-Russian agreement was to
remain for decades a source of bitter animosity on the part of Iranian toward Britain and
Russia.
After 1907 Russian and British agents were active throughout Iran. In 1909
Russian troops entered the country. Despite its neutrality, Iran was occupied by various
foreign powers during World War I and was the scene of widespread hostilities.
Russian forces confronted Turkey in the west. German agents intrigued in Tehran and
stirred up tribal rebellions in the south-west. Following the Russian Revolution, those
parts of northern Iran occupied by Russian troops, as well as Turkestan and the
Caucasus, were plunged into a state of near-anarchy. Russian forces disintegrated and
British troops advanced north from Baghdad through Iran to counter a German-Turkish
drive through the Caucasus toward Baku. Independent states were proclaimed in
northern Iran, the Caucasus, and in Turkestan. British troops remained in Iran until
1921, aiding anti-Bolshevik forces throughout Central Asia.5
After the war, Britain sought to re-establish its influence in Iran by concluding a
treaty in 1919 in which it undertook to reorganise Iran's army and treasury. This treaty
was extremely unpopular in Iran, and was repudiated in 1921. Following the British
evacuation from the Caucasus in 1920, Soviet forces established control in this area and
subsequently entered northern Iran in pursuit of White Russian forces. Soviet troops
remained in the province of Gilan until September 1921, propping up the independent
Soviet Republic which had been established there. A 1921 Soviet-Iranian treaty
repudiated all Czarist claims on Iran and paved the way for the removal of Soviet
forces. Soviet policy toward Iran in the interwar period was generally restrained, with
Reza Shah portrayed in the Soviet press as a "national reformist".6
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With the British treaty of 1919 and British and Soviet intrigues in Azerbaijan
and Gilan immediately after World War I, it was apparent that these two countries were
seeking to re-establish the dominant positions they had held in Iran before the war.
However, after the rise to power in the early 1920s of Reza Khan (who was crowned
Shah in 1925), the influence of these and other Western powers in Iran declined
significantly.
The first acts of the government established in 1921 by Reza Khan were to
conclude the treaty. Renouncing Soviet claims on Iran and repudiating the 1919 British
treaty. As minister of war Reza Khan quickly removed all foreign officers from the
military and took other steps to improve its loyalty, morale, and effectiveness. Arthur
Millspaugh, an American financial advisor, was hired to reorganise and strengthen the
economy, but was eventually undermined and forced out by Reza Shah. Trade with the
Soviet Union and later with Germany was increased to weaken the British domination
over Iran's economy. The Trans-Iranian railroad was built with local capital raised by a
tax on tea and sugar and with advisors and equipment drawn from a variety of foreign
countries. Measures such as import substitution and foreign exchange controls were
taken to broaden and protect the domestic economy. Iranians with foreign ties were
frequently harassed by Reza Shah and the system of capitulation for foreign merchants
was removed. A variety of less dramatic measures were also taken, such as an attempt
to purge Arabic words from Iran's Farsi language. 7
 By the late 1930s Iran had been
transformed from a backward country whose government and economy were dominated
by agents to a modernising country with a strong central government and considerable
independence from foreign actors.
5.2 The Politics of Iran, 1900-1941
The Qajar dynasty, which had ruled Iran since the end of the eighteenth century,
became seriously weakened by the beginning of the twentieth century. Growing foreign
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debt and the concessions granted by Nasr al-Din Shah and Mozaffar al-Din Shah made
the royal court increasingly susceptible to foreign influence. Foreign leadership in the
military made it less effective as an instrument of royal domination. The nation-wide
response to the 1890 tobacco concession demonstrated to both the monarchy and those
who opposed it the nascent strength of popular movements. In 1896 Nasr al-Din Shah
was assassinated by a follower of Jamal al-Afghani, an itinerant cleric and activist who
had inspired the tobacco boycott and who promoted Islam as a basis for struggles
against Western imperialism throughout the Middle East and southern Asia. Nasr al-
Din's successor, Mozaffar al-Din Shah, continued the policy of granting concessions..
Most notable was the 1900 Russian concession for customs revenues, which led to
widespread protest and rioting. In 1906 a series of public agitation's was staged in
Tehran. These led to the granting of a constitution and the establishment of a
parliament (the Majles) in July of that year.
5.2.1. The Social Structure of Iran under the Oaiars
The traditional structure of Iranian society had begun to undergo a series of
profound changes by the end of the nineteenth century, associated largely with Western
political, economic, and cultural penetration. In the early Qajar period four main
classes existed in Iran, in addition to the royal court: a traditional dominant class of
tribal khans and large landowners (including a few top clerics); a broad, heterogeneous
middle class of petty landowners, middle-level bureaucrats, bazaar traders, and rank-
and-file clergy; a lower class of artisans and wage-earners in the bazaar and the urban
lumpen-proletariat; and a large, impoverished rural mass of poor peasants and itinerant
tribal groups. These class divisions were embedded in a mosaic of regional, tribal,
ethnic, and religious divisions which effectively prevented any kind of large-scale class
or nationalist consciousness from emerging.8
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Following the first war with Russia in 1804-1813, modest efforts were begun to
establish a standing army to replace the ineffective tribal contingents. This involved the
conscription of some 6000 troops, the establishments of small industries to manufacture
arms and uniforms, the hiring of European advisors, the establishment of a secular
secondary school, the funding of limited opportunities for education in Europe, and
increases in taxes and tariffs to finance the entire effort. These measures fostered a
degree of contact with Western ideas and the beginning of a nationalist consciousness
among the small strata of educated bureaucrats and professionals. This brief period of
modernisation ended in 1951 under pressure from Britain and Russia and from
domestic elements which were adversely affected by the taxes and tariffs.
Western economic penetration in the second half of the nineteenth century
gradually produced a much stronger and broader nationalist consciousness, clearly
visible in the reactions to the 1872 Reuter concession, the 1890 British tobacco
concession, and the 1900 Russian loan. This consciousness emerged primarily among
three segments of the middle class. First, traders and merchants from the bazaar reacted
vehemently to the higher taxes and competition from foreign goods (particularly
textiles) and foreign merchants, who were protected by a series of capitulation.
Second, elements of the clergy became increasingly hostile toward foreign penetration,
for reasons ranging from their desire to protect Islamic traditions to their need to
reinforce their main base of support in the bazaar. Finally, a small, diverse strata of
Western-oriented intellectuals which began to emerge in this period became
increasingly incensed at the surrender by Qajar rulers of Iran's political and economic
independence. The orientation of these intellectuals toward Western nationalist and
democratic ideas was to provide the main ideological foundation for the constitutional
movement of 1906 and the republican movement of the early 1920s.9
5.2.2. The Constitutional Revolution and its Aftermath, 1906-1925
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The constitutional movement was a direct outgrowth of the protests which had
begun on a large scale with the tobacco boycott. Its immediate antecedent was an
economic crisis in 1905 which resulted from a bad harvest and the disruption of trade
with Russia caused by the Russo-Japanese War and the 1905 Russian Revolution.
Tehran merchants petitioned the court in the summer of 1905 to rectify some of the
damage done to them by the various foreign concessions and to dismiss the Belgian
administrator of the Russian customs concession. After the merchants' demands were
ignored a general strike erupted in December 1905 reiterating these demands and
calling for the establishment of a "House of Justice". Major demonstrations were
organised by merchants and elements of the clergy after a series of violent
confrontations in the summer of 1906, and the British legation was occupied by a
crowd estimated at 14,000. After receiving threats of armed uprisings and the defection
of the Cossack Brigade, Mozaffar al-Din Shah relented, permitting the establishment of
a parliament and the drafting of a constitution.
The constitutional movement was strongly opposed by Muhammad Ali Shah
(who succeeded his father in early 1907), and by Britain and Russia. The first Majles
blocked a new Anglo-Russian loan, condemned the 1907 convention establishing
spheres of influence in Iran, and sought to impose a number of reforms on the royal
court. The shah and his supporters responded by organising anti-constitutional
demonstrations which drew mainly from the urban lumpen-proletariat. In June 1908,
the shah's Russian-officered Cossacks bombarded the parliament building, closing the
first Majles. A number of constitutional leaders were subsequently tortured or
murdered, and a pro-constitutional revolt in Tabriz was crushed by the 1909 Russian
invasion, following a protracted siege. The Majles was restored in 1909 when a force
of constitutionalists from Rasht (the capital of Gilan) and Baktiari tribesman invaded
Tehran and ousted the shah. However, further Russian and British pressures, including
the development of more troops and a series of ultimatums demanding the dismissal of
the pro-constitutional American financial advisor Morgan Shuster, led to a coup in
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November 1911 by the pro-shah cabinet which closed the Majles and ended the early
nationalist period.10
Between 1911 and 1914, Iran was nominally governed by a cabinet dominated
by Bakhtiari tribal leaders. However, Russian and British influence in the cabinet and
the presence of over 12,000 Russian and British troops left actual control in the hands
of these powers. With the collapse of the central government tribal uprisings and
separatist revolts emerged in several outlying areas. These increased with the outbreak
of World War I, as German agents intrigued among remnants of the constitutional
movement in Tehran and as Soviet agents and sympathisers later aided separatist
movements in the Northwest. Ahmad Shah was crowned in July 1914, followed shortly
by elections for the third Majles, which were manipulated by the Russians and British.
Anarchy reigned in much of the country during World War I, particularly after the
collapse of the Czarist forces. Rebel governments were established in Gilan and
Azerbaijan and famine was reported in many areas.
With the collapse of Czarist Russia, Britain sought to extend its influence in
Iran after World War I by advancing the treaty of 1919. This treaty was almost
universally opposed in Iran and provoked strong anti-British sentiments. Elections for
the fourth Majles were rigged by Prime Minister Vosuq al-Doleh in an attempt to
achieve ratification of the treaty, raising further public outcries. By late 1920,
opposition to the treaty and to the Vosaq government which favoured it and had failed
to end the Gilan revolt was strong. 11 Several groups apparently contemplated coups at
this time, particularly in the military, which opposed the introduction of British advisors
and blamed its White Russian leadership for the failures in Gilan. In February 1921 a
coalition of Cossack officers under Reza Khan and liberal nationalists under Sayyed
Ziaal-Din seized power, installing Sayyed Zia as prime minister in 1923, and crowning
himself Shah in 1925. His accession to the throne was opposed by a handful of Majles
deputies led by Mohammed Mossadeq, 12 who was later to become the chief symbol of
Iranian nationalism.
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5.2.3. The Regime of Reza Shah Pahlavi, 1925-1941 
Reza Shah came to power because of the weakness of the Qajar state. The
Qajars had mortgaged much of their sovereignty to the Russians and British by
contracting loans and concessions to finance their extravagant lifestyles. This had
emptied the treasury, requiring tax and tariff increases and making large-scale reforms
and modernisation impossible. Particularly crucial to their fall was the inability of the
Qajars to finance a strong, loyal army which followed the constitutional period and
which would certainly have made the 1921 coup more difficult. Foreign concessions
and the weakness of the Qajars also alienated the middle-class elements whose
emerging consciousness and growing political power became evident during the
tobacco boycott and the constitutional period. Although Reza Shah's rise to power was
based primarily on his control over the military, it occurred initially with the active
support and later with the acquiescence of the middle-class.
During the early years of his rule, Reza Shah was a nationalistic, modernizing
monarch who bore a greater resemblance to his Turkish contemporary Kemal Ataturk
than to his Qajar predecessors. The actions taken by Reza Shah to reduce foreign
influence in Iran have been described above. Reza Shah also undertook a large-scale
programme of modernisation. This effort transformed Iran from a backward, largely
feudal country heavily dependent on the outside world for market, manufactured goods,
and administrative expertise to a semi-industrialised country dominated by a strong
state and considerably less dependent on the outside world.
Reza Shah's first modernisation efforts focused on the military and the civil
service, which served as his consolidation of power and in his years as Iran's
uncontested ruler. After the 1921 coup Reza Khan acted quickly to unite the diverse
military units under a reorganised, all-Iranian officer corps. Nation-wide compulsory
conscription was established in 1925, with mandatory literacy training and subsequent
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reserve duty for all recruits. The civil service was thoroughly reorganised in 1922,
when regulations governing hiring, promotion, and professional conduct were
established. Between 1923 and 1943 the number of civilian government employees
increased from 25,000 to 100,000, and the army grew to nearly 400,000.13
The growth of the officer corps and civil service groups was closely tied to the
establishment of a secular educational system in Iran. The number of students enrolled
in secular primary and secondary schools increased by an astonishing 1300 percent
between 1925 and 1929. The University of Tehran was established in 1934, and by
1941 36 teacher's colleges and 32 vocational schools had been established. Beginning
in 1928, 100 state scholarships for overseas study were awarded annually, and over
1500 students had returned from overseas by 1938. Schools for the military and civil
service and a large adult education programme were also established. In addition to
fostering a Western-oriented, non-aristocratic civil service and officer corps, the
establishment of a secular educational system helped undermine Islamic values and the
role of the clergy in Iranian society. This trend was further augmented by the secular
reforms of the civil code and judicial system which were carried out between 1928 and
1936.14
Economic development was also extensive in this period. Primary emphasis
was placed on the expansion of industry and infrastructure at the expense of agriculture.
Large-scale industrialisation occurred in the mid-and later-1930s. Industrial
employment increased by 250 percent from 1934 to 1938, and the share of industry in
Iran's GNP grew from nearly 0 to around 5 percent between 1926 and 1947. The main
industries established were textiles, matches, cements, and tobacco and food processing
plants. These used domestic raw materials almost exclusively, and constituted an initial
stage of import substitution.
The state played an extensive role in Iran's industrialisation under Reza Shah. A
national bank was established in 1927. By the late 1930s 20 percent of the national
budget was allocated to industrialisation, exceeding defence expenditures in 1939-1941.
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State-operated foreign and domestic trade monopolies were established. By the end of
Reza Shah's regime roughly 50 percent of industrial production and employment
(excluding the oil industry) were in state-owned industries. Great advances in
transportation and communications were also made under state sponsorship. The
Trans-Iranian Railroad, which connected the Persian Gulf and the main northern cities,
was constructed under Reza Shah. Not surprisingly, many of these industries,
particularly those operated by the state, were inefficient and unprofitable. It is evident
that much of the industrialisation and development of infrastructure (particularly the
railroad) undertaken in this period served the state goals of achieving greater economic
independence and a stronger military apparatus rather than the rational criteria of
economic planning. 15
5.2.4. The Social and Political Structure of Iran under the Reza Shah
Reza Shah's modernisation efforts had profound consequences for the social
structure of Iran, which had evolved only modestly since the early nineteenth century.
The most important new class to emerge under Reza Shah was an educated middle
class or intelligentsia, composed mainly of the professionals and middle-level
bureaucrats who had benefited from Reza Shah's educational reforms. This class
mainly grew out of the traditional middle class described above, many of its members
having come from bazaar or petty land-owning families. It had very heterogeneous
political loyalties, providing both the middle-level employees of the state apparatus and
much of the leadership of the various political movements which emerged after the fail
of Reza Shah in 1941. Closely related to the educated middle class (and in fact
overlapping considerably with it) were the lower levels of the officer corps, which had
been greatly expanded along with the civil service and the rest of the military by Reza
Shah. The emergence of the educated middle class corresponded with a decline in the
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position of the clergy, which was seriously weakened by Reza Shah's secularising
reforms. 16
Because of the dominant role played by the state in industrialisation under Reza
Shah, the Iranian bourgeoisie remained comparatively small and subservient to the state
in this period. Furthermore, since foreign investment in Iran was confined to the oil
industry until the mid-1950s, very little of the Iranian bourgeoisie could at that time be
described as dependent on foreign capital. The main industries open to the private
sector under Reza Shah were matches, some textiles, certain food processing industries,
and service industries such as transportation and construction. Most of the
industrialists who did emerge in this period came from either the bazaar or from Reza
Shah's close circle of top military officers and state officials.17
The great expansion of the economy under Reza Shah enlarged the traditional
petty bourgeoisie located in the bazaar, which had ties with both the industrial working
class, which grew from about 1500 at the turn of the century to 50,000 in 1941, with
another 40,000 in the oil industry. This modern working class was drawn mainly from
the poorer peasants and the urban lumpen-proletariat. Since labour unions were
outlawed before the main period of industrial expansion in the 1930s the working class
remained largely unorganised under Reza Shah. However, several strikes were staged
under communist leadership between 1929 and 1931, and the industrial working class
gave strong support to the communist Tudeh party in the 1940s and 1950s. 18
Reza Shah's regime was a mixed blessing for the landed aristocracy.
Landowners benefited from the sale of crown lands and from a series of laws passed in
the 1920s and early 1930s which firmly established the institution of the land-
ownership. Furthermore, the granting of universal male suffrage under the fourth
Majles enabled landowners to dominate that body, not only under Reza Shah (when it
was completely subordinated), but in the subsequent era as well. However, as much as
15 percent of the arable land in Iran (including almost the entire province of
Mazandaran) was acquired privately by Reza Shah, much of it through confiscation
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from wealthy landowners. Very little attention was devoted to the modernisation of
agriculture in Reza Shah's development programme. Much of the land-owning tribal
aristocracy was severely weakened by the pacification and forced settlement of the
tribes. 19
Needless to say, Reza Shah's actions brought very little change to the lives of
the poor peasants. The Iranian peasantry remained on the brink of survival throughout
this period. Other than those who migrated to the urban areas, Iranian peasants played
no significant role in Iranian politics.20
Despite his efforts to reduce foreign influence and modernise Iran, Reza Shah
was a tyrant and a dictator who ruled arbitrarily and used the crown to amass a great
fortune. After initially supporting the movement to establish a republic, Reza Khan
changed his mind in 1924 on the grounds that Iran was not yet ready to rule itself.
Political parties were outlawed in 1927, after making a brief appearance. Elections
were routinely manipulated, and the Majles served essentially to legislation handed
down by Reza Shah. Press censorship was severe, and labour unions were outlawed in
1931. The tribes were ruthlessly suppressed by the army, disarmed, and forced to settle
into villages. Those intellectuals, military officers, or clerics who opposed Reza Shah
or became too powerful were imprisoned, tortured, or murdered.21
Reza Shah's dictatorial methods served to temporarily neutralise the democratic
movement which had triumphed during the constitutional period. This movement
remained very much alive, however, and was paradoxically strengthened by the
modernisation efforts of Reza Shah, which greatly expanded its social base in the
middle and working classes. Iran's democratic movement re-emerged with great vigour
upon the demise of Reza Shah to present the most serious and protracted challenge to
the autocratic ambitions of his successor.
5.3. World War II and the Post War Period, 1941-1951
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Reza Shah's dictatorial regime came to an abrupt end in 1941 when Britain and
the Soviet Union Jointly invaded Iran. The immediate motive for the invasion was to
secure the Trans-Iranian Railway, through which some 30 percent of the supplies sent
to the Soviet Union from the West between 1942 and 1944 were eventually shipped.
The rapid growth in Iran's trade with Germany and increasing German involvement in
Iran's heavy industries and transportation system had given Germany a prominent
position in Iran by 1941. Strong pro-German sentiments and extensive German fifth
column activities in Iran were seen as a threat to Allied plans to use the Persian
Corridor as a supply route for the vital eastern front. British and Soviet demands prior
to invasion that Reza Shah eliminate German agents and sympathisers were ignored.
After the invasion, Reza Shah was exiled to Mauritius and subsequently to South Africa
where he died in 1944, leaving the throne to his 21 year old son Mohammed Reza.22
5.3.1. Iranian Polities during World War II and its Aftermath
The fall of Reza Shah initiated a twelve year period of fervent political activity
in Iran. Censorship was lifted, and a general amnesty for political prisoners was
declared. Political parties were reintroduced, with as many as 42 appearing by early
1944. The occupation of Iran by both Soviet and British and American forces helped to
promote a large measure of ideological diversity in Iranian politics, unlike earlier
foreign involvement which had generally contributed to national disintegration.23
The broad spectrum of social groups and political parties which were active in
this period and the degree to which these groups were mobilised contrasted sharply with
the previous and subsequent eras. Of the parties which emerged during the war, the
communist Tudeh party quickly established itself as the most active and most popular.
It was formed in late September 1941 by the survivors of a group of 53 Iranian
communists who had been jailed in 1937 and recently amnestied. It portrayed itself
until mid-1944 as a democratic, anti-fascist, and leftist but non-Marxist organisation. It
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participated in elections, supported the constitution, strongly Opposed the Axis powers
and the remaining vestiges of Reza Shah's regime, and found itself frequently at odds
with the Soviet Union and with veteran Iranian communists.
The Tudeh party sought to attract a broad spectrum of progressive elements in
this period, ranging from bourgeois nationalists to peasants and the new industrial
working class. The latter quickly emerged as its primary base of support, while its
leadership was drawn mainly from the educated middle class. It also received strong
support from regional and ethnic populations seeking greater autonomy from the central
government in Tehran, such as the Kurds and Azerbaijanis. The Tudeh party was very
popular and remained highly visible in this period, staging large demonstrations and
publishing a variety of newspapers. It elected 8 of the 126 representatives in the
fourteenth Majles elections of late 1943 and early 1944 (more than any other party) and
received 13 percent of the vote nation-wide. A New York Times reporter later estimated
that it could have received 40 percent of the vote for the fifteenth Majles elections in
1946, had they not been rigged by the government.24
Many of the other parties established in the years immediately after the fall of
Reza Shah had little popular sport and quickly disappeared from the political scene. By
the time of the fourteenth Majles elections five main parties had emerged, in addition to
the Tudeh. They were the conservative, royalist National Union party, supported
mainly by wealthy landowners; the conservative, pro-British Fatherland party, which
was headed by Sayyed Zia (who returned from exile in 1943) and represented the tribal
aristocracy, the conservative clergy, and elements of the bazaar; the centrist Justice
party, composed mainly of anti-Communist intellectuals; the progressive, nationalist
Iran party, which backed Mossadeq's re-entry into politics in this period and was
supported by moderate and left-wing intellectuals and bazaar elements; and the radical
Comrades' party, which split from the Tudeh in late 1942 and consisted mainly of anti-
Stalinist intellectuals. Together with the Tudeh party, which had by far the largest
popular base, these parties essentially defined the political spectrum of the time.
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Elections for the thirteenth Majles (which sat from November 1941 until
November 1943) had largely been completed before the Allied invasion, and
consequently the emergence of these parties had little effect on its composition.
However, they played an important role in the elections for the fourteenth Majles
(March 1944 -through March 1946). Although only a small number of its deputies
actually belonged to these parties, the fourteenth Majles quickly split into a number of
fractions or caucuses which espoused platforms similar to those held by the parties. The
main point of cleavage among them was between the pro- and anti-shah fractions. The
royalist National Union caucus held less than 25 percent of the seats, giving the Majles
a decidedly anti-shah character.
Conflict between the young shah and the fourteenth Majles began with his
attempts to influence the elections and to subsequently prevent it from convening.
Once the Majles was convened, the anti- shah forces gained control over the most
important committees and began to establish a cabinet and institute a series of
procedural reforms which solidified their position. The major confrontation between
the shah and his Majles opposition occurred when it attempted to assert control over the
military by restricting its budget and forcing it to enact major reforms. This posed a
serious threat to the shah, for whom the military was an essential base of power. The
effort by the Majles to rein in the military was thwarted by a series of protracted and
violent strikes by textile workers in Isfahan, apparently led by the Tudeh party. Local
tribal leaders feared Soviet intervention on behalf of the striking workers and joined
forces with the military and the shah. Calls to strengthen the armed forces and a strong
anti-Tudeh reaction emerged in the Majles, ending the drive to rein in the military and
weakening the anti-shah coalition.25
Since early 1943 the government had been quietly negotiating for new oil
concessions in the north and south-east with British and American oil companies. The
government had initially invited Standard of New Jersey to submit a bid, apparently in
an attempt to increase American influence to counter Britain and the Soviet Union.
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This promoted the Soviets to demand the northern concessions for themselves, marking
the beginning of a period of growing antagonism between the Soviets and the Iranian,
British, and American governments, and between Soviet supporters and opponents in
Iran.26
The Tudeh party quickly backed the Soviet demands, an action which openly
identified it as pro-soviet and signalled its increasing radicalisation. The progressive
and nationalist elements in the Majles broke their anti-shah alliance with the Tudeh
party and joined with conservatives elements in outlawing all further oil concessions, a
move which was led by Mosadeq. Hostility between the Soviet Union and Iran and the
radicalisation of the Tudeh party increased further after April 1945, when a government
which had attempted to placate the Soviets was replaced by one which was more
hostile, headed by the arch-conservative Mohsen Sadr.
Attacks by the Sadr government against Tudeh offices and news - papers in
August 1945 provoked uprisings in the Tudeh strongholds of Mazandaran and Gorgan
in the north and in Tabriz, the capital of Azerbaijan. Soviet troops which occupied
those areas prevented the local garrisons and outside reinforcements from responding to
the uprisings. The Tabriz uprising was accompanied by demands for the autonomy of
Azerbaijan led by Pishevari's Democratic party, which quickly absorbed the local
Tudeh branches. Further uprisings culminated in the establishment of the Autonomous
Republic of Azerbaijan in December 1945 and the Kurdish People's Republic in
western Azerbaijan in January 1946.
The Soviet Union was instrumental in establishing and protecting those
separatist movements. It continued to press for oil concessions and refused to consider
withdrawing its occupation forces. However, a combination of strong diplomatic
pressure by the United States and brilliant diplomatic manoeuvring by Ahmad Qavam,
who became prime minister in March 1946, led to the withdrawal of Soviet troops and
the subsequent collapse of the autonomous republics in December 1946. The proposed
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Soviet oil concession, which had been left for the Majles to ratify, was overwhelmingly
rejected in October 1947.27
The aggressive Soviet actions in Iran during this period were a major source of
East-West tension in the early years of the Cold War, and undoubtedly contributed to
the rigid view of Soviet intentions in Iran and elsewhere which subsequently prevailed
in Washington.28
 Soviet actions in this period can in part be explained by the declining
importance of the Persian Corridor after the Black Sea supply route was secured in
October 1944 and by the desire of the Soviet Union to establish friendly buffer states on
its borders. However, Nazi documents captured by the Allies revealed a November
1940 agreement between the Axis powers and the Soviet Union which acknowledged
Soviet territorial aspirations in the area to its south, including Iran. The existence of
such an agreement was apparently suspected by some Iranians at the time, and was
certainly known to US policymakers in the early days of the Cold War. 29 While one
may question the extent to which Soviet officials still held such intentions in the post-
war period (particularly after the death of Stalin in March 1953), it is clear that the
containment of Soviet expansionism remained a cardinal principle of US policy toward
Iran in the 1940s and 1950s.
5.3.2. The Post-war Struggle for Power in Iran
With the departure of Soviet troops and the collapse of the Ajerbaijan and
Kurdish republics, external forces again assumed the secondary role in Iranian domestic
politics which they had come to occupy under Reza Shah. However, in the open
political environment which prevailed after 1941, the withdrawal of foreign actors left
Iran turbulent and in a state of flux.
The immediate consequences of the Soviet withdrawal were a collapse of the
Tudeh Party's broad base of support and a surge in the popularity of Qavan's
Democratic party, which briefly gained control of the fifteenth Majles. An extensive
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government crackdown on the Tudeh party and its affiliates began in October 1946 and
continued during the reoccupation of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. In the invasion of
these provinces by government forces some 500 rebels were killed, over 10,000 fled to
the Soviet Union, and hundreds of top leaders were executed or imprisoned. This was a
serious blow to the Tudeh, whose main base of support had been in Azerbaijan. During
the next two years the party underwent a period of reorganisation and ideological
purification, purging its top leadership, identifying itself more closely with Marxist-
Leninist principles and with the Soviet Union, and boycotting the fifteenth Majles
elections.3°
Since those elections were held in the six months after the collapse of the
autonomous republics, Qavam's party obtained a strong majority in the fifteenth
Majles. However, much like the anti-shah coalition in the previous Majles and the
National Front movement which later emerged under Mossadeq, Qavam's Democratic
party contained very diverse elements. These ranged from wealthy landlords and
industrialists to tribal leaders, the urban middle class, and the industrial working class.
Friction among these groups soon emerged over a variety of issues, leading to
defections from the party and ultimately to the ouster of Qavam in a vote of no
confidence in late 1947.
Defection from the Democratic party left four fractions of roughly comparable
size in the Majles: the loyal Democratic (who continued to support Qavam), the royalist
National Union Caucus, the pro-British National Caucus, and a diverse group of
independents. In addition, the Tudeh party, which had boycotted the fifteenth Majles
elections and was still in the process of reorganising, began to be an important political
force in 1948. In the elections within the Majles for Qavam's successor the
royalist/pro-British candidate Hakami defeated the Democrat/independent candidate
Mossadeq by one vote. The Hakimi government opposed efforts (led by Mossadeq) to
renegotiate the 1933 British oil concession and continued Qavam's harassment of the
Tudeh party. It also made a number of proposals which would have made the shah
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more powerful, such as increased military spending and the establishment of an upper
house of parliament (the Senate), half of whose members were appointed by the shah.
After seven years as head of state and in the absence of a unified opposition
such as that headed by Qavam or the Tudeh/Soviet collaboration of 1944-1946, the
shah apparently felt in 1948 that he could attempt to re-establish the dominant position
held by the court under the Reza Shah. The size and quality of the military had been
growing steadily, due in part to US aid (see chapter 6, below). This not only increased
its ability to suppress mass-based groups such as the various autonomy movements, the
Tudeh party, and the tribes, but also increased its loyalty to the shah. The shah also
began to intrigue among the major political figures of the time, aiding those who were
loyal to him and undermining those who opposed him or remained independent (such
as Qavam, who was forced into exile when his government collapsed).
In attempting to re-establish the monarchy, the shah also sought to strengthen
Iran's ties with the United States and weaken the pro-British fraction in the Majles,
which brought down the Hakami government after only six months in office. The
royalists then formed a government in collaboration with Qavam's Democrats. This
government, which began secret negotiations to revise the British oil concession,
collapsed after four months because of obstructionism by the pro-British fraction, aided
by the populist cleric Ayatollah Kash-ani. The Majles was unable to agree on a new
government, and strongly opposed as unconstitutional the shah's efforts to appoint one.
The impasse was ended, however, in February 1949 when an attempt was made on the
shah's life. Seizing this opportunity, the shah declared martial law, installed his
candidate as prime minister, convened a constituent assembly which created the upper
house of parliament mentioned above, and instituted a wide-ranging crackdown on his
opposition, including a ban on all Tudeh party activities.31
5.3.3. The Emergence of the National Front
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The shah's crackdown and his subsequent attempt to rig the sixteenth Majles
elections (held between July 1949 and February 1950) provoked a large demonstration
in the royal palace grounds in Tehran. The demonstrators elected a committee of
twenty prominent activists to negotiate their demands with the shah, headed by
Mohammed Mossadeq. The committee obtained a promise from the court that free
elections for the sixteenth Majles would be permitted. It then retired to Mossadeq's
home, where it agreed to form a national organisation to continue pressing for various
reforms. This organisation became known as the National Front.
The National Front elected eight representatives to the sixteenth Majles (which
sat from February 1950 until May 1951), including Mossadeq and several other
members of the original committee of twenty. Although the sixteenth Majles was
overwhelmingly pro-shah, the National Front deputies immediately called for cuts in
the military budget, denounced the constituent assembly, and voiced other demands
aimed at reducing the power of the shah and improving the position of the , middle
classes. In June 1950 the pro-shah government submitted proposals to a Majles
committee calling for revisions in the 1933 oil agreement with the AIOC. In order to
aid passage of the proposals, the shah at the same time nominated Ali Razmara to be
the new prime minister. Razmara was a top general who favoured renegotiation of the
treaty but had otherwise been independent and frequently critical of the shah. Razmara
was quickly elected, despite opposition from the National Front. He then sponsored
measures in the Majles embodying the new proposals, along with a number of reforms
such as higher taxes for the rich, an anti-corruption commission, proposals for
provincial and local assemblies, a relaxation of anti-Tudeh measures, and a land reform
bill.
Razmara was assassinated in March 1951 by a member of the Fedayan-i Islam, a
Muslim extremist group which was closely associated with Kashani at the time.
Razmara's assassination was clearly tied to his support for the oil agreements, and
apparently involved Kashami and several other National Front leaders. By the time of
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Razmara's assassination, opposition to the oil agreements was nearly universal and the
National Front had begun to lead a movement for nationalisation of the AMC.
Recognising the strength of this movement, the Majles rejected the shah's nominee to
replace Razmara and elected the moderate Hossein Ala as the new prime minister.
Ala brought a top National Front leader into his cabinet and permitted a bill
calling for nationalisation to be adopted by the Majles. This bill, which was sponsored
by Mossadeq, was later approved by the Senate (half of whose members were appointed
by the shah) and signed into law by the shah, indicating the strength of the
nationalisation movement. In late March a series of Tudeh-sponsored strikes calling for
nationalisation and protesting working conditions swept the oilfields and the major
industrial cities. On April 29 the shah was forced to appoint Mossadeq prime minister.
This initiated a period of confrontation in which Mossadeq and the National Front were
pitted against Britain, the shah, and eventually the United States.32
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CHAPTER VI
US INTEREST AND OIL ISSUE, 1940 - 1950
Before World War II, the strategic and economic interests of the United States
in Iran consisted mainly of missionary activity, archaeological expeditions, and the
Shuster and Millspaugh advisory missions. Isolationist sentiments and the traditional
strength of the British in the Middle East kept Iran well out of US strategic
considerations. Oil concessions in Iran were of some interest to US oil companies in
the 1920s and 1930s, but these proved to be impractical because of the dominant role of
the AIOC. US contractors played a small part in the construction of the Trans-Iranian
Railroad, and the volume of US trade with Iran reached several million dollars per year
in the late 1930s. However, US commercial investments in Iran were negligible, being
for overshadowed by the holdings of the various US missionary organisations in
buildings, equipment, etc. Diplomatic relations between the United States and Iran
were evidently of such little importance that they were broken between 1936 and 1939
over derogatory statements made in the American press about Reza Shah.1
The United States was initially drawn into Iran by its role in the effort to supply
the Soviet Union through the Persian Corridor during World War ll. The first large
contingent of US troops arrived in Iran in December 1942, and by early 1944 nearly
30,000 US soldiers were there manning the supply operation. The United States
undertook extensive improvements to Iran's transportation system and to the AIOC
facilities during the course of the War. Plants for assembling aircraft, trucks, and oil
drums were also built. Arthur Millspaugh was brought back to Iran and given broad
authority to set prices, supervise civilian transportation, raise taxes, and manage the
nation budget. Military missions under Colonel Norman Schwartzkopf and General
Clarence Ridley were brought in to train and supervise the Gendarmerie (a rural police
force) and the Iranian army. Lend lease aid was extended to Iran in March 1942,
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consisting of both military and non-military items. By December 1946 the total value
of lend lease aid had reached $8.5 million.2
During World War II and in the first year after the war, two major concerns
emerged which were to dominate subsequent US policy toward Iran. The first was a
desire to increase and protect Middle East oil production. While the position of
ARAMCO in Saudi Arabia made that country the main focus of the Middle East oil
policy of the United States, Iran remained the largest producer in the region until 1951
and served as a crucial buffer between the Soviet Union and Persian Gulf reserves.
Secondly, as Cold War tensions mounted, US policymakers increasingly viewed Iran as
an important pawn in their strategy of containing the Soviet Union. Containment of the
Soviet Union in Iran was inextricably linked with the protection of Persian Gulf oil.
However, US policymakers also feared that control over Iran would enable the Soviets
to increase their pressure on Turkey and bring other countries in the area under their
domination as well.
These concerns led US policymakers to maintain close relations with Iran and
give it the years immediately after World War II. However, it was not until 1950 that
the United States extended large amounts of aid to Iran, and only in 1953 did it begin to
undertake the kind of commitments to Iran which embody a cliency relationship.
6.1. Oil and US Policy towards Iran
6.1.1. Middle East Oil during World War II
Although oil had been plentiful in the United States in the 1930s (selling for as
little ten cents per barrel in 1931), World War II placed heavy demands on US
productive capacity. By 1943 serious questions were being raised about the adequacy
of US oil supplies for the duration of the war and for the post-war period. The US
Senate heard testimony in June 1943 that serious shortages would appear by early 1944.
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Concern was nearly universal among government policymakers and oil industry
analysts that domestic supplies would not be sufficient in the post-war era for
peacetime requirements or for the needs of another war.3
These concerns led the Roosevelt administration to undertake a variety of
measures to increase domestic oil supplies. In May 1941 the Office of Petroleum Co-
ordinator for National Defence (later known as the Petroleum Administration for War)
was established and given broad powers to regulate US oil production and distribution.
Gasoline and fuel oil rationing were introduced in May 1942 after a series of supply
reductions proved to be unworkable. Numerous other actions were taken by this body
as well, such as the promotion of pipeline and tanker construction, measures to co-
ordinate refining and distribution, and efforts to stimulate domestic exploration and
production.4
Despite these actions, it soon became clear that domestic sources of crude oil
would not be sufficient to meet wartime or post-war needs. Because of its vast
reserves, the Middle East became the object of particular interest by US policymakers.
The Roosevelt administration established the government-owned Petroleum Reserves
Corporation (PRC) in June 1943, which sought to gain public control over foreign
sources of crude by attempting to purchase the California Arabian Standard Oil
Company, which had extensive holdings in Saudi Arabia. After this effort collapsed
the PRC attempted to build a refinery and later a pipeline in Saudi Arabia. These
efforts also failed, due to pressures by the US oil industry and the British government.
In December 1943 Roosevelt initiated talks with the British about the world petroleum
situation, focusing particularly on the Middle East. Although the agreements reached
as a result of these talks were never ratified by Congress, they helped establish a basis
for post-war co-operation by the major oil-producing powers.5
As part of this strategy of obtaining foreign sources of crude during World War
ll the US government also actively assisted US oil companies attempting to secure
concessions in northern and south-eastern Iran. The Iranian government had
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approached Standard of New Jersey in February 1943 about a possible concession, and
in March 1944 Sinclair also began to negotiate with Iran. The State Department,
working mainly through the US embassy in Teheran, gave important assistance to these
two companies. It acted as an intermediary in their negotiations with Iran and denied
taking on an active role to the British. The embassy exerted pressure on Iranian
officials to favour bids by the American companies over British bids. It also passed
important information to the US companies from two Americans who were acting as
private consultants to the Iranian government. Despite these actions and indications
that Iran wanted to engage US companies as a way of countering British and Soviet
influence, all negotiations for oil concessions were broken off by the Iranian
government in October 1944.
6.1.2. Oil in Post-war US Foreign Policy
As wartime fell off in 1945, concern about oil supplies briefly declined as well.
Oil industry analysts testifying before a Senate subcommittee in October 1945 predicted
that US petroleum consumption would resume the steady growth rate it had followed
before the war and that supplies would be adequate and imports from the Middle East
unnecessary through 1965. However, declining coal production, rapid conversion to oil
for home heating, and post-war recovery in general quickly pushed US consumption
past its wartime peak, despite substantial price increases. This growth in US
consumption was exacted by insufficient tanker capacity and by shortage of the steel
pipe needed for drilling new wells. Spot oil shortages in the winters of 1946, 1947, and
1948 led to Senate investigation and task of talk of rationing. Although shortages did
not reappear until the 1970s, the United States became a net oil importer in 1948, and
has remained so ever since.6
In addition to concern about domestic oil supplies, US policymakers were also
concerned in the late 1940s and early 1950s about the world situation and Middle East
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production in particular. One reason for this concern was the growing awareness that
oil would play a key role in European recovery. Western Europe produced less than
three percent of its oil needs in 1948 and 1949, with most of its imports coming from
the United States and the Caribbean. Dollar shortages in post-war Europe and
increasing US demand for western hemisphere production made sources in the Middle
East increasingly attractive to European consumers.7
Of more direct interest to US policymakers as the Cold War deepened was
concern about the adequacy of oil supplies for a future war. As early as October 1946,
the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) considered Iran and its oil supplies to be "of major
strategic interest". By early 1948 US military planners believed that the Middle East
and its oil-fields should be held as long as possible in the event of war, "regardless of
the risk involved". Joint US-British plans were drawn up for the defence of oil wells,
pipelines, and refineries. By November 1951 the National Security Council felt that an
all-out war with the Soviet Union could not be fuelled for more than six months
without holding Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Qatar. The situation was expected to be
even worse by 1956, and numerous contingency plans were drawn up. Similar ideas
were expressed in 1952 and 1953.8
It is evident that, except when it tried to obtain concessions in Iran for American
oil companies in 1943 and 1944, the US government focused primarily on Saudi Arabia
rather than Iran in its efforts to expand Middle East oil production. This was mainly
because Iranian oil was controlled by the British through the AIOC whereas Saudi oil
was controlled by US companies. The execution of US oil companies from Iran did not
keep Iran out of US policy in the Middle East was fundamentally regional in nature, and
was closely co-ordinated with British policy. Nevertheless, while US policymalcers
maintained close ties with Iran in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the absence of
tangible US interests in Iran gave them little incentive to substantially strengthen these
ties or become deeply involved in Iran's domestic politics.
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6.1.3. The major US institutions' Role in Oil Policy
It is important to emphasise here that while US policy towards Iran in this
period was motivated in part by concern about the security of Middle East oil, this
concern involved more than just a desire to protect private US interests in the region.
Several key policy decisions can be cited which indicate that US policy was based on
broad considerations of US national security rather than simply a desire to protect the
interests of American oil companies.
As mentioned above, the Roosevelt administration established a state-owned oil
company (the PRC) and entered into an agreement with Britain to manager world oil
supplies. These efforts were vigorously opposed by the US oil industry, and collapsed
only after they had become unnecessary. After the war recommendations were made
that some domestic fields be impounded and that domestic producers maintain a 10-15
percent excess capacity. Foreign production was encouraged in order to conserve US
reserves and case the European dollar shortage. This hurt domestic producers and
contributed to a decline in domestic exploration. It also boosted the sales of European
companies and led to periods of excess capacity for US overseas producers. European
refinery construction was financed under the Marshall Plan, weakening the share of US
companies in the European market. During the 1946-1947 Soviet-Iranian imbroglio,
the State Department sought to prevent US companies from obtaining oil concessions
in Iran, but did not oppose a Soviet concession.9
These tensions between the US government and the US oil industry indicate that
private interests were frequently sacrificed in this period for broader considerations of
national security. At least three national security concerns were evidently more
important to US policymakers at this time than private interests. First, the paramount
concern of US policymakers in the 1940s was to ensure that sufficient supplies of oil
would be available for wartime needs or for the needs of a future war. Second, US
policymakers intervened in the international oil market in order to promote post-war
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recovery in Europe. Finally, the interests of US oil companies were sacrificed in 1946
and 1947 in an attempt to lessen tensions between Iran and the Soviet Union.
In as much as US policy toward Iran in this period and in the subsequent era
was based on security concerns such as these rather than the interests of US oil
companies, the relationship that resulted between the United States and Iran constitutes
a very different kind of international relationship than that embodied in the concepts of
dependency and imperialism discussed in chapter 1.
6.2. The Evolution of the US Containment Strategy in Iran
Containment of the Soviet Union became an important element in US policy
toward Iran after the establishment of the autonomous republics of Azerbaijan and
Kurdistan in late 1945 and after the post-war dialogue between the United States and
the Soviet Union came to a virtual standstill in early 1946. Indeed, the crisis
precipitated by the failure of the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Iran in
March 1946 was something of a test case for the Truman administration in using a
tough approach to stop Soviet expansionism. Although the 1946 crisis served in some
ways as a model for subsequent US actions in Greece and Turkey, Iran was not
included with these countries under the Truman Doctrine. US aid to Iran was almost
negligible before 1950, and only reached high levels after the overthrow of Mossadeq in
1953. Consequently, US policymakers and while Iran was an important cornerstone in
the US containment strategy, these interests were not sufficient before 1953 to warrant
the establishment of a cliency relationship.
6.2.1. US Policy during the 1946 Crisis
As discussed in chapter 5, the Soviet Union began to pressure Iran for an oil
concession after the Persian Corridor ceased to be an essential supply line in late 1944.
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This was accompanied by strong Soviet support for the autonomy movements in
Azerbaijan and Kurdistan and by increasing friction with the United States over the
presence of US troops in Iran without a formal mandate. Although some US
policymakers advocated efforts to free Iran from Soviet (and British) domination at this
time, the desire to maintain harmony among the wartime allies apparently
overshadowed concern in Washington about Soviet intentions in Iran. The Roosevelt
administration made no serious attempt to block Soviet efforts to obtain an oil
concession and weaken the position of the central government in Azerbaijan.
Roosevelt, in fact, sought to accommodate the Soviet Union at Iran's expense by
suggesting that the Iranian railroad and a Persian Gulf port be placed under
international control to serve as a warm-water outlet for Soviet exports.1°
As the war in Europe came to an end, and especially after the death of
Roosevelt, US-Soviet relations began to deteriorate rapidly. The main issues of
contention between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union were the future status of
Germany and Eastern Europe (particularly Poland), the question of German reparations,
and the incipient civil war in Greece. Several major disputes were left unresolved at the
Potsdam conference in July 1945, and others were merely papered over. In the late
summer and fall of 1945 a new reality of confrontation began to emerge in US-Soviet
relations. Domestic political pressures also began to affect the Truman administration
as the 1946 election year approached. The Republican party accused it of "betrayal"
and "appeasement," and public opinion increasingly favoured a tougher attitude toward
the Soviet Union.11
As a result of three conflicting pressures, a much harder line was taken by the
Truman administration in the first months of 1946. Truman's new approach toward the
Soviet Union was precipitated in part by the agreements reached at the December 1945
Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference, which he regarded as "an empty promise". In
a meeting with Secretary of State Byrnes (who had just returned from negotiating these
agreements), Truman spoke very harshly of the Soviets and ruled out further
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compromise. In February 1946 this tough new approach was given a coherent
analytical framework in the widely-circulated and much-publicised "long telegram"
sent from Moscow by George Kennan. Kennan interpreted Soviet policy in Terms of
rigid Marxist-Leninist principles and traditional Russian territorial aspirations. In early
March 1946 the first public expression of this new hard line came in Churchill's
famous "iron curtain" speech. While Truman did not publicly embrace Churchill's
ideas, he and other US officials had read the speech beforehand and clearly approved of
it.12
The continued occupation of Iran by Soviet troops soon became the main focus
of the Truman administration's new hard line. Several attempts were made in the
summer and fall of 1945 to convince the Soviets to withdraw their troops. These had
little effect. Truman had intended that Iran be a major topic of conversation at the
December 1945 Moscow conference. Instead, Byrnes had focused on agreements
regarding the Balkan situation, atomic energy, and East Asia, failing to make any
progress on Iran. Furthermore, Stalin suggested for the first time at the Moscow
conference that Soviet troops might remain in Iran past the March 2 deadline
established in the 1942 Tripartite Treaty. Truman subsequently berated Byrnes on the
Iran issue, which he described as an "out-rage" In January 1946 Iran brought the
question of Soviet troops before the UN Security Council. After heated debate it was
decided that discussion of this issue would be postponed, pending further negotiations
between Iran and the Soviet Union.13
Tensions escalated rapidly as the March 2 deadline passed without compliance
by the Soviets. Iranian Prime Minister Qavam was told by Stalin that Soviet troops
would remain in Iran, "pending examination of the situation". US notes delivered in
Moscow on March 6 and 9 protesting the continued occupation were ignored. Soviet
troop movements in the Balkans and in Azerbaijan in late February and early March led
Truman to believe that an attack on Turkey was imminent. On March 8 it was
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announced that the battleship Missouri would sail to Istanbul to return the body of the
Turkish Ambassador to the United States, who had died in November 1944.14
The issue was again brought before the Security Council on March 18. Soviet
Ambassador Gromyko immediately attempted to end debate on the issue. Secretary of
State Byrnes forcefully defended Iran, and Gromyko stormed out of the meeting. A
note was delivered to Qavam in Tehran on March 24 declaring the Soviets' intention to
withdraw, but implicitly linking withdrawal to an oil concession. This was found to be
unacceptable by the United States, and Byrnes refused to end the Security Council
debate. In early April reports began to circulate that Soviet troops had begun to
evacuate. It soon became clear that the Soviets were backing down. On April 4 Byrnes
agreed to postpone future debate for a month to allow for bilateral negotiations between
Iran and the Soviet Union. The evacuation of Soviet troops was completed in early
May, although the issue remained on the Security Council agenda.15
Despite the complete evacuation of Soviet troops in May, it soon became
apparent that Soviet non-military personnel still remained in Azerbaijan. Attempts by
Qavam in the summer and fall of 1946 to bring the autonomous republics under the
control of Tehran were unsuccessful. Instead, Qavam was forced to make a number of
concessions to the Soviets and their Iranian allies, including negotiations for Soviet
control of oil and airline rights in the northern provinces and Tudeh representation in
the cabinet. In July a Tudeh-led strike by oil and workers turned into a bloody riot. In
September the southern Qashqai tribe revolted and laid siege to Shiraz over growing
Tudeh and Soviet influence in Tehran. In early October the Iranian ambassador in
Washington told the State Department that Iran "had arrived at a cross-roads where it
must choose between exclusive orientation toward Russia and a more balanced policy".
A request for $250 million in aid was made in September to the US Embassy in Tehran,
and repeated in October and November.
These alarming events led the State Department to undertake a thorough review
of US policy toward Iran in September and October of 1946. The views of the JCS on
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US strategic interests in Iran were solicited. However, despite the gravity of the
situation, no fundamental changes in US policy emerged from this process. Although
the JCS considered Iran to be an area "of major strategic interest," it recommended only
token military aid. The State Department suggested only that Iran "be encouraged to
hope" for US aid. In fact, a $10 million loan for Iran had been contemplated as early as
June 1946 and had still not been approved in late November. While an agreement in
principle covering this loan was reached in December 1946 it was not formally signed
until June 1947 and was re-negotiated in May 1948. After initially hedging on the
question, the state Department in early October cautiously offered US support for an
appeal by Iran to the Security Council. George Allen, the US ambassador in Tehran,
later lamented that Qavam's appeals for US help were answered only with advice to
depend on the United Nations. As late as October 30 the State Department continued to
pressure Qavam not to hold Majles elections, fearing that they would strengthen the
Tudeh party.
These elections were announced by the shah on October 5, after heavy Soviet
pressure. On October 10 Ambassador Allen received information that the Tudeh
cabinet members had been engaged in secret negotiations with the Soviets. He brought
this to the attention of Qavam and the shah, who forced Qavam to dismiss the Tudeh
ministers. This enraged the Soviets and brought an end to Qavam's policy of balancing
Soviet and Tudeh pressures with conciliatory gestures and minor concessions. Qavam
then began to seriously contemplate using force to liquidate the autonomy movements.
He expressed his intentions to Allen in late November and received assurances of US
support in the Security Council. Under the pretext of securing Azerbaijan for the
elections the Iranian army marched on Tabriz in early December. Spontaneous
uprisings in Tabriz overthrew the Pishevari government while the army was still 100
miles outside of the city.16
Although US policymakers were deeply concerned about these events their
actions were limited to promises of token military and economic aid, guarded
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assurances of Security Council support, and informal representations made by
Ambassador Allen on his own initiative. 17 In the dispute over Soviet troops in Iran in
the first half of 1946 the United States had given Iran important support in the Security
Council but had not committed itself further. The two US military missions established
during World War ll were maintained throughout this period, but military and
economic aid were not provided on even a moderate scale. This policy of limited US
assistance to Iran continued in 1947.
6.2.2. The Truman Doctrine and its Aftermath
In response to appeals from Britain in February 1947, the Truman
administration embarked on a massive programme of aid for Greece and Turkey. This
programme, which became known as the Truman Doctrine, established as a cornerstone
of US policy toward underdeveloped countries the use of economic aid to achieve
security goals. 18 As discussed above, the 1946 crisis in Iran had served as something of
a precedent for the active approach to Soviet expansionism begun by the Truman
administration in early 1946 and later epitomised by the Truman Doctrine. Both
Truman and Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson (who played a key role in the
formulation of the Truman Doctrine) feared that Iran and other countries in the Middle
East would fall into Soviet hands if the United States failed to aid Greece and Turkey.
Despite Congressional testimony by Acheson to the contrary, it is clear that the Truman
Doctrine was meant to apply to other counties as well. The Mashall Plan and aid
programmes for a number of underdeveloped countries were formulated and
implemented concurrently (see table 6.1). Nevertheless, although Iran was clearly a
prime candidate for such an aid programme, US assistance to it continued to be limited
in 1947.19
- Table 6.1 will be seen next page -
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Table 6.1. Major Recipients of U. S. Military and Economic Aid, 1946-1952
Country
(millions of U. S. dollars)
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952
Great Britain 79.9 3757.0 0 1613.7 1008.9 551.4 634.5
France 302. 42.8 363.7 1313.3 1162.3 1762.9 1698.5
West Germany 195.8 298.3 850.3 1257.6 733.4 652.8 310.3
Italy 423.3 416.7 331.0 684.1 445.7 665.9 567.1
Greece 195.2 180.9 332.8 362.0 256.6 317.3 351.2
Turkey 6.1 2.6 72.1 117.3 182.2 219.8 259.0
Iran 3.3 22.5 0 0 11.8 27.8 44.1
China (Taiwan) 128.7 464.1 50.9 344.6 51.1 193.8 275.8
Japan 106.7 389.3 483.7 501.5 365.3 290.3 63.6
South Korea 5.6 75.5 100.1 141.8 102.6 93.9 159.8
Philippines 31.4 161.5 136,4 237.7 154.8 158.8 161.2
SOURCE: US Department of States, Agency for International Development,
unpublished worksheets for US Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from
International Organisations, July I, 1945-September 30, 1980 (Washington, 1981).
Two weeks after Truman's March 12 speech to Congress calling for aid to
Greece and Turkey the shah complained to Ambassador Allen that US treatment of
Turkey because it involved a loan with interest rather than a grant. Allen replied that
the high levels of US aid given to Greece and Turkey were justified by the immediate
Soviet threat faced by those countries. In an April 14 discussion about the proposed
military credits for Iran the Iranian ambassador in Washington was told that Iran
"should keep the best possible relations with the Soviet Union". Further requests were
made by Iranian officials in the following months that payments on the proposed loan
be waived and that a grant of $100 million be made to Iran. While US support for
Iranian independence was reaffirmed, these requests were denied. The JCS viewed
Soviet military action toward Iran as unlikely at the time. Further US aid would be seen
as provocative by the Soviets, and would not appreciably enhance Iran's security.20
The pattern of relations established in 1946 and 1947 between the United States
and Iran continued to hold in 1948 and 1949. The United States continued to express
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strong support for Iran's independence and remained in close contact with Iranian
decision-makers. However, aside from a $ 10 million "token" military aid grant made
in 1949, substantial military and economic assistance for Iran was not forthcoming.
The shah, the Iranian ambassador in Washington, and the various prime ministers made
frequent requests that the existing aid agreements be expanded and that as much as
$500 million in aid be granted. Iran also made several other attempts to engage the
United States and Britain in formal and informal security agreements. These were
rejected as well. The issues of aid and a security agreement were raised again by the
shah during his first visit to Washington in November 1949. Although this trip ended
amicably, the shah's inability to obtain a stronger US commitment to Iran left him
deeply disappointed and fuelled growing anti-American sentiments in Iran.21
US policymakers gave three main reasons in rebuffing Iran's requests for a
closer relationship in this period. First, after the Soviet Union backed down during the
crises of 1946 it became apparent that Soviet leaders were unwilling to risk the political
consequences of an outright invasion of Iran. US policymakers thus had no compelling
reason to enhance Iran's ability to resist a Soviet invasion, and feared that increased
military aid would be seen as provocative. Second, it was felt that Soviet subversion
was the greatest threat to Iran, principally in Azerbaijan and through the Tudeh party.
The low levels of military aid extended to Iran in 1947 and 1949 were intended to meet
this threat by promoting domestic order. Concern about Soviet subversion also led US
policymakers to advocate economic development and political reform, including a
crackdown on corruption and opposition to the shah's attempts to expand his
constitutional powers. Finally, it was argued that Iran's relative economic stability and
strong balance of payments position qualified it for loans from the International Bank
rather than the sort of aid that had been extended to Greece and Turkey.
Privately, several other reasons were expressed for restricting US aid to Iran.
For one thing, it was felt that Congress and the American public would not regard Iran
as sufficiently important to warrant high levels of US aid. US policymakers also feared
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(with great prescience) that aid might be used by the shah or by top military leaders to
establish a dictatorship rather than promote development and political reform.
However, perhaps the most important reason why the United States avoided a
closer relationship with Iran in this period is that Iran (and the Middle East generally)
was still regarded as primarily a British military responsibility. Britain had as much as
500 million pounds invested in Iran, and more in Kuwait. By contrast, US investment
in the region was still quite small. The Middle East was considered "vital" to British
interests in the sense that its loss would present a "mortal danger". US policymakers
also considered the Middle East vital, but used this term much more loosely. The JCS
did not include Iran on its April 1947 list of strategically-important countries targeted
for aid. Britain had some 80,000 troops stationed in the Middle East, and a naval base
with 8 ships on Bahrain Island in the Persian Gulf. US military plans did not call for
the use of force in Iran, while British plans called for the introduction of army and air
force units into Iraq and southern Iran in the event of a Soviet invasion. Both the
United States and Britain considered the Middle East to be secondary in importance to
Europe. In the Middle East both countries gave the highest priority to defending the
"inner ring" of countries centred around Egypt rather than the "outer ring" including
most of Iran and Turkey.22
6.3. The Reorientation of US Policy toward Iran: 1950
By early 1950, several major changes had begun to take place in both US
foreign policy and in Iran's domestic and international affairs which soon led US
policymakers to significantly reorient their policy toward Iran. The first was a
fundamental re-evaluation of overall US foreign and security policy. This re-evaluation
was prompted by the Soviet atomic test of September 1949 and the establishment of the
People's Republic of China in the following month. These events, together with the
first rumblings of McCarthyite attacks on the State Department, led to emergence of a
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more aggressive US global strategy. This new strategy was codified in the National
Security Council paper NSC-68, written in February and March of 1950. NSC-68
called for a "renewed initiative in the Cold War," beginning with a substantial US
military build-up and large increases in US overseas military and economic aid. The
full realisation of NSC-68 was to come in the summer and fall of 1950, when the
United States sent troops to defend South Korea and then invaded North Korea.23
US policy toward Iran at this time was also affected by increasing concern about
its domestic stability. As discussed in chapter 5 Iran had entered into serious
depression by early 1950. This was caused mainly by the bad harvest of 1949, which
was followed by a decline in private consumption and consequently higher
unemployment and numerous business failures. Furthermore, broad public opposition
had emerged to the oil agreement negotiated by the Iranian government with the AIOC.
These factors and the growing strength of the Tudeh party led to fears of increasing
unrest. A top State Department official visiting Iran in late March described the
situation as "dangerous and explosive". After a similar visit in early April, the US
Army Chief of Staff warned that Iran might become a "second China". Policymakers in
the State Department criticised the shah's leadership as ineffective, and called for
increased US aid and pressure on the shah to install a more capable government. At the
London Foreign Ministers' Conference in May 1950 the British were pressured to make
greater concessions to Iran in order to resolve the oil dispute and thus placate the
Iranian public.24
These changes in the international situation and in Iran itself did not change the
basic principles which had guided US policy toward Iran in 1949. Rather, they changed
the policy prescriptions which followed from these principles. A Soviet attack on Iran
was still considered unlikely, and Iran was still assumed to be a British responsibility.
The deteriorating economic situation and renewed Tudeh activity had led to increased
fears of Soviet-inspired subversion. As in the past, economic development was seen as
the best means of combating subversion. However, Iran's deepening depression now
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required foreign aid to stimulate economic development. Furthermore, increased
military aid was deemed necessary to control the growing unrest and strengthen the
government. While US policymakers continued to press the shah for reforms, the
immediacy of the economic situation clearly took precedence over concerns about an
incipient dictatorship. Finally, although British military predominance was still
recognised as late as May 1952, the continuing failure of the British to resolve the oil
dispute was clearly frustrating and undoubtedly led US policymakers to contemplate
strengthening their role in Iran.
This stronger US role in Iran emerged in 1950, after a State Department review
of the crisis there and of US options for dealing with this crisis. In May a Mutual
Defence Assistance Agreement was signed which provided for an average of $23
million per year in military aid through 1956. In October a $25 million Bank loan was
granted and a modest Point 4 aid programme was begun. The United States also
supported Iran's request at this time for a $10 million International Bank loan. 25 By the
eve of the Anglo-Iranian oil crisis began in May 1951 the US had positioned itself to
take an active role in Iran's affairs, first an intermediary in negotiations with the British
and later as a patron power when it established a client state under the shah.
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CHAPTER VII
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A US CLIENT STATE, 1951-1953
Chapter 5 and 6 discussed Iranian domestic politics and US policy toward Iran
in the era before the appointment of Mohammed Mossadeq as prime minister on April
29, 1951. In chapter 5 it was argued that the 1941 Allied invasion which ended the
dictatorship of Reza Shah ushered in a 12-year period of intense political activity in
Iran. This period was considerably more democratic than either the previous or
subsequent eras. It was characterised by a plurality of political actors, relatively free
political institutions, and a vocal parliament willing to challenge the established power
of the royal court and the traditional ruling class. Moreover, with the emergence of
effective political parties and a growing number of gifted leaders, the trend toward
democracy in this period was becoming strongly established in Iranian society. The
intellectual and social origins of this democratic movement were traced in chapter 5 to
constitutional movement of the early 1900s and to the broad socio-economic changes
which began in the nineteenth century and accelerated under Reza Shah. It was also
argued in chapter 5 that while foreign powers had played a major role in Iran's affairs
since the early nineteenth century their role had declined substantially after 1925,
except in the period of Allied occupation during World War II.
Chapter 6 discussed US interests and policies in Iran before 1951. The US role
in Iran was never substantial in this period, although it gradually increased with
wartime occupation and the deepening Cold War. Before 1951 US policy toward Iran
was motivated primarily by strategic rather than economic concerns. US policymakers
were content to let Britain play the leading role for the West in Iran during this period.
This chapter ties these themes together by examining the events which led to a
fateful confrontation in August 1953 between the movement toward democracy in Iran
and the strategic views held by the Eisenhower Administration. By 1951 the
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democratic movement in Iran had become closely bound up with the oil nationalisation
issue and with Mossadeq and the National Front, who were its main proponents.
Mossadeq and the mainstream of the National Front were extremely popular in Iran and
had strong democratic ideals. Moreover, while nationalisation was the most prominent
issue pursued by the National Front, a more fundamental goal of this organisation was
the achievement of a more democratic distribution of power in Iran. At the height of
Mossadeq's popularity in late 1951 Iran appeared to be on the verge of establishing a
non-aligned, populist (if not truly democratic) state, not unlike those existing at the time
in India and Argentina.
The enactment of the nationalisation law in April 1951 set the stage for a
confrontation between the National Front and Britain. The Truman Administration
adopted a relatively neutral position in this dispute, supporting the British embargo on
Iran but also encouraging the British to negotiate and restraining British
interventionism. However, with the inauguration of the Eisenhower administration
Mossadeq became the target of new US approach toward Third World nationalism.
The United States played a crucial role in ousting Mossadeq in August 1953 and in the
post-coup consolidation of power by the shah and Prime Minister Zahedi. By helping
to destroy the National Front and install an authoritarian regime, the United States,
acting largely on strategic considerations, dealt a decisive blow to the long-term
prospects for democracy in Iran.
7.1. Iran on the Oil Nationalisation Efforts
7.1.1. The Oil Problem
With the collapse of the Soviet-supported autonomous republics in Azerbaijan
and Kurdistan in late 1946, Iran could once again begin to focus on internal issues.
Chief among these was the status of the 1933 oil agreement negotiated by Reza Shah.
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This agreement was widely regarded in Iran as a sell-out to the British and a surrender
of Iranian sovereignty. Knowledgeable Iranians were well aware of the successful
nationalisation by Mexico of its foreign-controlled oil industry and of the favourable
deals which Mexico and Venezuela had obtained from US oil companies. Pressure in
the Majles led to the passage of a bill in October 1947 requiring the government to re-
negotiate the agreement with the AIOC. After the AIOC announced a 100% increase in
profits between 1946 and 1947 a special Majles commission was established to study
the oil question.
Secret negotiations aimed at securing a new agreement were begun with the
AIOC in August 1948. The Iranian negotiating team presented an elaborate 25-point
list of complaint, which the AIOC promptly rejected. Talks continued intermittently
until July 1949, when a Supplemental Agreement was signed. This Agreement called
for increased payments to Iran but did little to satisfy the Iranian list of demands. The
presentation of the Supplemental Agreement to the Majles caused an immediate uproar,
which precluded ratification before the Majles adjourned in late July. Oil remained an
explosive issue during the ensuing elections. The prime minister who had begun the
secret negotiations (Hazhir) was assassinated by the xenophobic Fedayan-i-Islam. The
new Majles convened in March 1950 was even less sympathetic to the Supplemental
Agreement. In June the issue was turned over to an 18-member oil commission studied
the agreement and finally rejected it in November, amid calls by the National Front and
the Tudeh party for nationalisation.
By late 1950 oil had come to dominate Iranian politics. Shortly after the
commission rejected the Supplemental Agreement ARAMCO announced that it had
concluded a 50-50 profit-sharing arrangement with Saudi Arabia, the first such
agreement to be reached in the Middle East. The AIOC quickly offered to re-negotiate
the Supplemental Agreement along similar lines (nearly doubling its previous offer),
but by this time had waited too long. In January 1951 67 proposals dealing with the oil
issue were submitted to the Majles, including one authored by Mossadeq which called
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for nationalisation. Prime Minister Razmara publicly opposed the nationalisation bill
and was assassinated in early March by the Fedayan-i-Islam. Following a series of
protracted and violent strikes in the oil-fields in March and early April, the oil
committee approved Mossadeq's nationalisation bill on April 26. On the same day a
new proposal was presented by the British calling for the establishment of a new British
company having Iranian representation on its board of directors which would control
Iran's oil and divide profits on a 50-50 basis. This proposal differed only superficially
from the previous AIOC offer, and was lost in the rush of events. Yielding to popular
pressure, the shah appointed Mossadeq prime minister on April 29 and signed the
nationalisation bill into law on May 1.1
7.1.2. The Iranian Political Scene in 1951
By May 1951 most of the proponents of nationalisation had aligned themselves
with the National Front. The National Front had been organised in 1949 to protest the
shah's attempt to rig the sixteenth Majles elections. It quickly became an umbrella
organisation for a variety of groups favouring nationalisation and seeking a change in
the political status quo. The main organisations grouped in the National Front in 1951
were the progressive, nationalist Iran party, led by Allahyar Saleh and Karim Sanjabi,
which was formed in the early 1940s and was composed mainly of left-wing, anti-
Soviet intellectuals; the Toilers party, led by Mozaffar Baqai, which stood to the left of
the Iran party and contained both intellectual and working class/bazaar elements; and
the Mojahadin-i-Islam, led by the demagogic Ayatollah Kashani and composed mainly
of bazaar workers, merchants and rank-and-file clergy. The National Front also
attracted a large number of individuals with no organisational affiliation, particularly
among the growing urban middle class. The main organisations favouring
nationalisation which were not aligned with the National Front were the Tudeh party
and the fanatical Fedayan-i-Islam.2
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The diverse elements of the National Front shared one primary goal: the
nationalisation of Iran's oil resources. British control over Iran's oil was widely viewed
as the main obstacle to Iran's independence and as a hindrance to its social and
economic development. However, for virtually all elements of the National Front a
more fundamental objective lay behind the oil issue: a redistribution of political power
away from the royal court and the land-owning class toward the emerging middle and
lower classes. The court and the land-owning class were linked with the British
position in the oil dispute because of their long-standing ties with the British and
because they had consistently opposed full nationalisation. These links made the oil
issue an ideal medium for attacking the political power of these groups. They also gave
the oil nationalisation movement a popular character, tying it to the democratic
movement which had begun with the constitutional revolution.
While a redistribution of political power was favoured in one form or another by
virtually all elements of the National Front, there were considerable differences, mainly
of an ideological nature, over the extent a redistribution of power should take and over
the groups it should be targeted at. The liberals and centrists in the National Front
(whose views most closely corresponded with those of Mossadeq) favoured reforms
oriented toward the middle class but did not challenge fundamental institutions such as
the constitutional monarchy or the capitalist economy. The Marxists in the Toilers
party and in the Iran party were split into various factions which called for the
establishment of a socialist state modelled along particular ideological lines. Kashani's
supporters in the Mojahadin-i-Islam sought the abolition of secular laws and
implementation of Sharism much like the followers of Ayatollah Khomeini in post-
revolutionary Iran.
The various groups in the National Front differed over tactics, particularly on
the question of adherence to legal and constitutional means of political activity. The
most loyal elements of the National Front (i.e., those which continued to support
Mossadeq until his overthrow in 1953) were Western-oriented and were committed to
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working within the framework of the constitution. These included both the liberals and
centrists grouped closely around Mossadeq and the left-wing intellectuals of the Toilers
party and the Iran party. Although the latter were, for the most part, Marxist who had at
one time supported the Tudeh party, they are best described as democratic socialists.
Thus the Toilers party, despite its socialist rhetoric and programme, continued to favour
retention of the constitutional monarchy.3
Mossadeq himself had spent much of his life in public service and was deeply
committed to democratic principles. Although he was a wealthy landowner, he led an
austere life and had a reputation as a scrupulously honest politician. As a young man he
had been involved in the constitutional movement. Exiled in 1906 for his political
activities, he studied law in France and Switzerland, where his political beliefs were
further developed. After returning to Iran he held several administrative posts and
became a Majles deputy. In 1925 he publicly opposed the confrontation of Reza Shah
on the grounds that the monarch could not, under the constitution, retain the prime
ministership and the war ministry. Reza Shah sent him into internal exile. He returned
to public life in 1944 as a Majles deputy and authored the 1944 bill outlawing all future
foreign oil concessions. This bill was designed to guarantee that Iran's oil revenues
would be used for domestic purposes rather than to pacify the superpowers. Mossadeq
campaigned in 1944 on the issues of neutrality in foreign policy, parliamentary control
over the armed forces, and electoral reform. He continued to stress these basic themes
as prime minister in 1951-1953.4
While Mossadeq and his closest supporters were thus committed to upholding
the principles of the constitution, the same cannot be said for all elements of the
National Front. Ayatollah Kashani and his supporters in the Mojahadin-i-Islam made
no pretences about working within the framework of the constitution. Kashani openly
bragged about his links to the killers of Prime Minister Razmara and maintained close
ties with sports club gangs which could be hired to stage demonstrations or attack his
opponents. Much the same can be said for Baqai and his supporters in the working
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class/bazaar wing of the Toilers party, and for Hossein MaIdci, a popular Majles deputy
from Abadan who was secretary of the government's oil committee. Following their
defection from the National Front in late 1952 and early 1953 Kashani, Baqai, and
Maklci used these tactics to help undermine and eventually overthrow Mossadeq
himself.
In addition to their democratic proclivities Mossadeq and the mainstream of the
National Front were also by far the most popular political force in Iran at the time.
Mossadeq's Majles opposition never grew beyond a hard core of some fifteen
conservative, pro-British deputies. Virtually all outside observers, including top
policymakers in both the United States and Britain, admitted to the popularity of the
National Front and of Mossadeq in particular. Throughout the tenure of the Truman
administration the State Department recognised Mossadeq's popularity and viewed him
as the most effective barrier to a communist take-over in Iran. A State Department
study in early 1952 expressed concerns that Mossadeq's popularity in the army made its
loyalty to the shah doubtful in the event of a shah-Mossadeq power struggle. ' Much the
some views were held in CIA, who described Mossadeq as "the dominant political
force in Iran" because of his "popular prestige". Even the British, while making
continual efforts to unseat him, were forced to admit to Mossadeq's "personal
popularity". Similar views about Mossadeq were also expressed in both the British and
the American press.5
Although Mossadeq was clearly the most popular figure in the National Front,
other prominent figures in this organisation enjoyed considerable popularity as well.
Kashani, Baqai, and Maldci were able to mobilise extensive popular support on the
basis of their personal appeal and their ties to sports club leaders. The defection of
these key leaders from the National Front weakened it to some degree by reducing its
base of support. However, the ability of Mossadeq and the National Front to remain in
power after their defection and to survive repeated coup attempts (in which these men
were deeply involved) indicates Mossadeq's great popularity and his fundamental role
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in the organisation. Of the National Front figures who remained loyal to Mossadeq,
Khalil Malelci, leader of the intellectual wing of the Toilers party (who split with Baqai
to form the Third Force in late 1952), and the leaders of the Iran party also enjoyed
considerable public support.
Aside from the National Front, the only other political organisation which can
have enjoyed any broad-based popularity in Iran at this time was the Tudeh party, while
still outlawed which was making a strong recovery from the defeat it had suffered in
late 1946. It had well-disciplined cells in all the major cities, which operated through
front organisations and published a variety of newspapers. CIA estimates in early 1952
placed Tudeh membership in Tehran at 8,000, with three to four times as many
sympathisers. In addition, the Tudeh had successfully penetrated several government
departments and, apparently without the knowledge of the CIA, was installing an
elaborate network in the Iranian army. The Tudeh party continued to be extremely
popular among the oil workers in the south-west, where it was able to stage massive
demonstrations.6
Although the main orientation of the National Front was toward Iran's emerging
middle class, it enjoyed considerable support from the urban lower class and the
industrial working class as well, primarily through Kashani and the Toiler party. The
popularity of the National Front among the working class and its essentially liberal
policies led it into frequent conflict with the Tudeh party, which denounced it as "the
last hope of the decadent ruling class". 7
 Although the two shared some similar goals
and collaborated at times, notably in a series of violent demonstrations in July 1952
which returned Mossadeq to power after a brief period in which he had been replaced
by Qavam, the National Front government frequently harassed the Tudeh and was
careful to keep it under control. Oddly enough, several State Department studies at the
time portrayed Mossadeq and the National Front as anti-Communist and anti-Tudeh.
The lack of Tudeh support for the National Front remained a major point of self-
criticism within the party for years after Mossadeq's overthrow.8
229
Aside from the Tudeh party, the only opposition to the National Front before the
defection of Kashani, Baqai, and Makki came from a loosely-organised group of
wealthy landowners, businessmen, and top military officers. Although the young shah
was quite indecisive in this period, he invariably sided with this group against the
National Front. This traditional ruling elite had no significant popular support, but
managed to retain a number of Majles seats by buying votes and encouraging peasants
to vote for the candidates designated by their landowners. In addition to its small
Majles faction (led by Jamal Emami), the ruling elite controlled the upper house of
parliament, had strong influence in the royal court and in parts of the security apparatus,
and worked closely with the British. The conflicts between this group and the National
Front consequently amounted to a confrontation between the popular branch of
parliament and the crowds in the streets on the one hand, and the royal court, the senate,
and parts of the military (all backed by the British) on the other. Despite its various
strengths, the CIA saw little chance of this group coming to power or staying in power
without making concessions to nationalist sentiments and using authoritarian tactics.9
7.2. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis, 1951-1952
7.2.1. The Oil Negotiations Process
After the nationalisation bill was signed into law on May 1, 1951, the primary
British objective was to retain effective control over the production and marketing of
Iran's oil. In order to achieve this goal the British were willing to make minimal
concessions on price and accept the principle of nationalisation, provided that this
would not jeopardise their position of control. This objective was pursued both through
direct negotiations with the Iranian government and through appeals to the UN Security
Council and the International Court of Justice. The British also sought to pressure Iran
by instituting a series of economic embargoes against it and conspiring with opposition
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groups to 'remove Mossadeq from office. Beyond this, both the United States and the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development became involved in attempts to
mediate the dispute.
After the enactment of the nationalisation law the first act of the British was to
appeal to the International Court for a ruling on the oil dispute. Iran's position was that
the court was not competent to rule on the matter since the AIOC was, in fact, on an
Iranian company and the dispute was thus a domestic issue. At the same time the AIOC
sent a negotiating team to Tehran. This team proposed on June 19 that, in exchange for
recognising the principle of nationalisation, the AIOC should be hired to produce and
market Iran's oil on a 50-50 profit-sharing basis. This proposal differed little from the
previous British offer and was rejected by Iran. The AIOC meanwhile begun a
production slowdown and took steps to prevent tankers from loading oil at the port of
Abadan. These actions gradually evolved into a full-fledged oil blockade, which
reduced production to virtually nothing by the end of July. The other major oil
companies, fearing that nationalisation would undermine their own positions in other
producing countries, co-operated fully with the AIOC. Since only the majors had
sufficient tanker capacity to market Iran's oil their co-operation was crucial. On July 5
the International Court recommended that both sides return to the status quo as of May
1, but withheld judgement on the question of its competence in the case. This latter
issue was finally settled in July 1952 when the court ruled that it was not competent to
rule.
With the collapse of the June round of negotiations tensions began to escalate
rapidly. The Iranian government began to take control over the oil-fields and Britain
sent several warships into the Persian Gulf. In an attempt to resolve the deepening
crisis President Truman sent Averell Harriman to Tehran to try to mediate the dispute.
Harriman was greeted in Tehran on July 15 with bloody riots, apparently sponsored by
the Tudeh party. After two weeks Harriman finally succeeded in arranging a formula to
reopen direct negotiations. A British mission under Richard Stokes was dispatched to
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Tehran and presented an 8-point plan on August 13. This proposal again differed little
in substance from previous British offers and was eventually rejected. Mossadeq then
delivered a counter-proposal to Stokes on August 22. Stokes indignantly rejected this
proposal and returned to London the next day.
Upon Stokes' return the British Foreign Office made an ominous announcement
accusing the Mossadeq government of violating the terms of Harriman's negotiating
formula and stating that it would pursue the issue further at the International Court.
Mossadeq waited until September 5 for a reply to his counterproposal and then
announced that all British technicians would be expelled from the oil-fields unless
Britain resumed negotiations. Britain then announced that negotiations had been
cancelled and that it saw no hope of reaching a settlement with the Mossadeq
government. 10
With the failure of the Stokes mission, British abandoned direct negotiations
and adopted a three-track strategy designed to pressure Iran into a settlement on more
favourable terms. The first component of this strategy involved the implementation of
a plan to remove Mossadeq from office. This plan had been developed over the
previous months in conjunction with certain pro-British Iranian political figures. It
appears to have been co-ordinated with a large military build-up made by the British in
mid-September in response to Mossadeq's ultimatum. The second component of the
British strategy called for further economic sanctions which, together with the oil
blockade itself, were designed to turn domestic public opinion increasingly against
Mossadeq. These two components will be discussed in greater detail in the next
section.
The third component of the British strategy involved an attempt to mobilise
world opinion against Mossadeq through an appeal to the UN Security Council. To the
great dismay of the British, Mossadeq announced that he would personally lead the
Iranian delegation. Through a combination of great showmanship and strident anti-
imperialist rhetoric, Mossadeq was able first to water down the British resolution and
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then to block it entirely by having debate postponed until after the decision of the
International Court. Mossadeq made further gains during his stay in the United States
by meeting with President Truman and other top US officials. He impressed them with
his willingness to negotiate and got Truman to agree to consider a $120 million loan
package for Iran. Mossadeq returned to Iran in late November and received an
overwhelming vote of confidence in the Majles. Buoyed by his victories in the United
States, he immediately called for new elections.11
Elections were also held in Britain in late October, bringing Churchill, Eden,
and a new Conservative government to power. As members of the shadow cabinet,
Churchill and Eden had been deeply involved in the British plans of the previous
summer to overthrow Mossadeq. 12 They were, of course, staunch defenders of the
British empire, and as Tories they had no difficulty in opposing oil nationalisation or
Third World nationalism in general. Eden quickly made it clear to Acheson that he was
not interested in the discussions then being held in Washington with Mossadeq, which
US policymakers were quite optimistic about. He told Acheson that "no agreement
would be better than a bad one," and disputed Acheson's view that communism was the
only alternative to Mossadeq.13
From this point on the United States took the leading role in trying to revive the
stalled negotiations. It strongly backed a series of proposals by the International Bank,
the first of which was made during Mossadeq's stay in New York and pursued further
after his return to Tehran. This proposal called for a three-way division of profits
between the Bank, the AIOC, and Iran. It also called for a neutral operating company
(with some British staff) to operate the oil-fields and the refinery. Mossadeq rejected
this idea but left the door open for further negotiations. The Bank revised its offer
several times in the following months, making further concessions on price and on the
issue of British representation in the proposed operating company. However, none of
these proposals made more than nominal recognition of the principle of nationalisation,
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and were thus rejected by Iran. The Bank negotiations eventually reached an impose,
and were indefinitely suspended on March 16.14
With the collapse of these efforts negotiations came to a complete halt. No
further high-level talks were held until August 1952, after the International Court had
ruled in favour of Iran on the issue of its competence and after Mossadeq had left office
for a brief, tumultuous period in late July. The latter events touched off a frenzy of
activity on the part of the United States, which feared an imminent communist coup.
On August lithe  Associated Press reported that the United States was "prepared to
press for a radical change in British policies". This effort resulted in the release of a
joint US -British proposal, which was co-signed by Churchill and Truman.
The Churchill-Truman joint note called for the issue of compensation to be
submitted to the International Court on the basis of the pre-nationalisation status quo
and for a resumption of direct negotiations between the AIOC and Iran. In exchange
for this the British economic sanctions would be lifted, oil production would be
resumed by the Al0C, and the United States would make an immediate cash grant of
$10 million to Iran. This proposal entirely ignored the fact of nationalisation and called
for the return of the AlOC. Mossadeq did not reject this proposal outright, but rather
discussed it for two weeks with his cabinet and with the British and American
ambassadors. On September 16 he announced a series of counterproposals and made a
veiled threat that diplomatic relations with Britain would be broken unless it took a
more constructive attitude toward the dispute. These counterproposals were flatly
rejected by the British on October 14. Two days later Mossadeq announced that
diplomatic relations with Britain would be suspended.
A final attempt to reach a settlement was begun by the United States in
November 1952. Negotiations were held in Tehran in January and February 1953
between Mossadeq and the US ambassador, Loy Henderson. The United States
proposed that a purchasing company staffed by American, British, and other
unspecified nationals be formed to market Iran's oil, that the compensation issue be
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submitted to the Internationals Court for arbitration, and that an immediate $100
million US loan be extended to Iran. These talks dragged on until March 20, when they
were finally ended by Mossadeq. In calling for a purchasing company the US proposal
resembled previous US and British efforts, which Iran had rejected as inconsistent with
the principle of nationalisation. The US embassy personnel involved in these
negotiations became convinced that Mossadeq was not bargaining in good faith. After
the negotiations collapsed Henderson soon came around to the view held by his two top
assistants that Mossadeq would have to be removed from office. From this point on the
United States and Britain entirely abandoned serious negotiations with the Mossadeq
government and began to implement a covert plan to overthrow it.15
7.2.2. British Intervention in Iranian Politics
By 1951 Britain had been involved in Iran's domestic affairs for well over a
century. The most visible aspects of this involvement were Britain's frequent military
interventions and its extensive economic interests in Iran. During the oil crisis the
British government used both military power and economic coercion in conjunction
with the diplomatic efforts described above to weaken the Mossadeq government. As
an equally important aspect of Britain's involvement in Iran at this time was the
elaborate network of agents, informers, and influence peddlers it had developed through
the years. This network was employed during the oil crisis to further weaken Mossadeq
and to press for his replacement by a more compliant, pro-British government.
The British network in Iran had long been co-ordinated through the Freemason
lodge, which counted among its members many of Iran's top politicians, military
officers, and businessmen. In the 1940s and early 1950s a key element of the British
net was the Rashidian family. The Rashidians had made a huge fortune in military
construction during World War II with help from the British. They subsequently served
as a primary contact point for Iranians seeking British favours and as a liaison between
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the British embassy and the shah, with whom they regularly played poker. Another
important element of the British net was a group of prominent, pro-British politicians.
These included Sayyid Zia and the Majles faction headed by Jamal Emami. In addition
to these two groups the British had access to a broad assortment of journalists, bazaar
figures, and mullahs who could influence opinion and organise crowds and gangs of
sports club toughs on their behalf.16
Operating through this network, the British began to work against
nationalisation even before it became law. Their principal objective in the months
before the nationalisation bill was signed was to bring to power a government "with
which negotiations could be conducted reasonably". This was to be achieved through
pressure on the shah to appoint Sayyid Zia as prime minister. 17 The shah was apparently
agreeable to this, and was reportedly discussing the matter with Sayyid Zia when the
Majles nominated Mossadeq for the prime ministership on April 28, 1951. After
Mossadeq was appointed the British continued their efforts to install Sayyid Zia. This
goal was pursued despite strong reservations expressed by the British ambassador in
Tehran (Sir Francis Shepherd) and by the head of the Eastern Department in the Foreign
Office.18
With the appointment of Mossadeq as prime minister Britain set in motion the
diplomatic efforts described in the previous section. These were accompanied by a
heavy round of sabre-rattling. A paratroops brigade was dispatched to Cyprus in mid-
May and the cruiser Mauritius was sent to Abadan in June. These actions led the
National Front to announce that the first shot fired would "signal the start of World War
10. 19 In London British policymakers and academic advisors began to formulate long-
term plans in anticipation of a breakdown in negotiations. Plans for covert action and
economic sanctions were discussed. Christopher Montage Woodhouse, an MI6 officer
who had played a key role in the Greek Civil War, was dispatched to Tehran to co-
ordinate covert activities with the British net. Efforts to install Sayyid Zia were
apparently put on the back burner pending a break in the negotiations.2°
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The first round of oil negotiations collapsed in late June. Soon after, opposition
leaders Churchill and Eden began to press the Foreign Office to seek a joint US-British
approach to the shah to remove Mossadeq. This meant, in their words, bringing about
'a coup'.21 Plans for covert action had already been developed. The removal of
Mossadeq was viewed as 'objective number one'. 22 He was presumably to be replaced
with Sayyid Zia. Oddly enough, Fitzroy Maclean and several other MPs participated at
this time in a protracted lobbying effort on behalf of a bid to the Foreign Office by
Qavam for the prime ministership. The Foreign Office responded that "certain other
plans are now under way" and "we have our money on another horse," apparently
referring to Sayyid Zia. 23 Pressures were evidently brought to bear on the shah to
replace Mossadeq. He vacillated throughout July, first opposing the plan and then
favouring a joint Sayyid Zia-Qavam government. He changed his mind again when
negotiations were resumed under the Harriman and Stokes missions.24
The Stokes mission appears in retrospect to have been the last serious British
effort to negotiate with Mossadeq. When this effort failed, British immediately
mounted a multi-pronged offensive against Mossadeq designed to remove him from
office. Of the many attempts undertaken by domestic or foreign forces to overthrow
Mossadeq during his tenure as prime minister (including the one which finally
succeeded), this was the most determined and is most deservedly described as a coup
attempt.
Soon after the Iranian team rejected his proposals, Stokes met with the shah and
implored him to dismiss Mossadeq. 25 A memo written several days later by the
permanent under-secretary in the Foreign Office recommended that Mossadeq be
brought down as soon as possible. This memo referred to actions in Iran which were
"Indirect and behind the scenes," and pointedly noted "an encouraging growth of
opposition to (Mossadeq) in the Majles". 26 This was presumably a reference to efforts
by Jamal Emami and his faction to disrupt the Majles and block votes of confidence by
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preventing a quorum. Ambassador Shepherd followed up on Stokes' appeal to the shah
with a strong recommendation on August 29 that Sayyid Zia be brought in to replace
Mossadeq. Meanwhile, the Foreign Office was busy developing an elaborate set of
guidelines for dealing with Mossadeq's successor, whom it presumed would be Sayyid
Zia. These included a large AIOC loan and a modus vivendi (which Sayyid Zia had
agreed to) calling for a resumption of oil shipments and a return of the AIOC under a
different name. The Minister of Fuel and Power optimistically speculated that these
arrangements might just enable Britain to avoid full nationalisation.27
These behind-the-scenes efforts were accompanied by a series of economic
sanctions and an expanded British military presence. The blockade of Iranian oil
organised by the AIOC with help from the other major oil companies had by this time
reduced Iran's oil exports to a trickle. Britain's European allies were asked in late
August to discourage their citizens from seeking employment with the newly-formed
Iranian oil company. The AIOC announced on September 6 that it would ' take legal
action against any company or individual buying oil from the Iranian government.
Plans were drawn up in early September and quickly implemented to embargo British
exports to Iran of iron, steel, oil processing equipment, sugar, and goods which could be
resold for dollars. Privileges for currency conversion were cancelled on September 10
and other financial restrictions were subsequently imposed, violating a memorandum of
understanding which Britain had signed with Iran. Four British destroyers arrived in
the Persian Gulf on September 5. Plans were also made to strengthen British land and
air forces in the region. Together with the covert actions described above, these efforts
constituted a serious and concerned attempt on the part of the British government to
overthrow Mossadeq.28
Ambassador Shepherd took these efforts one step further in early September by
sending a message to the Foreign Office which prompted its September 6 statement that
negotiations had been suspended and that Britain saw no hope of reaching an agreement
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with Mossadeq. This statement, which was 'designed to encourage the opposition
group headed by Sayyid Zia,' led Mossadeq to accuse the British of trying to overthrow
him. 29 Shepherd reported that the shah favoured a change of government and suggested
that the opposition was on the verge of overthrowing Mossadeq. These views were
heatedly disputed by Stokes, who argued that "mucking about with discredited old
men... .will get us nowhere" 3° In fact the shah had told Shepherd on August 31 that he
preferred Qavam to Sayyid Zia, and on September 17 he stated that Mossadeq could not
be replaced at that time. Shepherd appears to have been the only British official who
felt the shah would dismiss Mossadeq. Deputy Under-secretary of State Sir Roger
Malcins argued that only two alternatives could come from the policy pushed by
Shepherd: either Mossadeq would fall (which he doubted) or the British would be
expelled from Abadan. 31 The latter soon occurred. Not surprisingly, Shepherd was
soon named ambassador to Poland.
After the September 6 announcement Shepherd continued to press the shah to
dismiss Mossadeq. The United States became aware of these activities and protested
vigorously. When Harriman suggested that Sayyid Zia was "not capable of governing,"
Shepherd was merely told not to mention Sayyid Zia by name when pressing the shah to
replace Mossadeq. 32 US policymakers felt Mossadeq was "anxious to reach an
agreement," and suggested that Britain receive an Iranian delegation. 33 Rather than
negotiate, the British decided to step up their pressure on Mossadeq's September 20
announcement that British workers must leave Abadan, Prime Minister Atlee
apparently addressed a personal note to Truman suggesting that he was considering the
use of force against Iran. Truman responded that the United States would not support
this. A second message stated that the United States was "gravely concerned" about the
present course of events, and again recommended negotiation. After British troops
were positioned in the Persian Gulf and warships held firing practice in the river off
Abadan, the British cabinet decided to take the matter to the Security Council rather
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than use force. Although they were "tired of being lectured by the United States," it
appears that lack of US support helped force the British to moderate their policies.34
Mossadeq triumphed in the Security Council and returned to Tehran in late
November, stronger than ever. It was quite clear that the British had suffered a serious
setback and that Mossadeq would remain in power for some time to come. Two major
changes occurred in British policy as a result of these failures. First, while they
continued to look for a way of ousting Mossadeq, they appear to have accepted the US
argument that Sayyid Zia was too discredited to assume power. His name is rarely
mentioned in British documents after this period. Instead of Sayyid Zia the British
began to back Qavam as a replacement for Mossadeq. Qavam stepped up his lobbying
efforts, and the British Minister of Fuel and Power suggested that he be put "in
funds".35 The US State Department believed that "the British are pinning their hopes
for a settlement of the oil issue on the replacement of Mossadeq by Qavam". 36 Other
candidates to succeed Mossadeq, such as Javad Bushier, Mossadeq's Minister of
Roads, were subsequently also discussed. 37 The second major change in British policy
made at this time was a greater effort to co-ordinate policy with the United States. This
was most evident in a series of joint appraisals made by the two embassies in the
following months.
The British continued to develop covert plans to oust Mossadeq in the winter
and spring of 1952. However, his strong domestic position and the absence of a
suitable alternative appear to have left them with no opportunity to implement these
plans. As discussed in the previous section, the British also took little interest in oil
negotiations with Mossadeq after August 1951. Their main strategy was to weaken
Iran's economy by maintaining the oil blockade and the other economic sanctions they
had imposed. Mossadeq's options for countering this strategy were expected to run out
in mid-1952. He would thereafter face growing domestic unrest, which would lead
either to his fall or to negotiations on more favourable terms.38
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In July 1952 Mossadeq suddenly resigned as prime minister in a dispute with
the shah over control of the armed forces. The Majles then elected Qavam to replace
him. Qavam remained in office for five tumultuous days, after which violent
demonstrations by the National Front and the Tudeh party forced the shah to relent and
re-appoint Mossadeq. This episode set off a flurry of activity by both the United States
and Britain. Hoping to stabilise what it regarded as a more co-operative government,
the State Department quickly made plans to offer economic aid to Qavam. The British
agreed "in principle" with these plans, and Qavam even made a formal request for aid
to the US embassy.39 However, before anything could be done to help Qavam
Mossadeq was triumphantly swept back into office.
In the aftermath of the Qavam episode both the United States and Britain again
re-evaluated their policies toward Iran. Discussions were held in Washington on July
29 between the British ambassador and Assistant Secretary of State Henry Byroade on
methods of stopping Iran from 'going down the drain', Byroade suggested that 'most
unorthodox methods' might be necessary, and 'was perfectly willing that the possibility
of a coup should be examined' .4° Loy Henderson, the US ambassador in Tehran, was
instructed to prepare a joint reappraisal of the situation with his British counterpart,
including a review of possible alternatives to Mossadeq and ways of bringing these
alternatives to power. George Middleton, the British charge' d'Affaires who headed
the Tehran embassy after the removal of Shepherd, reported to London that only a coup
could stop Iran from falling into communist hands. No outstanding candidate had yet
come forward, although General Fazlollah Zahedi was described as available and
adequate.'" A year later Zahedi led the coup which finally toppled Mossadeq.
While these discussions were going on Ambassador Henderson sent a cable
from Tehran which prompted Secretary of State Dean Acheson to press the British for a
new round of negotiations with Mossadeq. Acheson suggested that the United States
would immediately extend a $10 million grant to Iran and that Britain should buy some
Iranian oil and resume negotiations. The British replied that in their view Mossadeq
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should not be helped. They argued that morale in the Iranian army was improving and
that it might soon intervene against Mossadeq. This conflicted sharply with a
pessimistic report on army morale made a few days earlier by Middleton. Henderson's
reappraisal arrived in Washington at about this time. He also reported that army morale
was low and suggested that Mossadeq's removal might benefit the Tudeh. On August 9
British Foreign Secretary Eden addressed a note to Acheson stating again that the
army's morale was improving and that it might soon intervene. Two days later the
Associated Press ran a story indicating that the United States was "prepared to press for
a radical change in British policies toward Iran". 42 The next day Acheson told the
British ambassador in Washington that the United States could not accept the British
position and reserved the right to pursue an independent policy toward Iran.43
The British talk of a military coup apparently ceased at this point. Discussions
between the United States and British soon led to the drafting of the Truman-Churchill
joint note, which was presented to Mossadeq and eventually rejected. While there is no
reason to believe that the British did anything more than contemplate a coup against
Iran in this period, it is evident that the United States sought again to restrain the British
in this regard as they had in September 1951.
Mossadeq's rejection of the joint note was soon followed by a decision to break
diplomatic relations with Britain. Deprived of both diplomatic contact with Iranian
government and a base of operations inside Iran, the British were now forced to rely on
the United States to resolve the oil crisis.
7.2.3. The US Role in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Negotiations
As discussed in chapter 6, US strategic and economic interests in the Middle
East were focused more on Saudi Arabia than on Iran in the years after World War II.
Saudi oil was controlled by US companies, while Iran's oil was controlled by the
British. Although Iran played a key role in the US containment strategy, it was not
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covered under the Truman Doctrine and responsibility for its defence was left to the
British military. In 1950 US policymakers began to take greater interest in Iran as its
internal situation deteriorated and as the Cold War deepened. However, while
economic aid was increased somewhat, no fundamental changes were made in US
policy toward Iran.
US policy in the Middle East was closely linked with British policy in the early
1950s. The United States and Britain held similar views about Soviet intentions in the
area and were firmly committed to keeping it in the Western sphere of influence. Joint
military policies were consequently formulated by the two allies for regional defence.
The United States also shared Britain's interest in keeping down oil prices and
maintaining US-British control over the region's oil. A glut in the oil market and
pressure from the oil-producing countries to raise production levels kept the two
powers from encroaching on each other's oil concessions. These ties led to a high level
of co-operation between the United States and Britain and made it difficult for US
policymakers to distance themselves significantly from the British.
Nevertheless, some differences did emerge. The United States had supported
the anti-colonial movement in India several years earlier and was sympathetic to the
nationalist movement in Iran, which was vehemently anti-British. US policymakers
were clearly more worried than their British counterparts about the communist threat in
Iran. Also, since the AIOC was a British company US officials were less concerned
about its plight and more willing to reach a settlement at its expense than were the
British. While US policy was ultimately supportive of British interests, these factors
led to important differences on a number of key issues.
US policymalcers became increasingly concerned about the situation in Iran as
the nationalisation movement began to pick up steam. In March 1951 the National
Security Council concluded that "failure to reach (an oil agreement) carries with it such
undesirable consequences that no opportunity should be impart to both governments
our sense of urgency in this matter". Recommendations were made that military and
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economic aid to Iran be increased and that the British be pressed for an "early and
equitable settlement".44 In April the British were urged to accept an arrangement
recognising the principle of nationalisation but assuring effective British control.
According to US officials the key was to pay "lip service" to Iranian nationalism while
safeguarding British interests. The British were pressed to accept a 50-50 division of
profits, but were warned that a larger share for Iran would upset other pricing
arrangements in the Middle East.45
After the nationalisation law went into effect the United States publicly sought
to portray itself as neutral in the dispute. On May 18 the State Department called for a
negotiated settlement between Britain and Iran. It urged both sides to avoid threats and
intimidation and stated that it would not get involved in the specifics of a settlement.
Several days later General Omar Bradley announced that US troops would not became
oinvolved if fighting broke out. On May 24 Secretary of State Acheson pledged that
the United States would not intervene in Iran's internal affairs. Privately the British
were told that the United States opposed pressure on the shah for a change of
government. US officials said they would view "with grave concern" the use of force
in Iran, except under very limited conditions. 46 British officials complained that they
were "bothered" and "annoyed at the American attitude of relative indifference".47
While US policymakers pressed both sides for an early end to the dispute, they
quietly began to formulate a strategy for restructuring the world distribution of oil to
make up for the impending loss of Iran's production. On June 3 the Foreign Petroleum
Committee (composed of officials from the Departments of Defence, State, and
Commerce) adopted a plan under which US oil companies would voluntarily provide
oil to US allies whose supplies had been disrupted by the cut-off of Iranian production.
This plan ultimately provided some 46 million barrels of oil products to affected
countries in the first year of the blockade, which amounted to 20% of Iran's total 1950
production. These actions were carried out under the Defence Production Act of 1950
in order to ensure that adequate oil supplies would be available in the event of an
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outbreak of hostilities. However, they had the effect of strengthening Britain's oil
blockade and hence helped to undermine Iran's economy and weaken the Mossadeq
govemment.48
As the first round of oil negotiations broke down in June, the United States
maintained its neutral posture but stepped up its efforts to mediate the oil dispute. After
Iran rejected the British proposals on June 19 Acheson and Assistant Secretary of State
George McGhee met with British officials and again expressed their opposition to
efforts to unseat Mossadeq. Acheson was quite alarmed at the breakdown in
negotiations and on July 4 proposed to the British ambassador that Averell Harriman be
sent to Tehran as a mediator. Harriman was greeted in Tehran with large-scale
demonstrations, but soon managed to arrange a resumption of negotiations under the
aegis of the Stokes mission. Although this effort ultimately failed, Acheson credits
Harriman with preventing on outbreak of hostilities between Britain and Iran.49
With the collapse of the Stokes mission Britain began to implement the
elaborate plans described above to overthrow Mossadeq. The United States continued
to oppose these efforts. US officials felt that Mossadeq was the only Iranian political
figure capable of getting an agreement through the Majles. They also believed that the
shah was unwilling to replace Mossadeq. Harriman told British officials that he was
deeply disturbed at their covert activities on behalf of Sayyid Zia. He suggested that
either the United States or Britain should offer economic aid to Mossadeq. Other US
officials repeatedly pressured the British to resume negotiations. Even after the
September 20 announcement that British workers were to leave the oil-fields the United
States continued to oppose plans to overthrow Mossadeq. On September 26 President
Truman sent a message to Prime Minister Atlee stating that the United States would not
support the use of force by Britain. He also urged a resumption of negotiations. 5° On
the following day Atlee's cabinet decided not to use force and instead sent the matter to
the Security Council. Although Acheson initially opposed this move on the grounds
that Britain had little chance of success, US policymakers quickly became involved in
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the ensuing deliberations. 51
 Talks were also held with Mossadeq in New York and
Washington on the International Bank proposal and other matters.
The grave crisis which had emerged by the end of September led to a subtle but
important shift in US policy away from the British position on the oil issue. On
October 10 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a memo which stated that "Iran's
orientation towards the United States in peacetime and maintenance of the British
position in the Middle East now transcend in importance the desirability of supporting
British oil interests in Iran." 52 This memo was subsequently adopted as official US
policy by the National Security Council. At the same time a new approach to the oil
dispute reflecting this view was pursued with the British. US officials suggested that a
multinational consortium be established to market Iran's oil. Royal Dutch/Shell was
suggested as a possible leader of this consortium, and there was talk that US companies
might also participate. A modification of this arrangement was finally adopted three
years later, after Britain was expelled from Iran and Mossadeq was overthrown.
However, in October 1951 the British were still hoping to oust Moss adeq and gain a
more favourable settlement. Hence they had little enthusiasm for this approach. In any
case it is doubtful that Mossadeq would have accepted it.53
Throughout November 1951 the United States continued to oppose efforts to
overthrow Mossadeq, arguing that the only alternative to him would be a communist
take-over. Although the British continued their efforts to unseat Mossadeq they shared
this concern. A joint appraisal made by the two embassies on November 19 stated that
"the immediate, mutual and overriding United States-United Kingdom objective in Iran
is to prevent that country falling into communist hands." 54 These fears increased when
large-scale Tudeh demonstrations broke out in early December. Opposition deputies
occupied the Majles building, and a New York Times reporter was expelled from Iran
for writing lies and insults about the government. Rumours circulated that Mossadeq
was about to sell oil to the Soviet Union. Mossadeq announced that aid from the West
would only be accepted on an unconditional basis.55
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US policymakers were greatly disturbed at these events. A report in mid-
January of 1952 expressed the fear that Iran might collapse within thirty days. By the
end of the month US officials viewed as "highly probable" the possibility that
Mossadeq would turn to the Soviet Union for aid. 56 British officials felt that their
American counterparts had 'fallen completely for (Mossadeq's) propaganda' and were
"obsessed by their over-riding fear of communism". 57 Feeling that economic collapse
was imminent, the United States announced on January 21 that the point 4 aid
programme in Iran would be greatly expanded. 58 Discussions on the International Bank
plan, which had begun in October, were pressed with renewed vigour.
Unrest continued in Iran in the first few months of 1952. The seventeenth
Majles elections were accompanied by bloody riots in early February. The Fedayan-i-
Islam shot and seriously wounded Deputy Prime Minister Hossein Fatemi and
threatened to kill Mossadeq. The Tudeh party continued to stage violent
demonstrations. In late January Mossadeq ordered all British consulates closed,
charging interference in Iran's internal affairs. A dispute erupted with the United States
when Mossadeq refused to accept the terms under which the US military mission was to
operate. The US-sponsored International Bank negotiations broke down in March and
President Truman announced that the $120 million loan first discussed in October
would be contingent on a settlement of the oil dispute. US policymakers came to doubt
Mossadeq's willingness to reach a settlement. However, after his success in the Majles
elections they began to take a more optimistic view about his ability to remain in office.
While financial pressures were expected ultimately to lead to a collapse, it was felt that
Mossadeq would remain in power for at least another 2-3 months. By May US officials
no longer felt a serious crisis or a Tudeh-sponsored coup was imminent.59
In mid-July Mossadeq unexpectedly resigned and was replaced by Qavam.
Qavam remained in office for five tumultuous days, after which massive
demonstrations forced the shah to re-appoint Mossadeq. As discussed in the previous
section, the United States had sought to bolster Qavam with a $10-20 million aid
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package. After Mossadeq returned to office US and British officials made thorough re-
evaluations of their policies. Acheson proposed a new plan for negotiations to the
British, who quickly rejected it. He then warned that the United States was prepared to
act independently if the British would not co-operate. Discussions between the two
allies were resumed, culminating in the Truman-Churchill joint note. This note was
rejected by Mossadeq. Diplomatic relations between Britain and Iran were soon
broken.
With the rejection of the joint note US officials began to search for another
approach to the oil problem. They soon turned their attention to the consortium
arrangement which had been considered briefly in the fall of 1951 and then dropped.
The ensuing discussions over this approach and the crisis atmosphere then prevailing
led to a quiet debate within the US government over how closely the United States
should align itself with the British position. In the end the State Department
disregarded suggestions by the Department of Justice and Joint Chiefs of Staff,
choosing to maintain the generally pro-British position it had hitherto followed.
The consortium arrangement discussed in October 1951 was modified slightly
in 1952. Where the AIOC had been excluded in the previous formulation, the new plan
called for the AIOC to purchase 75% of Iran's oil output, with the remaining share to be
distributed among several US companies. In addition, a $100 million payment was to
be advanced to Iran by the US government against future oil purchases. The British
were told that US companies were reluctant to participate because of anti-trust actions
then pending against them and because it would upset their arrangements with other
producing countries, who would oppose the necessary production cutbacks. US
companies were to be included only because this was necessary to secure the $100
million from the export-import Bank.6°
The views of the Justice Department on the anti-trust implications of this
arrangement were solicited. After examining the proposed arrangement, Justice
concluded that it would constitute "an unreasonable restraint upon.. .foreign commerce"
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and would thus violate federal anti-trust laws. 61 Two days later the Justice Department
issued a memo suggesting that the goal of keeping Iran out of Soviet hands could be
achieved without violating anti-trust laws by enabling Iran to sell its oil on the open
market, i.e.,by doing away with the consortium arrangement and, by implication, with
the AIOC concession as wel1. 62 The State Department apparently ignored this
suggestion. It eventually chose to circumvent the anti-trust issue when a consortium
arrangement was finally implemented in August 1954 by citing urgent national security
concerns.
A second dispute arose with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Following Mossadeq's
rejection of the joint note the National Security Council decided to re-examine the US
position in the oil dispute. The Joint Chiefs proposed that the United States be
prepared to act independently of Britain if necessary in order to prevent a communist
take-over. In doing so they explicitly recognised that this might jeopardise the close US
relationship with Britain. The State Department opposed this recommendation, and it
was not included in the revised Security Council position paper eventually adopted.63
The reluctance of the State Department to distance itself from the British
became even more apparent during discussions over two notes issued by the State
Department in late November. The first note was a transcript of conversations held on
November 20 between Acheson and Eden. During this conversation Acheson
apparently warned Eden that the United States would consider buying Iranian oil if the
AIOC could not purchase sufficient quantities to meet Iran's financial needs under an
agreement then being discussed. When a transcript of this conversation was shown to
British officials, they strongly protested Acheson's statement. US officials agreed to
retract the statement and delete it from the transcript. However, they refused to rule out
the possibility of taking such actions in the future if the need arose.64
The second note was a statement issued to the press by the State Department on
December 7. This note stated that the question of whether US oil companies should
buy Iranian oil would be left to the companies themselves to decide. It was clearly
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directed at smaller, independent oil companies, since the majors had already expressed
their reluctance to the idea of buying Iranian oil. While it appeared to indicate that the
US government was not opposed to such purchases, this note gave no indication that
the government would provide further assistance in the form of help on anti-trust
matters or possible AIOC lawsuits. It stated further that the US government did not
think purchases by independents could contribute significantly to Iran's problems.
Nevertheless, the British were quite unhappy with this note. Although they were not
successful in blocking its release, they did manage to convince State Department
officials to delete a crucial sentence which declared that the Department "will take no
action to advise, dissuade, or prevent" purchases by US companies. The message
which finally emerged was consequently quite ambiguous about the US attitude toward
purchases by US companies.65
The consortium arrangement which re-emerged in November 1952 gradually
evolved into the set of proposals made by Acheson to Mossadeq in December of that
year. Negotiations on these proposals dragged on until early March, when they finally
terminated by Mossadeq. After almost two years of discussion, the positions of the
Iranian, British, and US governments had changed very little. Further negotiations
seemed pointless. The United States had by this time begun to develop covert plans to
overthrow Mossadeq. The coup which followed on August 19, 1953 was a decisive
turning point in Iran's political evolution. It also set something of a precedent for US
covert action in the Third World which still holds today.
7.3. The Downfall of the Mossadeq Government
7.3.1. The Coup of August 19, 1953
After the British embassy was closed in October 1952 a decision was made by
the British Foreign Office to approach US officials about the possibility of a joint US-
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British covert operation to oust Mossadeq. 66 Christopher Woodhouse, who had been
directing British covert activities in Tehran before the embassy was closed, was
dispatched to Washington with an elaborate plan for Mossadeq's overthrow. This plan
called for a co-ordinated uprising to be engineered (with or without shah's support) by
the British network in Tehran and by pro-British tribes (presumably the Bakhtiari) in
south-western Iran. Both the State Department and the CIA were approached. Not
surprisingly, State Department officials showed little interest at time. However, the
CIA, particularly Deputy Director Allen Dulles and Deputy for Plans Frank Wisner,
were quite receptive. At the same time Kermit Roosevelt, chief of CIA operations in
the Middle East and a grandson of Teddy Roosevelt, was approached in London with
the same plan by top MI6 officials. The British were told that nothing could be done
under Truman, but that Eisenhower, who was to be inaugurated in January, might be
more receptive.°
Further meetings were held in Washington in December between Foreign Office
and State Department officials. The latter were now willing to discuss a coup, but
wanted to wait until Eisenhower had been inaugurated and the oil negotiations then
being conducted with Mossadeq had been given a chance. They also suggested that the
coup be directed against Tudeh party and other radical elements, and that it be
undertaken in co-operation with Mossadeq. Needless to say, this idea horrified the
British. It is indicative of the very different views held by the State Department on the
one hand and by the CIA and the British on the other about Mossadeq and how he
should be dealt with.68
Serious planning without the knowledge of Eisenhower for the coup begun in
early February 1953, although it was to be implemented only if necessary. In a meeting
of top diplomatic and intelligence officials from both countries it was decided that
planning for the coup would go forward under Roosevelt, who was to lead the
operation. At this meeting the Rashidian network and a well-known British agent
named Ahmed Aramesh were made available to Roosevelt. It was also decided that
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General Fazlollah Zahedi would be supported to replace Mossadeq as prime minister,
apparently because he was the choice of the shah.69
Zahedi was well known to the British. He had been arrested in 1941 by Fitzroy
Maclean for helping the Germans plan an uprising against the Allied occupation forces.
Maclean later described him as "one of the worst grain holders in the country". 7° Zahedi
was interned in Palestine for the remainder of the war. The British also arrested
Ayatollah Kashani during the war and brought him to Palestine as well. Many Iranians
believe that these two men became British agents at this time and that Kashani later
worked secretly with Zahedi against Mossadeq. British documents cast some doubt on
this. Ambassador Shepherd described Zahedi in May 1951 as "vain" and "completely
untrustworthy". While he was Interior Minister in Mossadeq's first cabinet Zahedi had
helped strengthen the National Front and worked for nationalisation. He had been
discussed by the British as a possible coup leader since 1951, but was ,never their
principal candidate. As for Kashani, his father had been killed by the British and he
himself had led an uprising against the British in Iraq in 1919. His speeches in the post-
World War II era were rapidly anti-British. British officials at various times suspected
him of having ties with the United States and the Soviet Union.71
Planning for the coup, now given the CIA code-name TPAJAX, continued after
the February meeting. Roosevelt travelled frequently to London, Beirut, and Tehran
where he met with British officials and members of the local CIA stations. The CIA
chief in Tehran at this time is identified in Roosevelt's memoir Counter-coup as George
Cuvier.72
 Cuvier opposed the coup, but helped Roosevelt in his preparations. He was
replaced in July 1953 by Bill Herman, who had previously served as Cuvier's
intelligence deputy. As an Associated Press reporter Herman had covered the
Azerbaijan crisis in 1946 and had become acquainted with a broad spectrum of Iranian
political figures. Roosevelt and Herman were helped in the planning and later in the
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coup itself by three other station operatives. Two of these are inexplicably combined in
Roosevelt's account into a character named Peter Stoneman, and the third is identified
as Fred Zimmerman. One Peter Stoneman, was brought to Tehran in July 1953 to
maintain liaison with the Iranian military officers involved in the coup. He had
previously been stationed in South Korea, where he had directed paramilitary
operations. Zimmerman and the other Peter Stoneman were both in their late twenties,
on their first CIA assignment.
Two other important CIA figures in Iran at this time were Roger Black and a
"Persia expert," who is described but not named by Roosevelt. 73 These two were well-
known American academics with long-standing CIA/OSS ties in Iran, apparently
working in the Tehran station on a contract basis. In 1950 Roger Black had recruited
the Iranians who in 1953 worked with Roosevelt's team in the plot against Mossadeq.
These agents, code-named Nerren and Cilley, ran a propaganda operation for the CIA
which was code-named TPBEDAMN.74
TPBEDAMN was the only major CIA operation targeted at Iranian political
groups in the early 1950s. It had been set up in 1950 or 1951 (possibly after the
assassination of Razmara) by the "Persia expert". and was subsequently transferred to
Dick Manville(another CIA officer mentioned by Roosevelt) sometime before the 1953
coup. It reportedly had an annual budget of $1 million, and continued to operate for at
least a year after the 1953 coup.
TPBEDAMN was mainly a propaganda operation directed against the Soviet
Union and the Tudeh party. 75 However, other small-scale operations were carried out
under its aegis as well. Sports club toughs were hired to break up Tudeh
demonstrations. Money was given to the right-wing, ultra-nationalist Pan-Orients
party. An attempt was made to counter the great influence of Kashani by building up a
clerical organisation around the mullah Falsafi. These operations were all carried out
through Nerren and Cilley, who had their own network of agents. The CIA had little or
no direct contact with this network (other than through Nerren and Cilley), and its
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members presumably had no direct or indirect contact in the National Front. However,
despite its relatively large budget,76the operations carried out under TPBEDAMN had
little real impact on either the Tudeh party or the National Front. Its primary
significance lay in the network of agents it made available to the TPAJAX operation.
Nerren and Cilley were the only Iranians directly employed by the CIA who
played a role in TPAJAX. By 1953 the Tehran station had developed a wide network
of agents who were used to gather intelligence on events inside Iran and Soviet and
Eastern Bloc activities. These included informants in all levels of the government
bureaucracy, in Mossadeq's cabinet and among his closest advisors and assistants, in
the Tudeh party, and in several Eastern European embassies. While information
contributed by these agents was undoubtedly of some use in planning TPAJAX, none of
them played an active role in the operation. In addition to Nerren and Cilley, the
Rashidian brothers and Aramesh (who had been loaned to Roosevelt by the British)
played important roles in the coup.
Final approval for TPAJAX came in a meeting on June 25 at the State
Department. Present at this meeting were Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Allen
Dulles, Loy Henderson, Roosevelt, and several top officials from the Departments of
State and Defence. A plan for the coup, based in part on the original British proposal,
was unanimously adopted at this meeting.77
Roosevelt soon left to lead the coup, arriving in Tehran on July 19. Since the
shah had not yet been told about Roosevelt's plan, arrangements were made to contact
him. US Airforce Major Charles Mason (this is the pseudonyms used by Roosevelt)
and Norman Derbyshire, an MI6 officer who had been Woodhouse's assistant in
Tehran, were sent to Paris to encourage the shah's sister Ashraf to go to Tehran and
notify her brother of the plan. Mason and Derbyshire finally located Ashraf, who liked
to gamble, in the French casino town of Deauville. She reluctantly agreed to speak to
her brother, after receiving an unauthorised promise from Mason that the United States
would support her brother in the style to which he was accustomed in the event that the
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coup failed. Ashraf arrived in Tehran on July 25, but harassment from the Mossadeq
government (which had forced her into exile) prevented her from delivering the
message.
A second attempt to contact the shah was made a week later through US
General Norman Schwartzkopf, who had commanded the Iranian Gendarmerie from
1942 until 1948. Schwartzkopf managed to see the shah, amid heavy criticism in the
local press. He told the shah about the CIA plan and asked him to sign fir-mans (or
decrees) dismissing Mossadeq and appointing Zahedi as the new prime minister. (This
was the shah's legal prerogative under the constitution.) The shah refused to sign the
fir-mans and would not commit himself to the CIA plan. Schwartzkopf then advised
Roosevelt to see the shah personally. Arrangements were made through the Rashidians,
who had access to the court. Roosevelt and the shah met several times to discuss the
coup plans.78
Roosevelt's plan was to have the shah sign the two fir-mans and then fly to the
Caspian coast and await developments. The fir-man dismissing Mossadeq was to be
delivered to him at his home. After the fir-man was delivered armoured units were to
take up key positions in the city. It was evidently assumed that Mossadeq would simply
give up the prime ministership to Zahedi, since no contingency plans were made.
After a brief mix-up the fir-man was delivered to Mossadeq on the night of
Saturday August 15 by Colonel Nematollah Nassiri, Commander of the Imperial
Guards and later a notorious chief of SAVAK, the shah's brutal secret police.
Mossadeq had been warned of Nassiri's mission by a Colonel Mumtaz, apparently one
of the officers Roosevelt's team had been working with. Mossadeq denounced the fir-
man as a forgery, tore it up, and had Nassiri arrested. According to some reports the
signature on the fir-mans was not the shah's. According to others it was clear that the
fir-mans were drafted on a blank sheet of paper which had already been signed by the
shah. In either case Mossadeq considered the shah's orders to be invalid. Troops loyal
to Mossadeq set up roadblocks throughout the city. Opposition deputies, military
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officers suspected of being loyal to Zahedi, and the shah's minister of court were
arrested. A massive search was made for Zahedi and a reward of 100,000 rials was
offered for his arrest. The armoured column which was to move into Tehran apparently
broke up, with some soldiers joining the pro-Mossadeq forces. Without informing
Roosevelt's team the shah fled the country in panic, first to Baghdad and then to
Rome.79
The arrest of Nassiri ended the original coup attempt. Having made no
contingency plans, Roosevelt and his team were forced to improvise a new strategy.
Their first act was to arrange for the evacuation of Roosevelt, Zahedi, and other key
participants. 8° Zahedi was brought to the house of Fred Zimmerman to await
evacuation by the US air attaché. He remained there until Mossadeq was finally
toppled.
The decision to make plans to evacuate Zahedi and Roosevelt did not end the
CIA effort to oust Mossadeq. Several diverse and uncoordinated actions were
undertaken by Roosevelt's team and by Nerren and Cilley (who were acting almost
independently) in the hope that a successful coup could be triggered.
The first was an effort to publicise the shah's dismissal of Mossadeq and
appointment of Zahedi. This was accomplished in two ways. First, it was decided that
the royal fir-mans should be copied and distributed to the news media and the public.
This was done on Sunday, August 16 in the house of one of the CIA officers identified
by Roosevelt as Peter Stoneman. The copies were given to Nerren and Cilley to
distribute. 8I Since the Mossadeq government had not announced delivery of the fir-man
to Mossadeq's home this was an effective way to make the shah's replacement of
Mossadeq known. In a second effort to publicise the shah's actions, Bill Herman
brought Kennett Love of the New York Times and Don Schwind of the Associated
Press to Stonemason's house to meet with Zahedi's son Ardeshir. Ardeshir told them
about the fir-mans and described Mossadeq's attempt to arrest his father as a coup,
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since his father had legally been appointed prime minister. Love and Schwind quickly
published this information.82
After the shah's actions had been publicised the American and Iranian
conspirators took steps to build support in the military for a Zahedi government.
Zahedi quickly drew up and distributed a declaration calling for members of the armed
forces to support the shah. Military supplies were distributed by the US military
advisory mission to pro-Zahedi forces in the Tehran area. Efforts were also made to
gain the support of military garrisons in other key cities. Messengers were sent to
Kermanshah and Isfahan, using forged travel documents which had been brought in
from CIA headquarters in Washington. The elder Peter Stoneman and an American
CIA driver went to Kermanshah, where Colonel Teimur Bakhtiar was the garrison
commander. Bakhtiar was sympathetic and led a column of tanks and armoured cars
toward Tehran in support of Zahedi. Although this column did not arrive in Tehran
until after Mossadeq had been ousted, news that Bakhtiar was marching in support of
Zahedi reached Tehran immediately and helped turn the tide against Mossadeq.
Ardeshir Zahedi was sent to Isfahan where the acting garrison commander, Colonel
Zarqam, agreed to co-operate."
As these events were unfolding, Nerren and Cilley arranged on Sunday August
16 to have a large crowd march into central Tehran on the following day shouting
Tudeh slogans and carrying signs denouncing the shah. This crowd was organised
through the usual sports club leaders and was intended to rally support for the shah by
provoking fears of a Tudeh take-over. This was done independently of Roosevelt's
efforts, and apparently without his knowledge. It was financed in part with $50,000
given to Nerren and Cilley on Sunday night by Fred Zimmerman, who was handling
them while Dick Manville was sick with jaundice. This crowd duly appeared on
Monday morning and was soon joined by real Tudeh members, who were apparently
unaware that the original crowd had been hired with CIA money. The combined crowd
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attacked the Reza Shah mausoleum and then set about tearing down all statues of the
shah and his father in Tehran, these demonstrations continued on the following day.
Fearing that the crowd would attack Americans, US Ambassador Henderson
met with Mossadeq on Tuesday night and convinced him to send the Tehran police into
the streets to break up the demonstrations. Mossadeq also telephoned all the
democratic political parties requesting them not to organise any further demonstration.
These proved to be a fateful decisions for Mossadeq, as the Tudeh party, which had
unintentionally became one of Mossadeq's main sources of support by this time,
retaliated by ordering its members off the streets. Another thread in the web undertaken
by Roosevelt and Herman was to attempt to trigger popular uprising against
Mos s adeq.84
Once the fir-man had been publicised and stops had been taken to rally the
military behind Zahedi, Roosevelt and Herman began to look for a way to trigger
popular uprisings against Mossadeq. The most obvious way of doing this was through
the clergy, preferably through a popular figure such as Kashani. His religious
cridentials, strident opposition to Britain and the US as well as his public challenges to
Mossadeq in his role as leader of the Majles made him an ideal candidate around which
to coalesce support. James Bill argues that the US were able to use him to support the
shah due to his hatred of the politics of terrorism employed by Mossadeq. 85 The CIA
station had no ties with Kashani, and apparently had no other religious ties which could
accomplish this task. However, the Rashidians were close to Ayatollah Behbehani, a
leading figure in the Shiite establishment, and so Roosevelt asked them to arrange an
anti-Mossadeq demonstration. He was told that this could not be done until Friday,
when weekly prayer would be held.
Fearing that Mossadeq's net would close in around them by the time these
demonstrations could be held, Roosevelt asked the Rashidians how he could contact
Kashani. The Rashidians directed him to Aramesh. Bill Herman and Fred Zimmerman
met with Aramesh on the morning of Wednesday, August 19. They gave him $10,000,
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which was apparently passed on to Kashani. Kashani in turn arranged to have a crowd
of sports club toughs and bazaar workers march toward the centre of town from the
bazaar area. In the following days so much of this American currency had found its
way into the bazaar that the black market exchange rate had fallen from over 100 rials
to the dollar to under 50.86
The crowd organised by Kashani marched toward the centre of town. It was
joined along the way by army and police unites and by onlookers who had become
disillusioned with Mossadeq or were angered by the Tudeh demonstrations of the
previous days. Government office buildings, Tudeh and pro-Mossadeq newspapers,
and the offices of several pro-Mossadeq parties were attacked. Mossadeq refused to
send loyal army units to break up this crowd and refused a request by the Tudeh party
for arms to attack it. A source who was close to Mossadeq at the time told me that
Mossadeq, fearing a Tudeh take-over and recognising the strength of the opposition,
simply gave up.87
On Wednesday morning an army detachment loyal to Zahedi was still hiding in
the basement of Fred Zimmerman's house at this time. Hearing denunciations of
Mossadeq over the radio and seeing a large pro-shah crowd, Roosevelt rushed over to
Zahedi's hideout. On the way he encountered General Guilanshah, commander of the
air force. Guilanshah followed Roosevelt to Zahedi's hideout with several tanks.
Zahedi and Guilanshah were soon joined by several other tank detachments, led by
Colonels Oveissi, Khajeh-Nouri, and others. Together with the pro-shah
demonstrators, this unit (reportedly containing 35 tanks) seized the army headquarters
and then marched on Mossadeq's residence. There a nine-hour battle ensued in which
some 300 people were killed. The walls around Mossadeq's house were destroyed with
tank and artillery fire. The crowd stormed the house and Mossadeq escaped over the
garden wall. He surrendered to Zahedi the next day.88
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7.3.2. The Post-Coup Consolidation of Power
The arrest of Mossadeq did not entirely eliminate public opposition to Zahedi's
take-over. Sporadic outbursts and demonstrations continued in Tehran and in outlying
provincial towns. A number of Mossadeq's closest associates, including Foreign
Minister Hossein Fatemi, went into hiding and in the following months tried to rally
Mossadeq's supporters. The Tudeh party continued to operate clandestinely. Perhaps
the most serious threat to Zahedi came from the pro-Mossadeq Qashqai tribe, which
was based in south-central Iran around the city of Shiraz. Immediately after the coup
the Qashqai khans withdrew from Tehran to consider an attack on Zahedi's forces.
After an initial meeting they told CIA station chief Bill Herman that they had decided
against an attack. However, in late September they deployed their forces around Shirrs
and threatened to invade the city unless Mossadeq was released from prison. Tudeh
party members in the air forces sabotaged a number of surveillance planes being used to
watch the Qashqai. The stand-off around Shirrs continued until the end of September,
when the Qashqai apparently withdraw their forces.89
In the weeks and months after the coup Zahedi moved quickly to neutralise what
remained of the opposition. Mossadeq and General Riahi (his army chief of staff) were
arrested and eventually given short prison terms. Most other National Front leaders
were soon arrested as well and given prison terms or sent into internal exile. Only
Hossein Fatemi, who had been a particularly bitter critic of the shah and was regarded
as a communist sympathiser by the US embassy staff, was eventually executed.
Kashani, Baqai, and Makki, who had each contributed to Mossadeq's downfall, were
even kept on a short leash by Zahedi. The two leading Tehran newspapers (Kayhan and
Ettela'at) were briefly closed down after the coup because they had supported
Mossadeq. Frequent sweeps were made for Tudeh suspects, with 1,200 being arrested
by the end of October. Tudeh networks in the air force, the court system, and the
education ministry were uncovered and large quantities of Tudeh arms and literature
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were seized. All demonstrations by the Tudeh and the National Front were broken up.
In at least two cases CIA officers worked with Zahedi's forces to break up
demonstrations in the fall of 1953.9°
By the time Mossadeq was overthrown the oil blockade had been in place for
over two years. Despite the austerity measures implemented by Mossadeq, Iran's
foreign exchange holdings had nearly been depleted. The Iranian government estimated
at the time that the blockade had cost it roughly $200 million. Mossadeq had appealed
to Eisenhower in May 1953 for economic aid, but was flatly rejected. Now, after the
coup, US aid was suddenly available. Five million dollars was immediately given to
Ali Amini, Zahedi's minister of finance, by the CIA. This was allegedly followed up
with another $2-3 million, which Zahedi is said to have pocketed. On September 1
Eisenhower approved a $23 million point 4 aid grant for Iran. Five days later another
$45 million in aid was approved. This brought the total to at least $73 million in the
first three weeks after the coup, more than a third of the revenue lost due to the oil
blockade under Mossadeq. Several days after the coup Zahedi told Henderson that Iran
would fall to communism if aid were not immediately forthcoming. Given the
importance of the oil blockade in undermining Mossadeq and the fact that oil sales
were not resumed until November 1954, this seems to be a reasonable conclusion.91
7.4. Summary and Conclusion
This chapter has argued that the United States, acting largely on the basis of
strategic considerations, played a crucial role in the overthrew of the National Front
government led by Mohammed Mossadeq. It is useful to view the US involvement in
Mossadeq's overthrow as occurring in distinct phases, corresponding to the periods in
which Presidents Truman and Eisenhower held office. Under Truman the United States
facilitated the British oil blockade and refused to grant a large aid package to
Mossadeq. These acts contributed to Iran's economic deterioration and in this sense
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played a minor role in undermining the Mossadeq government. However, Truman also
blocked British efforts to overthrow Mossadeq. Despite his support for the British
position in the oil dispute it is clear that Truman had no desire to remove Mossadeq
from office. Given his tolerance of Mossadeq and Mossadeq's commitment to an
independent and non-aligned Iran, it is also clear that Truman had no interest in turning
Iran into client state.
The de facto decision to make Iran a US client did not occur until Eisenhower
was inaugurated. This was done by engineering the overthrow of Mossadeq and
replacing him with the pro-shah government headed by Zahedi. Mossadeq's overthrow
was achieved, quite obviously, through covert US intervention in the form of the CIA
operation code-named TPAJAX. Other cliency instruments, including military and
economic aid and assistance to Iran's security forces, also played important roles in
establishing Iran as a US client.
This shift in policy occurred primarily due to Eisenhower's fear of a Soviet take
over in Iran. Inherent instability in the area in the form of new state of Israel, the rise of
Nasser, disturbances in Iraq and Lebanon all provoked fears of spreading trouble which
the Soviets could take advantage of. The withdrawal of Britain as the regions external
hegemony left a vacuum for the US to fill. The failure of Mossadeq to agree the oil
deal with Britain and his breaking of the negotiations allowed Eisenhower
administration to implement his overthrow, which had been sought by oil interests, the
British and the CIA.92
There can be no doubt that the US role was crucial in overthrowing Mossadeq.
Planning for the coup began during Eisenhower's first month from CIA and State
Department of the United States. The coup was directed and financed by the CIA.
Although it was carried out in a very haphazard manner, the CIA team and its agents
conceived and implemented such crucial details of the coup as the publication of the
fir-mans, the enlistment of the garrisons at Isfahan and Kermanshah, the use of fake
Tudeh crowds to heighten fears of a Tudeh take-over, and the organisation of the crowd
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which stormed Mossadeq's house. While these events were unfolding the shah had fled
the country in panic and Zahedi, the prime minister-designate, was hiding from
Mossadeq's forces in a CIA safe house. After the coup US economic aid and, as will
be discussed in the next chapter, extensive US security assistance played a crucial role
in consolidating the dictatorship which replaced Mossadeq.
The oil blockade and the other economic sanctions imposed on Iran by Britain
clearly helped prepare the way for Mossadeq's downfall. The economic deterioration
that followed alienated many of Mossadeq's supporters, particularly among the middle
class. This undoubtedly contributed to the defection of key leaders from the National
Front and to the willingness of the Tehran crowds to throw their support to Zehadi on
the day Mossadeq was overthrown.
While the British blockade thus played a crucial role in Mossadeq's downfall, it
should be emphasised that the US role in the coup which brought Mossadeq down was
decisive, both in removing him from office and, more importantly, in determining the
type of regime which succeeded his. Although Mossadeq's popularity had slipped
considerably by August 1953, a royalist coup was, in the absence of a US intervention,
perhaps the least likely outcome of Mossadeq's decline. Mossadeq could have regained
his earlier popularity by arranging oil sales to countries such as Japan or Italy or by
striking a deal with domestic power brokers such as Kashani. It is also possible that
Mossadeq's prime ministership and his position as leader of the nationalist movement
could have been transferred peacefully to another figure, such as Kashani, Baqai,
Daftari, or even Qavam. Probably the most likely alternative in the absence of a US
intervention would have been a Tudeh take-over. In any event, Zahedi and royalist
forces he conspired with had no significant popular support and thus could not have
achieved power peacefully. Had they managed to seize power without US help it is
difficult to see how they could have remained in power for long without substantial
outside assistance.
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It should also be emphasised that British role in the coup itself was not of great
importance. The British had originally approached US policymakers with a plan for the
coup and had made available to the CIA team part of their intelligence network. The
original British plan was thoroughly rewritten, however, and in any case the plan finally
adopted provided little guidance for the events which actually took place. The British
network was of some use, notably in arranging contact with Ayatollah Kashani to
provide the crowd which marched on Mossadeq's house. However, the success of
Nerren and Cilley in producing the fake Tudeh crowd which appeared on August 17
suggests that this could have been accomplished in other ways.
The conclusion that the United States played a crucial role in overthrowing
Mossadeq thus appears inescapable. What, then, were the consequences of the US
intervention and its subsequent role in the consolidation of power by Zahedi and the
shah for Iran's domestic politics?
As outlined in the first part of this chapter, Mossadeq was the leader of a
popular, democratic organisation known as the National Front. The National Front was
founded in 1949 at the apex of a period of intense political activity in Iran to co-
ordinate opposition to the shah's attempt to rig the sixteenth Majles elections. Its
ideology, tactics, and social bases of support placed it squarely in the tradition of the
1906 constitutional movement. The political organisations included in the National
Front ranged across the entire political spectrum and, with the exception of the Tudeh
party and certain pro-British elements, included every major organisation active in this
period. The main issue addressed by the National Front was the oil nationalisation
question. However, equally important and closely bound up with this issue was the
goal of a more equitable distribution of power in Iran.
Mossadeq was thus the leader of an organisation which was populist in
character, closely tied to the traditions of Iran's democratic movement, and which
emerged during a period of fervent political activity to lead the struggle for a new
political order in Iran. By removing Mossadeq from office and installing in his place a
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dictatorship led by General Zahedi the United States destroyed this organisation and
ended the prospects for a transition to democracy, which appeared to have begun under
Mossadeq. This had two main consequences. First, it enabled the shah to rule for the
twenty-five years without regard for popular political pressures. Second, it destroyed
much of the liberal, democratic leadership in Iran, creating a vacuum which was later to
be filled by radical elements of both the left and the right. As will be discussed in the
conclusion of this study, these consequences had important implications for events
which took place in Iran in 1978 and 1979.
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CHAPTER VIII
THE CONSOLIDATION OF A CLIENT STATE, 1953 - 1963
8.1. The US-Iran Cliency Relationship
After the 1953 coup the main US goal in Iran was to keep that country from
falling under Soviet domination. A National Security Council report approved in
December 1953 stated that Iran's Western orientation was of "critical importance" to
the United States. According to this report, the loss of Iran to the Soviet Union would:
i) threaten the security of the Middle East and South-western Asia; ii) increase Soviet
oil resources; iii) weaken the "will to resist" of US allies and damage US prestige in the
area; iv) enable the Soviets to deny Iranian oil to the West; and v) "have serious
psychological impact elsewhere in the free world". Iran was to be kept out of Soviet
hands by creating a strong and stable government under the shah and his prime
minister.'
This was to be achieved in three main ways. First, a settlement of the oil
dispute which would enable Iran to resume its oil exports was to be obtained at the
earliest possible date. Toward this end the National Security Council recommended
that the president secure participation of the major US oil companies in a consortium
arrangement similar to that proposed by Truman in late 1952 by offering to drop anti-
trust action then pending against them in federal court. Eisenhower accepted this
recommendation and an agreement with Iran was finally reached in August 1954.
Second, a large-scale economic aid package was to be made available to the Iranian
government to enable it to meet the operating deficit inherited from Mossadeq and
instituted social and economic reforms, which were viewed as necessary to achieve
long-term stability. Finally, a large military aid package for Iran was recommended.
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US military aid was necessary to strengthen Iran against outside attacks and to improve
morale in the military, which was recognised as the shah's "only real source of power".2
8.1.1. Military and Economic Aid
As mentioned in chapter 6, at least $73 million in economic aid was given to the
Zahedi government in the first three weeks after Mossadeq's overthrow. This
amounted to over one-third of the government revenue said to have been lost up to that
point as a result of the oil blockade. Table 8.1 shows that roughly $1 billion in US
military and economic aid grants were given to Iran in the decade after the coup. US
loans and grants together totalled over $1.2 billion in this period and accounted for
about 21 percent of government expenditures. This percentage is even higher in the
years immediately after the coup. US loans and grants in 1954-1958 finance 33 percent
of government expenditures, about the same amount accounted for by oil revenues in
this period. This figure is 44 percent for 1953-1954. From September 1953 through
the end of 1954 it is probably closer to 60 percent, since US aid had been reduced to a
trickle before Mossadeq was ousted. 3 This massive influx of aid came at a time when
government spending was increased dramatically in an effort to consolidate the regime
inaugurated with the coup of 1953.
- 
Table 8.1 will be seen next page -
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Table 8.1: US Aid to Iran and Oil Revenues as Percentage of Iranian
Government Expenditures, 1950-1967
Year
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Government
Expenditures
US Aid (loans
and grants)
(b) as %
of (a)
US Aid
(grants only)
(c) as %
of (a)
Oil
Revenues
(d) as %
of (a)
1950 225.9 11.8 5.2 11.8 5.2 38.5 17
1951 188.3 27.8 14.8 27.8 14.8 19.9 10.6
1952 149.6 44.1 29.5 44.1 29.5 0 0
1953 167.6 52.5 31.3 52.5 31.3 0 0
1954 201.2 110.1 54.7 110.1 54.7 7.4 3.7
1955 285.1 90.7 31.8 58.7 20.6 77.5 27.2
1956 415.3 97.7 23.5 85.3 20.5 131.5 31.7
1957 414 138.5 33.5 115.5 27.9 182.4 44.1
1958 506.8 157 31 117 23.1 211.9 41.8
1959 611.6 132 21.6 94.3 15.4 224.9 36.8
1960 697.9 123.4 17.7 123.4 17.7 244.6 35
1961 721.4 146.8 20.3 94.9 13.2 258.2 35.8
1962 893.3 113.4 12.7 88.5 9.9 286.1 32
1963 1117.6 103.5 9.3 81.8 7.3 329.8 29.5
1964 1185.6 54.7 4.6 49.4 4.2 411.4 34.7
1965 1248.4 101.6 8.1 39.7 3.2 440.2 35.3
1966 1305.9 175.1 13.4 71.9 5.5 498 38.1
1967 1469.3 202.4 13.8 39.8 2.7 637.4 43.4
SOURCES:
(a) Julian Bharier, Economic Development in Iran, 1900-1070 (London: Oxford University press,
1971), pp. 68, 90-98, 98, 126-127. The values given here include both "ordinary" expenditures
and expenditures on the various development plans. Yearly plan expenditures were estimated
using the actual outlays Bharier gives for aggregated periods. Bhariers figures were converted
into US dollars.
(b), (c) US Department of State, Agency for International Development, unpublished worksheets for US
Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organisations (Washington,
1981).
(d)	 Bharier, pp. 158, 165. These figures were converted from English Pounds at an exchange rate of
$2.40 per Pound.
NOTE: All volume figures are given in million of US dollars.
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Real government expenditures grew by an average of 23 percent per year in
1954-1958 and 16 percent in 1959-1963. While reliable figures are not available for
1954 or 1955, about 27 percent of government expenditures in 1956-1962 were for the
security forces (military, police, Gendarmerie, and presumably also SAVAK), with
about 12 and 33 percent respectively for education and economic development. US
loans and grants accounted for 21 percent of government revenues in this period. 4 As
will be discussed below, the security forces and economic development were
fundamental pillars of the shah's dictatorship. It is evident that, particularly in the
1950s, US aid played a major role in developing these as cornerstones of the shah's
regime.
Just under half of the value of US loans and grants given to Iran in the decade
after the coup was for military assistance. US military aid to Iran was similar in
character to that given to other major US allies in the third world during this period.
Equipment ranging from ammunition to tanks and jet aircraft was provided. A Military
Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) unit was stationed in Iran to train and advise the
Iranian army. Over six thousand Iranian soldiers (mostly officers) were sent to the
United States for training. Further military co-operation occurred under the Baghdad
Pact and CENTO. The United States was not a full member of these organisations but
was heavily involved in the military matters which took place under their auspices
through a liaison office. Although the Iranian military was slow in assimilating the new
equipment and tactics provided by the United States, it had improved substantially by
the late 1950s. In 1961 US Senator Hubert Humphrey was told by an Iranian general
that US aid had been very helpful and the army "was now capable of coping with the
civilian population".s
The total value of US economic aid to Iran (both loans and grants) in 1950-1967
was $944.1 million. Before 1950 and after 1967 US aid to Iran was almost negligible,
amounting to less than $25 million for both periods together. Of the $944.1 million
given in 1950-1967, $200.4 million was on export-import bank loans. These loans are
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generally used to finance US exports to the recipient country, and must be repaid in full
(with interest). Hence their main value lies in easing the recipient through temporary
periods of foreign exchange scarcity, such as the period before November 1954 when
Iran's oil was kept off the international market. Loans of this sort can thus be quite
useful to the recipient government, although their domestic social impact is felt only
indirectly.
Of the remaining $743.7 million in US economic aid, $183.1 million came in
the form of Food for Peace (or P.L. 480) aid, and the remaining $610.6 million in
ordinary foreign aid appropriations. Most, although not all, of the Food for Peace aid
was used for the purchase of basic food commodities such as wheat, butter, cooking oil,
feed grains, and dried milk. Some $34 million was earmarked for economic
development purposes, including highway construction, improvements to the Mehrabad
Airport in Tehran, and other public infrastructure projects. Smaller amounts were spent
on military construction ($5.9 million) and loans to expand private enterprise ($4.7
million). In addition, $58.5 million in ordinary foreign aid appropriations was used to
finance sugar imports. Adding this and subtracting that part not used for commodity
imports, some $197 million in US aid during 1950-1967 was spent directly on food
supplies.
About one third of the $610.6 million in ordinary foreign aid appropriations
came in the form of loans, and the rest as grants. The largest portion of this ($139.3
million, or about 23 percent) was for budget support, which is used directly to
underwrite government spending. Another $108.1 million (or 17 percent) was spent on
public infrastructure projects such as highway, port, and railroad construction.
Spending on economic development projects (including agriculture, mining, industry,
and loans to Iran's development bank) took another $53.9 million. The remaining 46
percent of foreign aid appropriations was spread across a variety of smaller areas.
Social programmes such as health, education, housing, and disaster relief accounted for
$37.3 million. Non-food commodities such as textiles, machinery, and motor vehicles
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took $69 million. Public administration and public safety assistance (including the
police training programme described below) accounted for $10.8 million. The
remainder was either spent in support of the missions which carried out the above
activities or cannot be easily identified.6
While the US aid programme in Iran appears on paper to have been
comprehensive and well-balanced, it was, in fact, the subject of frequent criticism and
controversy. A House subcommittee examined this programme in 1957 and found that
it was so poorly administered that it could not be determined how aid funds had been
spent. Funding levels appeared "to have been picked out of the air," with no apparent
regard for Iran's economic needs. Aid given to Iran in 1953 and 1954 was described as
"neither technical assistance nor economic development but an ad hoc method of
keeping the Iranian economy afloat". The subcommittee criticised not only the
relatively high level of budget support given to Iran but specific projects as well.
Although it stopped short of charging that US aid had been used in a corrupt manner,
the subcommittee report contained clear inferences that US aid had been used by the
Iranian government for domestic purposes.7
Further evidence that the US aid programme in Iran was used for corrupt
purposes by the shah appeared in 1965 when an article in The Nation charged that US
aid had been used to finance payments of over $40 million to top Iranian and American
officials and members of the shah's inner circle. After this article was published a
Senate investigation into the matter was abruptly halted and The Nation was threatened
with a lawsuit. While strong evidence was presented, the charges were never proved.8
There is also reason to believe that some US military aid was pocketed by Iranian
military officers.
8.1.2. Security Assistance
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US security assistance to Iran came mainly in two forms.9 First, Iran's security
forces 1 ° were provided with specialised training and equipment by the United States.
The training provided was extensive and quite diverse. In at least one case it involved a
US advisor who worked in a top command capacity. Second, a certain amount of
intelligence information was exchanged between the US and Iranian security services.
As will be discussed below, security assistance of this latter kind was not extensive, and
hence is of limited importance in this study.
Large-scale US training and advice for Iran's security forces began in
September 1953, within weeks of Mosadeq's overthrow. As discussed in chapter five
US advisory missions had been working with the Iranian military and Gendarmeries
since the early 1940s. However, other than assistance to military intelligence (or G-
2), 11
 these missions were not involved in security training per se. In September 1953 a
US Army officer who had been working with the CIA in the Middle East for several
years and who had a background in police and detective work was sent to Iran as a
military attaché. His mission was to organise and command a new security force, the
main task of which was to seek out and eliminate all threats to the shah. These were
expected to come mainly from the Tudeh party. However, challenges to the shah from
military officers and even from remnants of the National Front were also regarded as
possible sources of threat.
This security force was organised around General Teimur Bakhtiar and three
army colonels. It did not, at this time, have a well-defined organisational structure, and
apparently was not even given a name. Rather, it operated informally and
clandestinely, acting independently of the other branches of the security apparatus and
reporting directly to the US attaché, who himself had direct access to the shah. 12 It was
built primarily on the military governorship of Tehran (which was put under the
command of Bakhtiar in December 1953), but drew resources from a number of
existing government facilities, both military and civilian. In addition to commanding
this organisation, the US attaché trained Bakhtiar and the three colonels in basic
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intelligence tactics. These included surveillance and interrogation methods, the
operation of intelligence networks, organisational security measures, etc. This
organisation was the first modern, efficient security force to operate in Iran. It
eventually evolved into the notorious secret police SAVAK, which served as a primary
pillar of the shah's dictatorship. Its main achievement was to break up a large Tudeh
network which had been organised in the armed forces. This operation will be
described in some detail below.
SAVAK13
 was established in 1957 with Balchtiar as its first director. The shah
had two main goals in creating SAVAK. First, he wanted to establish an efficient
security apparatus which could provide the kind of security structure needed to
maintain an unpopular dictatorship such as his. The Tudeh military network rolled up
in September 1954 had included such high-ranking figures as the head of army G-2 and
the prime minister's personal bodyguard. The discovery of this network revealed the
incompetence and inadequacy of the existing security forces and convinced the shah
that a major restructuring of these forces was necessary. Second, the shah created
SAVAK in part to eliminate the overlap and competition which existed between the
various organisations which were responsible for maintaining security. SAVAK was
created primarily from the organisation which had been developed by Bakhtiar and the
US military attaché. However, it also incorporated personnel from other branches of
the existing security apparatus. It soon developed operating procedures and recruiting
methods which gave it a very distinct and independent character.
After Bakhtiar's association with the US military attaché ended he was sent to
the United States to study the US security organisation and examine how their methods
and institutions might be adapted to suit conditions in Iran. In 1957, shortly after
SAVAK was formally established, a team of five CIA officers was sent to Iran to
organise and train SAVAK. This team included specialists in intelligence analysis,
operations, and counter-intelligence. According to one of the member of this team, the
assistance it provided included "everything from setting up the SAVAK library to how
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to set up counter-intelligence files". While the United States provided extensive
assistance to SAVAK, it was not modelled on US institutions such as the CIA or FBI.
In fact, US advice to the shah that domestic and foreign operations should be handled
by distinct and independent agencies (like the FBI and CIA) was rejected.
US assistance to SAVAK included training for SAVAK personnel, both in Iran
and in the United States. The training given to SAVAK personnel consisted of standard
courses made available by the CIA to "friendly" security services throughout the world.
These courses are quite similar to the basic training given to CIA personnel at bases
such as Ft. Meade, in Maryland. SAVAK personnel were trained in the fundamentals
of spycraft, such as surveillance, interrogation, and personal security. Despite frequent
accusations to the contrary, SAVAK personnel were not trained in torture techniques by
the CIA (CIA people often argue that SAVAK employees were already adept in these
areas.) However, their training included courses on how to resist torture. In this
context different forms of torture were discussed. 14 CIA officers were certainly aware
of the use of torture by SAVAK, and at least one CIA officer reportedly toured SAVAK
torture chambers. 15 SAVAK personnel were also trained in the United States at the
International Police Academy and the Internationals Police Services School. These
training centres were run by the US Agency for International Development, allegedly
with covert CIA sponsorship.16
In addition to the CIA training and advisory mission that worked with SAVAK,
there was also a certain amount of co-operation between the two agencies on
intelligence collection. Some intelligence information was exchanged, primarily
material relating to third countries such as the Soviet Union. There was also some
exchange of information relating to domestic matters, though this was much more
limited in scope. The information provided to the CIA by SAVAK was generally
regarded to be of dubious value. For its part, the CIA was reluctant to provide SAVAK
with information for fear that its sources would be exposed. In any case, by the mid-
1960s SAVAK had became quite sophisticated and presumably had better sources than
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the CIA, who by this time almost entirely stopped using agents in Iran. 17 While very
little information relating to domestic matters was thus exchanged, the two services
frequently discussed matters of concern and co-ordinated policies.
One other area in which the United States contributed significantly to Iran's
security capabilities was through a police training and advisory mission administered by
the US Agency for International Development. This mission, which was begun in the
summer of 1954 and continued at least through the end of 1965, was established to
provide training and advice for Iran's National Police. The original agreement covering
this mission called for assistance in the areas of headquarters and field organisation,
personnel practices, records, motor vehicle maintenance, communications, training,
traffic management, identification, and investigative procedures. While much of the
assistance provided by this mission involved routine police work and thus is of little
interest here, some of its activities were of considerable domestic political importance.
These included training in riot control, assistance in restructuring the National Police
Academy and Patrolmen's School, the establishment of a nation-wide police radio
network with connections to the international Interpol network, and the development of
fingerprint and photographic labs.18
8.1.3. The Evolution of US-Iranian Relations
The relationship between the United States and Iran remained very close but
passed through several phases in this period. As discussed above, the main goal of US
policy toward Iran after the 1953 coup was to stabilise Iran around a strong central
government led by the shah and his prime minister. This goal, which was explicitly
stated in the National Security Council report approved in December 1953, called for an
early resolution of the oil dispute and large-scale military and economic aid
programmes. It also called for the establishment of a new security apparatus under the
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command of a US military attaché and small-scale covert US operations against
National Front and Tudeh targets in the fall of 1953 (as described in chapter 7).
By the end of 1954 this goal had largely been achieved. Oil had begun to flow
again. The liberal opposition had grown docile and the Tudeh party had been dealt a
decisive blow with the rollup of its military network. The picture became even brighter
for US policymakers when the shah dismissed Zahedi in April 1955. This was regarded
as a sign that the shah was at last ready to assume control over the country and act
decisively to stamp out corruption, which had grown rampant under Zahedi. In late
April 1955 the US embassy in Tehran stated that the threat of large-scale insurrection
which had existed in 1953 had been brought under control. The problem now was to
reinforce the regime against the continuing threat of Soviet subversion. This was to be
accomplished through continued military and economic aid and further strengthening of
the security apparatus.19
This new US confidence in the shah and in his ability to maintain control was
reflected in the activities of the CIA station in Tehran at this time. Covert US
operations against Iranian targets were scaled back greatly by the end of 1954. Both the
TPBEDAMN operation (which had provided the two principal US agents used in the
overthrow of Mossadeq) and the small operations undertaken in the 1953 against the
National Front and the Tudeh party were ended. Similarly, the number of agents used
for routine intelligence-gathering in Iran declined steadily after 1953. The new
atmosphere of stability and growing US confidence in the shah dictated a new
approach. Rather than intervening directly in Iran's affairs, US policymakers
increasingly thought in terms of enabling the shah to provide for his own security by
giving him aid and building up his security forces. The CIA station busied itself more
with cross-border operations directed at the Soviet Union and Afghanistan and with
penetrations of the Eastern Bloc embassies in Tehran.2°
In the late 1950s and early 1960s two additional factors began to emerge which
had the effect of further curtailing US activities in Iran. First, due largely to training
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and assistance described above, SAVAK was becoming increasingly effective as a
security force at this time. It was therefore less dependent on its liaison with the United
States and more able to detect and disrupt US intelligence-gathering activities. Second,
in 1957 the United States began to install electronic listening devices in Iran. These
devices were of critical importance after the Soviet Union launched Sputnik because
they were more reliable than satellites and high-altitude aircraft and because no other
US allies were close enough to the Central Asian launch sites to provide comparable
facilities. 21 A formal agreement for the basing of these devices was never concluded.
US policymalcers were consequently very reluctant to undertake operations in Iran
which might anger the shah and lead him to withdraw their basing privileges.
These factors led to a further curtailment of US intelligence-gathering and other
political activities in Iran. By mid-1962 the CIA training mission with SAVAK had
been greatly scaled back. Where in 1957 it had been very broad in scope, by the early
1960s its training activities were limited to very specific projects, usually involving
sophisticated electronic equipment. In its place the CIA-SAVAK connection had
evolved into a liaison mission whose primary purpose was to carry out joint operations,
mainly to be directed at the Tudeh party. However, SAVAK officials had become very
obstinate by this time and no joint operations of this kind actually occurred.22
Similarly, the close personal relationships which had earlier been of great benefit to
both American and Iranian participants were new replaced by more distant
relationships. CIA officers were now routinely followed in Iran and their telephones
were bugged. To the extent that when foreign training of SAVAK officers occurred it
was now done by Israelis, often in Israel.
For similar reasons the activities of US embassy officials and the Tehran CIA
station became more highly circumscribed in the early 1960s as well. Except for one
round of meetings with prominent National Front figures in 1962 and 1963, contact
between the embassy and the Iranian opposition was forbidden by successive US
ambassadors, apparently after complaints by the shah. The CIA station, having dropped
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most of its agents, was by this time relying almost exclusively on SAVAK and overt
sources (such as newspapers) for intelligence.23 This situation persisted until 1977,
when growing unrest led to renewed contacts with the opposition. This is the main
reason why the Iranian revolution caught US policymakers so much by surprise.24
The one area of US-Iranian relations which was not greatly scaled back in the
early 1960s was the military and economic aid programme. As shown in table 7-1, US
military economic aid to Iran remained at high levels through 1967, although it
increasingly shifted from grants to loans and declined noticeably as a percentage of
Iranian government expenditures. This aid was reportedly used in 1961 to pressure the
shah into appointing the reformant Ali Amini as prime minister. 25 US policymakers
had been aware of the need for social and economic reforms in Iran for some time.26
However, it was not until the inauguration of the Kennedy Administration, with its
dramatically different approach to the third world, that pressure for reforms was finally
exerted on the shah.
This pressure was remarkably effective. Amini and his minister of agriculture
Dr. Hasanjani instituted a wide-ranging series of reforms, including land reform, health
and literacy programmes, the enfranchisement of women, etc. As will be discussed
below, the shah took this programme to be his own, calling it the "white revolution"
and the "short-people revolution". Having made the reform programme into a
cornerstone of his regime the shah was able to dismiss the pro-American Amini and
pre-empt further American pressures. At the same time US aid levels continued to drop
off. At the lavish ceremonies marking the 2500th anniversary of Persian monarchy held
at Persepolis in 1971 the shah publicly renounced further US aid.
US-Iranian relations by this time had come full circle. With the 1953 coup and
large-scale military and economic aid and security assistance in the following years, the
United States had played a crucial role in rescuing the shah and making him into a
powerful dictator. As the shah became strong and as Iran grew in importance to the
United States the US-Iran cliency relationship changed dramatically in character. By
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1963 the cliency relationship between the US and Iran had became fully established.
Even though, cliency relationship had maintained until Iranian revolution period,
thereafter the flow of cliency instruments such as intervention, aid , and security
assistance was reduced year by year. However, in contrast, domestical autonomy
gradually increased due to the consequences of the White Revolution.
8.2. The Foundations of Shah's Dictatorship
8.2.1. The Security Forces
As in any other dictatorship, the primary pillar of the shah's authoritarian
regime was its security apparatus. 27 Before the creation of SAVAK, the security
apparatus had had three main components: the National Police, the Gendarmerie, and
the armed forces. The armed forces included the military governorship of Tehran,
which replaced the civilian administration when martial law was declared in 1953. The
military governorship was in turn the main organisation which Balchtiar and the US
military attaché drew upon in establishing the predecessor to SAVAK.
The National Police had been created by Reza Shah to provide a unified, nation-
wide structure for law enforcement in the larger cities and towns of Iran. Its primary
responsibility was to carry out routine police duties such as criminal investigation and
apprehension. However, it also had a secret police division which handled domestic
security and intelligence matters. The main responsibility of the secret police was
monitor and disrupt subversive elements which posed a threat to the regime. In the late
1940s and early 1950s this meant primarily the Tudeh party and the Fedayan-i-Islam.
The secret police had no foreign intelligence capabilities as such. Like much of the
government bureaucracy at the time it was extremely corrupt and inefficient. It was no
match for the well-disciplined Tudeh party and was not effective in preventing
assassination attempts against the shah and his prime ministers.
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The Gendarmerie was the rural counterpart of the National Police. It operated
the border patrol, policed the small towns and villages, and shared responsibility with
the army for keeping track of the tribes. The Gendarmeries had a small intelligence
section whose primary function was to maintain security within the Gendarmerie itself.
The Gendarmerie also handled cross-border infiltration into Iran, to the extent that these
were handled at all. Its main role in providing domestic security was its activities
regarding the tribes.
Before the creation of SAVAK the primary responsibility for maintaining
domestic security lay with the armed forces, including the martial law administration
and the new security force established under Bakhtiar and the US military attaché. The
army itself played an important role in maintaining order. It had been deeply involved
in the overthrow of Mossadeq and in the widespread arrests which followed the coup.
It conducted operations against the tribes and later against the guerrilla bands which
began to emerge in the late 1960s. In 1963 the army was called out to put down large
demonstrations led by a little-known clergyman named Khomeini. Hundreds were
killed in the ensuing confrontation. Even when it remained in the barracks, fear that the
military might intervene contributed to the atmosphere of intimidation and alienation
which prevailed under the shah. The activities of the armed forces were closely
supervised by the shah, and were co-ordinated with those of the other security
organisations.
As mentioned above, SAVAK was organised in part to end the competition and
redundancy which the system of overlapping security forces entailed. This
consolidation process actually seems to have been with the establishment of the
organisation headed by Balchtiar and the US military attaché. This organisation drew
from both the military and the secret police. With the exception of military G-2 it
appears to have entirely taken over responsibility for domestic intelligence activities
from these organisations. G-2 was only peripherally involved in domestic intelligence,
being mainly concerned with security in the military itself and with the activities of the
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armed forces in neighbouring countries. The National Police, the Gendarmeries, and
the military still played important roles in maintaining domestic security. However,
they acted primarily in an enforcement capacity, whereas Bakhtiar's organisation and
later SAVAK assumed responsibility for domestic intelligence matters.
The manner in which SAVAK and its immediate predecessor carried out the
task of maintaining security changed considerably in the twenty-five years after
Mossadeq was overthrown. One source of this change lay in the evolution of SAVAK
from a corrupt, comparatively backward organisation to a modern, efficient security
force which became something of a model for organisations of this kind of the third
world. 28 The key role played by the United States in this process of evolution has been
described above. A second source of change in SAVAK's mode of operation resulted
from to the changing roles it was called on to play by the shah and, by extension, from
the different personalities of the men appointed to lead it.
The founder and first director of SAVAK was Teimur Bakhtiar, who remained
in that position until March 1961 when he was exiled for plotting to overthrow the
shah. After the 1955 coup and throughout the 1950s the shah was in the process of
consolidating his authoritarian regime. An efficient security force under the command
of a ruthless and determined leader like Bakhtiar was crucial to this process of
consolidation. Bakhtiar was a crude and violent man,29 and the organisation he led took
on a character much like his. Although little is written about SAVAK in the 1950s
there can be no doubt that it was as brutal as the SAVAK of the 1970s, if perhaps
somewhat less effective. Thousands of people were arrested in the period after August
1953, mostly on charges of being members of the outlawed Tudeh party. At least 94
people were executed in this period,30 and the true figure was undoubtedly several times
higher. At least some are said to have been tortured to death. Bakhtiar's security force
was responsible for the break-up of the Tudeh military network in September 1954 and
closely monitored all political groups. Opposition political parties were illegal at this
time, and overt political activity was impossible.
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Balchtiar was succeeded as head of SAVAK by General Hassan Palcravan, a
highly cultured man of considerable intellect who stood in marked contrast to his
predecessor and successor as SAVAK chief. The choice of Pakravan, who had
previously been Balchtiar's deputy, came at almost the same time that the reformist Ali
Amini was appointed Prime Minister. SAVAK is said to have been much more
restrained under Palcravan. Torture was apparently stopped. 31 Ironically, Palcravan,
who was executed by Khomeini's Revolutionary Guards soon after the revolution, is
said to have convinced the shah to spare Khomeini's life after the 1963 demonstrations.
In part because of these demonstration, the shah became convinced that Palcravan was
too lenient. 32
 Palcravan was dismissed in January 1965 after Prime Minister Hassan Ali
Mansour was assassinated.
Pakravan's successor as SAVAK chief was General Nematollah Nassiri, who
had been serving as head of the National Police. Nassiri was a loyal servant to the shah.
The two had been classmates at the Iranian Military Academy. Nassiri had delivered
the fir-man dismissing Mossadeq in August 1953 and after the coup had personally
arrested Mossadeq. Under Nassiri SAVAK gained a world-wide reputation for brutally
and efficiency. Not surprisingly, Nassiri was executed in February 1979, one of four
generals who were the first victims of the post-revolutionary regime.33
SAVAK was a complete intelligence service, handling both domestic and
foreign matters and having access to virtually all aspects of life in Iran. It had
approximately 3000 full-time employees, and, according to one source, some 3 million
part-time agents and informers. 34
 SAVAK had three main parts: a central organisation
divided into nine general departments, a branch for monitoring activities in Tehran, and
branches for the various provinces. The general departments consisted of units with
responsibility for overall command, foreign intelligence-gathering, domestic security,
SAVAK security, technical matters, support personnel and equipment, overt
intelligence sources, counter-espionage, and overt operations. The most notorious of
these was department three: domestic security.
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In 1971 department three had 300 full-time employees and was divided into four
sections. Section one handled operations and investigations. It had separate branches
covering the Tudeh party, the National Front and its associated parties, students and
other Iranians living abroad, the Arab and Baluch minorities, the Kurds, and the clergy.
Section two seems to have had similar duties, though it was organised functionally
rather than by group. It had branches dealing with the press, the tribes, workers and
farmers, the official political parties, universities and schools, the legislative houses and
ministries, and one branch whose function was "to eliminate the peoples' discontent".35
Section three managed the elaborate system of archives and records kept by department
three. Section four handled enforcement. It had branches for censorship, indoctrination
and training, special operations, and judicial matters, including interrogation.
Department three also contained independent branches for translation, finance,
and military matters, as well as an additional, independent judicial branch. Most of
Iran's prisons were under the direction of department three. The one exception was the
dreaded Evin Prison in Tehran, which was operated by department eight (counter-
espionage). Finally, department three worked closely (and perhaps commanded)
Tehran SAVAK, which had separate branches covering the National Front, the Tudeh
party, the clergy, the workers, the universities, and the Tehran bazaar, as well as
separate investigation and surveillance units.
SAVAK was an extremely sophisticated and effective instrument of repression.
Its tactics ranged from the crudest forms of violence to carefully orchestrated
psychological operations designed to disrupt the opposition and promote loyalty to the
shah.
The charges of torture by SAVAK are well-known and need not be detailed
here.36 Torture was widespread in Iran under the shah. It was the ultimate recourse of
the shah's security forces in dealing with obstinate members of the opposition. It also
helped to create a climate of fear and intimidation which, probably more than any other
tactic employed by the regime, discouraged opposition to the shah.
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Despite the central role played by torture under the shah, which served to break
down and undermine opposition groups. Arbitrary arrest and imprisonment were
commonplace. SAVAK officers were empowered under the 1957 bill establishing
SAVAK to act as military magistrates and detain suspects. The usual charge in such
cases was "forming or belonging to organisations opposed to the monarchy or having a
collectivist ideology," which was illegal under the Iranian penal code. Amnesty
International reported in 1976 that there were between 25,000 and 100,000 political
prisoners in Iran. Trials for political prisoners were conducted under military tribunals.
Investigations for the prosecution were carried out by SAVAK. Defendants were
permitted to choose lawyers from short lists prepared by the tribunal, usually consisting
of retired military officers. Defence lawyers had no more than ten days to prepare their
cases. Trials were held without juries and usually in camera. Defendants had no right
to call or cross-examine witnesses. Amnesty International knew of no such cases in
which defendants were acquitted. In 1975 Amnesty International stated that "no
country in the world has a worse record in human rights than Iran".37
SAVAK also much subtler ways of promoting conformity. Its networks of
informers were so widespread that Iranians were afraid to speak critically about the
regime even in their own homes. Using the elaborate filing system maintained by
department three, all applications for employment in government-run
organisations(including the universities) and in many private organisations were
carefully screened by SAVAK. Applicants who had opposed the regime or were even
related to someone who had opposed it were not only kept out of sensitive positions in
this way but often denied meaningful employment altogether. A similar process was
used to deny passports to dissidents. Censorship was extremely tight in Iran. However,
SAVAK took censorship one step further by publishing and disseminating information
designed both to discredit the opposition and to increase popular fears about its own
operations.38 Another SAVAK tactic was to create organisations which were mildly
critical of the shah's regime in order to co-opt and channel dissent and gather
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information on the regime's critics. Such organisations included the Iranian Society for
Human Rights and an organisation for Iranian intellectuals. An unsuccessful attempt
was made to establish a similar organisation for lawyers.39
8.2.2. Mechanisms of Co-optation
The shah balanced these repressive capabilities in a carrot-and -stick approach
of inducements and reforms designed to buy support for his regime and deflect criticism
from the opposition. These measures, which were only partly successful, fell into three
main categories: reforms designed and financed by the government, corruption, and
corporatist political institutions such as the official parties and branches of the
government bureaucracy.
After the 1953 coup the shah and his American advisors came to realise that
social reforms and economic development would be crucial if the regime was to last. A
major development effort was consequently launched. As mentioned above,
government spending increased by an average of 23 percent per year in 1954-1958 and
16 percent in 1959-1963. The percentage of government expenditures which went for
economic development rose from 13 percent in 1954 to 39 percent in 1962.40 Where
the First Development Plan (covering 1949-1955) called for (but did not actually spend)
21 billion rials for development, the Second Plan (1956-1962) called for 94.5 billion.
This included a 448 percent increase in spending for agricultural programmes over the
First Plan levels, a 520 percent increase for transportation and communications, and
220 and 217 percent increases (respectively) for industry and social programmes.
These efforts were quite successful. Iran's GNP grew at an annual rate of 7-8 percent
in 1955-1960. Manufacturing employment grew by 19 percent in 1956-1960. The
number of houses and primary and secondary schools grew by 10.8 percent and 47
percent (respectively) in 1955-1960. The production of livestock in 1955-1959 was 48
percent higher than it had been in the previous five years.41
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Development efforts continued at a similar pace in the early 1960s. Real
government expenditures grew at an average annual rate of 9.4 percent in 1962-1967
and spending for development held steady at just under 40 percent of government
expenditures in this period. Average yearly outlays planned under the Third
Development Plan (1962-1967) were almost three times higher than under the Second
Plan, with the largest increases being in industry (754 percent ) and social services (584
percent). Real GNP grew at an average annual rate of 8.7 in 1960-1967, and
employment in manufacturing grew by 37 percent. The number of houses grew by 37
percent. The number of houses grew by 10.7 percent in 1960-1965, and the number of
schools almost doubled. While livestock production remained at about the same levels,
domestic per capita agricultural production grew by 4.6 percent in 1960-1967.42
In January 1963 the shah announced plans for a series of reforms which came to
be known as the White Revolution. By identifying his regime so closely with a
programme of reforms the shah sought to portray himself as a progressive, modernising
monarch and thus deflect criticism from the liberal and radical opposition. The White
Revolution included plans for the nationalisation of forests and water resources,
legislation to introduce profit-sharing in private industry, and programs to establish
health, education, and development corps. The jewel in the crown of the White
Revolution, however, was a large-scale land reform programme.
The land tenure system in Iran had long been a serious impediment to social and
economic development. Land reform had been a prominent political issue for years,
and the shah had even begun a limited land redistribution programme in the early
1950s. The programme begun in the early 1960s was of a much larger scale, however.
By the time the land reform programme was officially ended in September 1971
virtually every village in Iran had been affected. The massive estates of the land-
owning elite, and hence their primary sources of political power, were largely
dismantled. Ninety-two percent of the peasant sharecroppers eligible to receive land
under the programme eventually did. While the grand scale of these reforms cannot be
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denied, the programme contained one major oversight: the landless agricultural
labourers who constituted almost half of the Iranian peasantry were not only completely
excluded from the programme but were, in most cases, forced off the land with the
break-up of the large feudal estates.43 The profound consequences of the land reform
programme for Iranian politics will be discussed at some length below and in the
conclusion of this study.
A second mechanism of co-optation used by the shah was corruption. While
corruption under the shah is hard to document (for obvious reasons), there is no doubt
that it permeated the Iranian political process and that much of it originated in the royal
court itself.44 Corruption came in a myriad of forms in Iran. It involved not only the
royal family and wealthy businessmen but also tribal and religious leaders, government
employees at all levels, and even peasants and the urban unemployed. While its
primary motive in most cases was personal greed, corruption also served an important
political purpose: it enabled the shah and his allies to buy the loyalty of the people
involved and thus exert control over them. This had the effect of eliminating many
potential competing centres of power and creating a vast system of patronage which
linked the royal court in a personal way to virtually all segments of society. As
discussed above, there is some evidence that US foreign aid was used by the shah and
his officials for corrupt purposes. Given the secrecy involving these matters, the cases
cited may have been only the tip of the iceberg.
A final mechanism used by the shah to coopt the opposition was employment or
membership in government-controlled or government-affiliated institutions such as the
universities and research institutes, the government bureaucracies, and the legal
political parties. Because of the sheer size of the government, much of the most
prestigious employment in Iran lay in the public sector. This was particularly true for
the secular, well-educated children of the upper and middle classes, who formed the
core of the liberal and radical opposition. As discussed above, applicants for
government positions were carefully screened by SAVAK. Those who had participated
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in opposition political activities were either barred from public service or given
unsuitable or temporary employment. This created powerful incentives for students to
refrain from engaging in political activity. Government employees were closely
watched and similarly found it difficult to be politically active. Much the same
situation held in many newspapers, businesses, and labour unions, which often had
direct ties to the government or were run by allies of the shah.45
A similar role was played by the various government-sponsored political parties,
which first appeared in 1957. These parties were in no way popular or representative.
Rather, they served mainly as socialisation and recruitment organs for the state, with
membership being virtually obligatory for anyone hoping to enter into the highest levels
of government. These parties helped to co-opt opposition to the shah in two main
ways. First, members of these parties could not, of course, openly belong to other
parties or criticise the shah. Hence the official parties had the effect of forcing
politically-active Iranians to make a clear choice between the shah and the opposition.
Second, since only these parties could nominate candidate for the Majles, the
opposition was denied an organisational base for entering this body (Independent
candidates were, however, permitted to run for office.) Either the shah himself or a
trusted ally always headed the official parties and selected their candidates. Hence
there was little chance for the opposition to become a powerful force in the Majles, and
this body never regained the power it had held under Mossadeq.46
8.3. The Shah and the Opposition
In the years after he was returned to power in 1953, the shah used his coercive
apparatus and these mechanisms of co-optation to systematically undermine all sources
of opposition to his rule. This meant not only the liberal and radical opposition but also
real and potential threats from the military, the clergy, and even from the traditional
landed upper class. In the process, state-society relations in Iran evolved from the
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pluralism of the late 1940s and early 1950s to the authoritarian, relatively autonomous
dictatorship of the 1960s and 1970s.
8.3.1. The National Front and the Tudeh Party
The first targets of the shah were, of course, the liberals and radicals of the
National Front and the Tudeh party. The National Front suffered a mortal blow with
the overthrow of the Mossadeq government in 1953 and the subsequent wave of arrests.
It continued to exist under a variety of different names and remained the most vocal
opposition force in Iran until the last days of the shah's reign. However, because of its
broad popularity and the personal threat it had posed to him in 1953, the shah harassed
the National Front more than any other group. The effect of the shah's attacks was
already evident by 1963 when the clergy rather than the liberal opposition led the
massive demonstrations which occurred in that year.
The shah's main instrument in dealing with the opposition was repression.
Virtually the entire leadership of the National Front was arrested in August 1953, and
after that arrest and imprisonment became a routine matter. 47 Public meetings and
demonstrations by the National Front were banned and frequent raids were made to
disrupt planning sessions, seize mimeograph machines, etc. Censorship was used to
deny the National Front a public forum. Rigged elections and the ban on independent
political parties made it virtually impossible for the National Front to place candidates
in the Majles. The powerful Qashqai Khans were exiled in the mid-1950s, denying the
substantial resources of the Qashqai Tribal Confederacy to the National Front."
Repression not only made it difficult for the National Front to operate but
reduced its public appeal as well. The shah also used the mechanisms of co-optation
described above to undermine the popularity of the National Front. Although this co-
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optation occurred in a great variety of ways, it was the reform programme of the early
1960s which had the greatest effect on the National Front.
The origins of this programme lay in the events of the mid-1950s. Iran quickly
reached a state of relative prosperity after oil started to flow again in late 1954.
Rumblings about redistributing this wealth and about land reform were heard. Also in
the mid-and late-1950s a growing number of Iranian students began to return from
European and American universities with ideas about reform. These factors played into
the hands of the National Front, which in early 1960 staged its first public
demonstrations since 1953. In 1961 the Kennedy Administration was inaugurated,
adding to the pressure for reform.
The shah soon realised that he could harness and channel these pressures for
reform for his own political benefit. In 1961 he appointed Ali Amini as prime minister.
Amini was a liberal technocrat with no popular following and no real ties to the
National Front. Amini launched the programme with help from his very capable
minister of agriculture, Dr. Hassan Arsanjani. Amini was forced to resign in July 1962
and Arsanjani followed soon after. Having used Amini and Arsanjani to steal the
thunder from his liberal and radical critics, the shah now made the reforms programme
his own under the banner of the "White Revolution". The coup de grace was
administered to the National Front in June 1963, after the large demonstrations led by
Khomeini. Hundreds were killed and thousands arrested in these demonstrations,
including many National Front leaders and supporters.
Despite the massive arrests which followed the 1953 coup, the Tudeh party
emerged relatively unscathed from the overthrow of Mossadeq. It had long since
organised itself into clandestine cells and its leadership and cadres had grown adept at
operating secretly during the years in which the party was outlawed. However, in
August 1954 the security force led by Bakhtiar and the American military attaché
managed to come up with a list of the members of the Tudeh military network. ° This
network contained over 600 officers, including Zahedi's personal bodyguard and the
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head of army G-2. It had been set up during the Soviet occupation in 1941-1946 and
apparently was designed primarily to gather intelligence on the Iranian army rather than
to carry out subversive operations. 5° This network had been backbone of the Tudeh
party. Its destruction finished the Tudeh as a serious threat to the shah.
The Tudeh party and the various manifestations of the National Front were the
only major legitimate representatives of Iran's emerging middle and lower classes.
Hence their destruction with the operations carried out in 1953 and 1954 marked the
inauguration of an authoritarian regime. These operations and the subsequent
combination of repression and co-optation kept the shah's popular opposition
effectively under control. However, in the 1950s and early 1960s the shah's autocratic
ambitions were still threatened from other sources. The most immediate of these
threats came from a series of military officers who attempted to oust the shah.
8.3.2. The Militar
The first was General Zahedi's whose ambitions were common knowledge. In
1953 when Zahedi was chosen to lead TPAJAX it was generally assumed by the CIA
that the shah would reign rather than rule and that effective control of the country
would be in the hands of Zahedi. The shah was evidently concerned about Zahedi's
ambitions from the very beginning. When Dennis Wright was sent to Tehran as charge
in December 1953 to reopen the British embassy the shah sounded him out about the
British attitude toward Zahedi. Throughout 1954 the shah continually asked the British
and American ambassadors whether they supported Zahedi. The shah travelled to the
United States and Britain in December 1954. When the issue of Zahedi's tenure in
office was not brought up the shah apparently believed he had received a green light
from these two countries to remove Zahedi. He did so in April 1955.
The second threat from the military came in March 1958. A group of reform-
minded officers led by General Garaneh (the head of army G-2) and apparently
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associated with Amini and Arsanjani 51
 organised a coup which came within two days of
succeeding. The shah somehow got wind of the plot and managed to break it up.
Garaneh and some of his collaborators were given short prison terms. Amini and
Arsanjani were briefly detained but soon managed to fall back into favour with the
shah.
The third threat to the shah from the military came from Bakhtiar. As chief of
SAVAK, Bakhtiar had probably the second most powerful man in Iran by 1960. The
shah was by this time alert to the threat from powerful subordinate, and managed to fire
him in early 1961. Bakhtiar then begun to conspire with other retired officers and
Iranian political figures. He was forced to flee Iran in January 1962, amid rumours of a
coup attempt. From exile in Europe, Beirut, and Baghdad, Balchtiar apparently
continued to plot against the shah. Balchiar was killed in a hunting accident in 1970.
There is little doubt that he was actually executed by SAVAK.52
8.3.3. The Land-owning Aristocracy and The Clergy
The reform programme of the early 1960s also enabled the shah to strike at the
two remaining sources of potential opposition to his rule: the landed upper class and the
clergy. Much of the power of the land-owning class lay in its ability to deliver the votes
of the peasantry in the Majles elections. By breaking up the large feudal estates, the
shah severed the peasant-landlord relationship and rendered the landowner class largely
powerless.53 In fact, the land reform programme took this process one step further. By
decreeing that the large estates should be sold to the government at a reasonable price
for resale to the peasants rather than simply expropriated, the shah in effect converted
the land-owning aristocracy into a new bourgeoisie. Since the state took a leading role
in the economy through the Development Plans, this new bourgeoisie was subordinate
to the state and hence to the shah.
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The reforms of the early 1960s also singled the emergence of a confrontation
between the shah and the conservative clergy. The clergy had traditionally relied on
large endowed estates as an important source of revenue. By breaking up these estates
the shah seriously undercut the power of the clergy in this regard. A number of other
reforms enacted under the White Revolution, including most notably the
enfranchisement of women, conflicted directly with Shi'ite doctrine and threatened to
undermine the hold of the clergy on Iranian society. It was, in fact, the issues of land
reform and the enfranchisement of women that sparked the demonstrations in 1963 led
by Khomeini.54
Although the clergy were hurt by these measures and the wave of arrests which
followed the 1963 demonstrations, there was a limit to the damage which the shah
could inflict on it. Short of destroying every mosque in Iran and arresting all of the
mullahs (who numbered in the hundreds of thousands), it was simply not possible to
eliminate the clergy as a political force. A further impediment to the shah in this regard
was the close relationship between the Iranian Shi'ite community and that in
neighbouring Iraq. The shah had very bad relations with the Iraqi government
throughout much of this reign, and the latter were eager to help religious leaders such as
Khomeini who passed a threat to the shah. In the conclusion of this study it will be
argued that these unique factors enabled the clergy to assume the leadership of the
revolutionary upheaval that emerged in the late 1970s.
Since the land-owning aristocracy and the top layer of the clerical hierarchy had
formed the backbone of Iran's traditional ruling class, these measures enabled the shah
henceforth to act with virtually no opposition from Iran's upper class. Where the coup
of 1953 and the subsequent repression of the National Front and the Tudeh party had
marked the establishment of an authoritarian regime, the land reform programme of the
early 1960s signalled the relative autonomy of the shah's state from the upper classes.
With the inauguration of this programme in January 1963 and the bloody suppression
of the June 1963 riots, the shah had eliminated all immediate sources of opposition to
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his rule by the end of 1963. The process of transition toward an authoritarian and
relatively autonomous client had been completed.
8.4. Cliency and Dictatorship in Iran
This chapter has outlined the steps taken by the United States to secure Iran as a
client state and the repressive and cooptative measures used by the shah to neutralise
his opposition. It is important now to clarify the relationship between these two basic
themes. By summarising how US policy contributed to the establishment of the shah's
dictatorship, this section recapitulates the basic argument of this study: that policies
designed to promote stability in a client country can instead promote authoritarianism
and relative autonomy.
The single most important aspect of US policy toward Iran in this regard was
the CIA-led operation to overthrow Mossadeq. The implications of this operation for
Iran's domestic politics were discussed at some length in the last section of chapter 6.
The overthrow of Mossadeq and the wave of arrests which followed removed the
National Front from power and destroyed it as an effective political force. In its place
was installed a dictatorship led by Zahedi and the shah. The National Front had
emerged in the late 1940s as the democratic movement which first appeared with the
constitutional uprising of the early twentieth century. It was the political embodiment
of the new middle class which began to emerge in the 1920s and 1930s under Reza
Shah. By destroying Mossadeq and the National Front, the CIA-led coup of 1953 cut
short a process of transition to democracy and frustrated the political aspirations of this
new class.
Within weeks of the coup the United States provided Iran with at least $73
million through the Point Four aid program, the CIA, and through ordinary foreign aid
channels. This was followed in the next decade with an additional $900 million in aid
grants and $200-300 million in loans, which together accounted for about 21 percent of
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expenditures by the Iranian government in that period. Between August 1953 and
November 1954 US aid accounted for roughly 60 percent of the expenditures of the
Zahedi government. Given the chaos in Iran in this period, the absence of any popular
support for the Zahedi government, and the efforts made by it to restore order and
solidify its domestic position, this aid program can only be regarded as having played a
major role in the establishment of the shah-Zahedi dictatorship.
While US aid declined somewhat as a percentage of government expenditures in
the following decade, it continued to play an important role in the shah's consolidation
of power. Most of this aid was used to finance economic development projects and the
modernisation of the shah's military and security forces. Inasmuch as these
development projects and the security apparatus were fundamental pillars of the shah's
dictatorship, US aid in this way made an important contribution to the consolidation of
this dictatorship. Moreover, the US aid programs in Iran also included substantial
technical advice and training. Hence they contributed not only to the financing of the
main institutions used by the shah to consolidate his rule but also to the particular form
they took and their efficiency and effectiveness as political instruments. Finally, there
is some evidence that US aid to Iran was used by the shah to extend his political
influence through patronage and corruption.
For the purposes of this study the single most important aspect of the US aid
program in Iran after the 1953 coup was the assistance given to the shah's security
forces. This began immediately after the coup with the mission of the US military
attaché and continued into the early 1960s. The shah's security forces evolved under
this program from a poorly-organised and ineffective apparatus divided among the
National Police, the Gendarmerie, and military intelligence to the modern, efficient
organisation centralised under SAVAK. By the early 1960s SAVAK had become the
single most important pillar of the shah's dictatorship. It penetrated and disrupted
opposition organisations and undermined their based of support by coopting and
demobilising their constituencies. To the extent that US training and assistance for
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SAVAK and its predecessors made them more effective, this aspect of US policy
toward Iran had obvious and important implications for its domestic politics.
There can be little doubt that the actions just summarised which took place
under the US-Iran cliency relationship played a significant role in the establishment and
consolidation of the shah's dictatorship. However, a variety of other factors can be
mentioned which also contributed to dictatorship in Iran. The British oil blockade
created severe economic problems which weakened Mossadeq's base of support.
Conversely, the rapid growth of Iran's oil wealth after November 1954 helped the shah
finance development programs and other projects which served to coopt unrest. Iran
did not have a long-standing democratic tradition. Although there was a emerging
modern middle class, social and political conditions such as the low level of literacy,
the entrenched power of the land-owning aristocracy, the pro-Soviet orientation of the
Tudeh party, the broad appeal of Islam, and the mosaic of tribal and ethnic loyalties
hindered prospects for democracy in Iran.
If other factors thus contributed to dictatorship in Iran, can it be said that the
role of cliency was crucial? Furthermore, how does cliency compare in importance to
these other causal factors?
The evidence presented in this and the previous chapter indicates that cliency
did play a crucial role in the establishment of dictatorship in Iran. The CIA planned and
carried out the operation that removed Mossadeq from office. Although Iranians were
involved in this operation, they were subordinate to the CIA team which implemented
it. As the operation unfolded the shah fled the country in panic and Zahedi took refuge
in a CIA safe house. The British oil blockade also made a contribution to Massage's
downfall. However, as was argued in chapter 5, while Mossadeq may well have fallen
in the absence of a CIA coup, the dictatorship that emerged under Zahedi and the shah
was probably the least likely alternative to Mossadeq. US economic aid kept the
Zahedi government afloat for fifteen months until oil exports were resumed. The
303
conclusion that the United States was instrumental in installing the shah's dictatorship
thus appears inescapable.
Once the shah was firmly established in power, US economic aid and security
assistance played an important, though perhaps not crucial, role in keeping him there.
Although Iran's yearly oil revenues first surpassed US aid receipts in 1956, they
remained of comparable magnitude until 1962 when they finally exceeded twice the
dollar value of US aid (see table 8.1). Hence US aid continued to be an important
source of funding for development projects and other mechanisms of co-optation
through the early 1960s. US training for the shah's security forces certainly made them
more effective as instruments of repression. However, it cannot be said with any
certainty that they could not have been effective in this regard without US assistance.
Hence while US aid was important in maintaining the shah in power in the late 1950s
and early 1960s, domestic factors also worked in his favour at this time.
How does cliency compare in importance to other factors which helped to
promote dictatorship in Iran? Of the many influences on Iranian politics in the early-
and mid-1950s, only three were novel and of sufficient importance to bring about such
a dramatic change in the type of regime: the British oil embargo, the renewal of oil
exports in late 1954, and the establishment of the cliency relationship.
As discussed in chapter 7, while the British oil blockade undoubtedly
contributed to the downfall of Mossadeq, any of a number of other leaders could have
emerged in his place as a result. By contrast, the CIA operation TPAJAK which
inaugurated the cliency relationship was undertaken not only to remove Mossadeq from
power but also to install a particular regime under Zahedi and the shah. Hence while
the oil blockade helped undermine Mossadeq, it did not in any direct way lead to the
establishment of a dictatorship.
Similarly, the influx of oil revenues after November 1954 certainly helped the
shah consolidate his dictatorship. However, this income did not reach high levels until
some eighteen months after Mossadeq was ousted. By this time the National Front and
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the Tudeh party had been thoroughly crushed (with substantial US assistance) and the
shah was firmly in power. Thus while oil revenues helped the shah further to
consolidate his regime, much of this process had already taken place by the time they
become available.
Other factors, such as Iran's comparatively weak democratic tradition and the
social and political conditions mentioned above, also contributed to dictatorship in Iran.
However, these factors were not new in the early 1950s. They did not stop Mossadeq
from establishing himself firmly in power and had not prevented the emergence in the
1940s of democratic institutions such as representative parties and a free press.
Moreover, the social and economic development which occurred in Iran in the 1940s
and early 1950s and the experience of the Mossadeq era can only have strengthened the
social and political bases for democracy in Iran. Hence while these factors may have
contributed in a general way to the establishment of the shah's dictatorship, they can
only have played a background role.
The question of whether cliency was more important than other factors as a
cause of dictatorship in Iran can only be answered definitively through a detailed
analysis of the dynamics of Iranian politics. However, on the basis of this discussion it
appears to have played a more important role than any other factor mentioned here. If
this is true, what then were the long-term implications of the policy of engaging Iran in
a cliency relationship? This question will be the principal issue addressed in the
conclusion of this study.
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York Press, 1980), ch. 4.
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CONCLUSION
1. General
This study examined the characteristics of US security policy. Consequently this
study has argued that the key US foreign and security policy makers, by engaging Iran
in a cliency relationship, helped undermine a process of transition toward democracy in
Iran and helped install an authoritarian, relatively autonomous client state under the
leadership of the late shah through security assistance and economic aids. The concepts
of great power - small power and patron - client state relationships were introduced in
chapter 1. In chapter 2 a theoretical framework was developed for investigating the
impact of cliency on the client's domestic politics. In chapter 3 and 4, the
characteristics of US foreign and security policy making process were developed for
providing general concept of analysis on US and Iran relations. Chapter 5 gave an
overview of Iranian politics in the era before the US-Iran cliency relationship was
begun. In chapter 6 the history of US-Iranian relations was discussed and US interests
in Iran in the late 1940s and early 1950s were examined.
The main brunt of the argument presented here came in chapters 7 and 8. Chapter
7 detailed the US role in the 1953 coup and the implications of this coup for Iranian
politics, building on the material presented in chapter 5. Chapter 8 outlined the kinds
of assistance provided by the United States to Iran under the cliency relationship and
the mechanisms used by the shah to consolidate and maintain his dictatorship. The last
section of chapter 8 brought these two themes together by discussing how the assistance
provided under the cliency relationship facilitated this process of consolidation.
If the basic argument of this study is accepted, what then were the long-term
implications of the policy of establishing Iran as a US client state? The immediate
implications for domestic politics in Iran are clear: after Zahedi and the shah were
installed in power in 1953 a twenty-five year period of repressive and often brutal
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dictatorship ensued as we examined in the case study of US and Iran relations. But
what role, if any, did cliency ultimately play in the constellation of social forces that led
to the 1978-79 revolution? Furthermore, if cliency did contribute in some manner to
revolution in Iran, what general conclusions can be drawn for alternative US foreign
and security policy recommendations towards the Third World countries in the new
global systems and her national conditions?
Through the case study of US and Iran relations, this study examined several
aspects on the US security policy making process. First, US foreign and security policy
has been inclined to pursue the national interest rather than American philosophy and
ideology. Accordingly the US policy makers regarded the coup of 1953 against
Mossadeq nationalist government as a major triumph of covert action in terms of US
security interests. They perceived the results of the coup as positive: Iran became
unambiguously a client ally of the US: in addition, the coup not only restored power a
pro-Western government, but more significantly restored to control over Iran's oil
production to the West. Within one year of the coup, a new consortium of Western oil
interests was created to manage Iranian oil. This agreement marked the beginning of
US economic interests in Iran, interests that would intensify during the next twenty-five
years. I Second, during establishment procedures of the cliency relationship with Iran,
most of the related institutions were involved in developing the policies. As we
discussed in chapter 6, in October 1946 and early 1948, JCS and the Department of
Defense considered Iran and its oil supplies to be of major US strategic interest. Also in
November 1951, NSC expressed the same opinion. Due to these conceptions Truman
as a decision maker determined Iran as a strategic position to contain the threat of
Soviet Union expansionism. As examined in the chapter 7, although the coup, of 1953
was initiated by the CIA covertly, the planning of the coup was discussed by top
diplomats in the State Department and high-ranking CIA officials. After the coup
besides the State Department and DOD, key senators in congress also played an active
role in developing the cliency relationship via increased military and economic aid as
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discussed in chapter 8. Third, even though US foreign and security policy seems to
vary with different presidents and public opinions which change according to different
circumstances, the policy towards Iran for establishing and maintaining the cliency
relationship has remained constant. After the 1953 coup, $73 million in economic aid
was given to the Zahedi government in the first three weeks after the event. Also,
under the Nixon doctrine, to attempt to establish Iran as 'the policeman of Persian Gulf'
some of sophisticated weapons were permitted to the shah. US sales of military
hardware to Iran between 1971 and 1977 totalled more than $ 11.8 billion.' Even under
Carter's 'human rights' administration, and despite his criticism of president Ford's
arms sales to Iran during the 1976 nationally televised presidential election debate, after
entering the White House the policy towards Iran never changed.
To conclude, US foreign and security policy towards Iran cannot be understood in
isolation, but must be considered in the global context. After World War II, the US
emerged as the economic military and political dominant superpower. Therefore her
interventions toward the Third World countries are inevitable aspects to maintain the
global order. However, the key US policy makers in the cold war era have been
inclined to pursue US national interest rather than national ideology and her philosophy.
The result of the inclination of the US policy makers concentrations on the national
interest was the failure of some relationships in the Third World countries. One of the
strongest examples is the cliency relationship between US and Iran lasting 25 years
after 1953. As examined in the case study, the disregard of the Iranian internal political
situation and the consistent support for the shah's dictatorship provoked anti-American
emotion. These facts are one of the major reasons which facilitated the Iranian
revolution.
Presently the status of the US in world politics can no longer be seen as
hegemonic, compared with the previous cold war era. The US security policy towards
Third World countries should be changed based on the new global system and her
national conditions. Based on this new system and the lessons of the case study, to
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avoid re-iterating the failures of the cold war era, the next section will suggest
alternative recommendations for US security policy makers. In third section of this
conclusion, the impact for Iranian politics will be considered
2. The impact on Iranian Politics
By the early 1960s, the state in Iran had become sufficiently autonomous and
authoritarian that it could act against the interests of any group in society without regard
for countervailing political pressures. Two profoundly important events occurred in
1963 which made this eminently clear. First, in January 1963 the shah announced plans
for a far-reaching land reform program. As discussed in chapter 8, this programme
devastated the political base of the dominant, land-owning class by breaking the feudal
bonds which had previously linked peasants to their landlords. Second, after the
gradual relaxation of sanctions against open political activity beginning in 1960, the
shah responded to the June 1963 uprisings by re-imposing the harsh measures which
had hitherto prevailed. The ease with which this was accomplished indicated clearly
how little power vis-à-vis the state the lower and middle classes actually possessed.
In addition to these dramatic events, the state's autonomy from domestic political
pressures had an important bearing on its policies in a variety of other areas. Of
perhaps greatest concern was its economic policy. The shah's Development Plans
promoted large-scale, capital-intensive industrialisation at the expense of agriculture
and basic industry, resulting in the development of high-prestige projects such as
nuclear power plants, steel mills, and petrochemical complexes were built. These
projects were poorly-suited to Iran's economic conditions. They provided little
employment for Iran's large unskilled workforce but required large numbers of skilled
technicians and engineers, most of whom were recruited in the United States and
Europe. Domestic unemployment was aggravated by the land reform program and by
the general neglect of agriculture, which reduced rural employment and led to massive
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urban migration. Much of this industrialisation was export-oriented and did little to
satisfy Iran's growing demand for cheap consumer goods. These new industries used a
relatively small proportion of domestically-produced inputs. The results of these facts
was large bottlenecks and imports increasing at a rapid rate.3
The relative autonomy of the state enabled the shah to pursue ill-suited and
unpopular policies in a variety of other areas as well. Despite occasional opposition
from the United States, the shah sought to build up Iran's armed forces to the point
where they could credibly engage the Soviet Union. Billions of dollars were spent on
weapons each year in the 1970s and tens of thousands of foreign advisors, most of them
American, were brought to Iran to provide training and support. 4 The shah also sought
to Westernise and secularise Iran. Virtually every aspect of state policy had a Western
orientation. Western culture, particularly American culture, became increasingly
visible. The shah pursued policies such as land reform and the enfranchisement of
women which were an anathema to the orthodox Islamic community. In the late 1970s
he withdrew millions of dollars in subsidies which had helped support the Shi'ite
clergy. Much of the shah's foreign policy, such as his close relationship with Israel and
his support of the Oman government against the Dhofar rebellion, was also quite
unpopular.
As in the cases discussed in section 3 of chapter 2, the cliency relationship
increased the relative autonomy of the state in Iran which enabled the shah to pursue
economic policies and policies in other areas that served neither the interests of the
established upper classes nor those of the lower and middle classes. No internal
pressures of any kind existed to force the shah to pursue policies that suited Iran's
needs. This had ominous long-term implications for Iranian politics.
It is obviously beyond the scope of this study to give a detailed analysis of the
origins of the Iranian revolution. Most writers have focused on the unique ability of the
Shi'ite clergy to mobilise latent popular unrest. 5 Defenders of the shah speak of
communist subversion and suggest that the pace of modernisation was too rapid.6
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Ironically, the shah himself accused the United States and Britain of fomenting unrest
and opposition to his rule.7
Regardless of where blame is ultimately laid for the Iranian revolution, there can
be no doubt that popular revulsion at the shah's policies played a key role. Despite
reports that Iran's oil resources would be depleted by the end of the century, the shah
continued to spend heavily on sophisticated military equipment and high-prestige
industrial projects. These expenditures increased dramatically after oil prices began to
rise in the late 1960s. Corruption among high government officials and members of the
royal family grew rampant. The shah and his close associates enjoyed an increasingly
extravagant lifestyle, symbolised most notably by the lavish Persepolis celebrations of
1971, which reportedly cost $100 million. 8 However, despite high growth rates, very
little of Iran's wealth reached the impoverished majority. The slums of Tehran and
other major cities became bloated in the 1970s. Income inequality worsened and the
literacy rate remained under 50 percent.9
Ironically, Iran's economic situation became worse in the late 1970s, despite the
great influx of oil revenues after 1973. The quadrupling of oil prices in that year led the
shah to draw up overly-ambitious plans for economic development and modernisation
of the armed forces. By 1976 large deficits forced the shah to implement stringent
austerity measures and even borrow in foreign capital markets. The shah's elaborate
spending plans caused severe economic bottlenecks and a substantial increase in the
inflation rate. The continued neglect of agriculture led millions of peasants to migrate
to the cities and forced Iran to import growing quantities of food.
These economic problems were a fundamental cause of unrest among Iran's lower
and middle classes in the late 1970s. 1° Beyond these economic problems, the continued
absence of meaningful forms of political participation and the increasingly frequent
human rights abuses further alienated the liberal opposition, which began to agitate
against the shah. The growing trends of Westernisation and secularisation outraged the
more devout Muslims and led the clergy to become increasingly vocal.
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Ultimately, neither the liberal opposition nor the clergy really "led" the Iranian
revolution. The inheritors of the National Front were poorly-organised and divided
among themselves, as was indicated by their subsequent failure to prevent the
conservative clergy from assuming complete control. The clergy was also poorly-
organised and divided. Ayatollah Khomeini, whose fiery speeches and role in the 1963
demonstrations made him the most prominent member of the clerical opposition, had
not been inside Iran for almost fifteen years. The Islamic Republican Party, which now
holds power in Iran, was not even formed until after the revolution.
The liberal opposition did serve to catalyse the opposition by circulating petitions
and organising demonstrations in the years before the revolution. The clergy, by virtue
of the importance of Shi'a Islam in Iranian culture and the protection afforded it by the
mosques (which the shah's forces could not easily penetrate), was able to mobilise
certain segments of Iranian society, notably the urbanised peasants who later formed the
main social base of the post-revolutionary Islamic regime. However, neither the liberal
opposition nor the clergy had in any sense prepared for a revolution. It was only in the
fall of 1978 that the anti-shah demonstrations took on the appearance of a revolutionary
upheaval rather than simply popular unrest. The Iranian revolution was an outburst
from the very belly of Iran, guided but not led by the clergy and the liberal opposition,
which expiated the shah but had neither the foresight nor the leadership to replace him
with a regime that was more just and forward-looking.
3. Alternative recommendations for US security policy
A fundamental reason for engaging Iran as a US client was to make that country
more stable. However, if cliency played a significant role in making the state more
autonomous and authoritarian in Iran, and if these consequences in turn set the stage for
revolution, then the policy of establishing Iran as a US client created a serious paradox 
for US foreign and security policymakers: while cliency had undoubtedly made Iran
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more stable in the short term, its long-term result was quite the opposite. Furthermore,
not only was Iran suddenly unstable after twenty-five years of cliency, it was virulently
anti-American as well. A policy that in the 1950s and 1960s seemed beneficial for US
security interests to assist the containment policy, appeared by the end of 1979 to have
been extremely short-sighted.
If such a paradox is inherent in cliency relationships, are there ways in which the
patron can achieve the same general goals without producing these undesirable
consequences? Three possible scenarios are discussed below.
The first is to escalate the cliency relationship. After the Iranian revolution, critics
of the Carter Administration charged that it had "lost Iran" by failing to provide
appropriate assistance to the shah in his hour of need. Similar charges were made with
respect to the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua. The idea behind these charges was
that the governments in question could have been kept afloat if the United States had
given them sufficient assistance in the form of military and economic aid, or perhaps by
military intervention. While it is possible that US assistance could have saved these
governments, it is doubtful that anything short of a prolonged US military occupation
would have been adequate. This kind of "Vietnam solution" would have been
extremely unpopular in the United States , and hence very difficult to implement. It
would not, in any case, have improved prospects for a transition to democracy in these
countries.
A second possibility is to cease involvement in cliency relationships altogether.
Isolationism of this kind is so unpopular in the United States today that it can be ruled
out as a practical alternative to cliency. The global interests acquired by the United
States in the post-war era simply could not be maintained without key clients such as
South Korea, the Philippines, and Panama. Furthermore, in the absence of concrete
measures to build strong democratic institutions, simply abrogating cliency
relationships with countries such as these could lead to the collapse of their
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governments under praetorian onslaughts such as the one which toppled the shah. A
more deliberate and peaceful process of transition is clearly preferable.
A third possibility which may hold more promise involves using the leverage
inherent in military and economic aid and other transfers occurring under a cliency
relationship to pressure the client government into implementing social and political
reforms. This approach was, in fact, pursued for a brief period in the early 1960s in
Iran when the Kennedy Administration exerted pressure on the shah to enact certain
reforms." Leverage of this kind can be used to force the client government to stop
abuses of power, thus directly countering some of the undesirable consequences of
cliency. It can also be used to promote democratic institutions such as representative
parties and free elections, as well as social reforms such as literacy and public education
programs which can enhance the long-term prospects for democracy.
There are some problems in this approach. First, the patron may be heavily
dependent on the client for services such as the provision of military and security bases
which are of vital importance to the patron. By threatening to withdraw these services,
the client can effectively block attempts by the patron to pressure it. 12 Second, in
promoting political liberalisation, this kind of pressure may also promote nationalist
sentiments in the client country which are opposed to the cliency relationship or in
other ways conflict with the interests of the patron. Nonetheless, these problems do not
discount the overall value of the third approach. It is a question of balancing carefully
the various trade-offs. The third approach is in fact the only alternative to the kind of
disastrous long-term consequences of cliency which occurred in Iran.
In conclusion it has become apparent from this study that there are two distinct, but
closely related aspects of cliency, the external and the domestic, which evolve
differently as the patron-client relationships. This relationship can be seen to have two
phases. The first phase when the client became less autonomous in its relationship with
the patron but domestically becomes more autonomous vis-a-vis society. In this case
1953 to 1963 would cover this phase. In the second phase starting from 1963 Iran is
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able to become less dependent on its patron, the US but at the same time losses its
domestic autonomy, as seen by the rise domestic.
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2	 Melvin Gurtov, Roots of Failure: United States Policy in the Third World (London: Greenwood
Press, 1985), pp. 86-88.
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